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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is the provision of the Divorce Decree requiring 
Defendant-Appellant, hereinafter referred to as "Husband", to 
pay the house payment actually alimony so that it is subject 
to modification upon a showing of a material change of circum-
stances? 
2. If so, has there been a mater:ai change of cir-
cumstances since the granting of the Divorce Decree so as to 
warrant the termination of said house payments by Husband? 
3. Plaintiff-Respondent, hereinafter referred to as 
"Wife11, does not agree that Husband's Statement of Issues accur-
ately sets forth the actual issues in this case, but Wife will 
address each of said purported issues in her Brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal by Husband from an Order denying 
his Petition to modify the provision of the original Decree 
of Divorce which required him to pay monthly house payments. 
2. Course of the Proceedings. 
The parties were divorced from each other pursuant 
to a Decree of Divorce which became final on May 20, 1983. 
Husband filed a Petition to modify said Decree of Divorce which 
was heard October 3, 1984 by the Honorable Douglas L Cornaby, 
one of the Judges of the Second Judicial District Court of 
Davis County, Utah. 
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3. Disposition in the District Court. 
The Honorable Douglas L Cornaby denied Husband's 
Petition to modify the Decree of Divorce. 
4. Statement of Material Facts. 
The parties were divorced from each other pursuant 
to a Decree of Divorce which became final on May 20, 1983 
(R. 53-57), Said decree was granted pursuant to an oral stip-
ulation of the parties and said decree provided, inter alia, 
that Wife was awarded custody of the three children of the 
parties and Husband was ordered to pay $200.00 per month for 
the support of each of said children (R. 54). Wife was awarded 
no alimony, she having waived her right to either past, present, 
or future alimony (R. 56). Wife was awarded the marital home 
located at 55 South 4th West, Kaysville, Utah, subject to a 
lien in favor of Husband in the sum of $12,340.00 which shall 
become due and payable upon the happening of any of the 
following events: 
(a) The remarriage of Wife, or 
(b) Another adult male living in the 
home, or 
(c) Wife's no longer using the premises 
as a principal place of residence, or 
(d) At such time as the youngest child of 
the parties reaches the age of majority, or 
(e) At such time as the home might be sold. 
-3-
Husband was also ordered to pay the house payments on the 
Kaysville home in the sum of $276.00 per month until such 
time as any of the five conditions set forth above might occur 
(R. 55). 
Although the divorce decree was granted pursuant to 
oral stipulation of the parties, it is evident that Husband 
clearly understood all of the provisions he had agreed to in-* 
asmuch as he, as well as his counsel, subsequently signed 
both the original Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
the original Decree of Divorce "APPROVED AS TO FORM" (R. 52 
and R. 57). 
The Findings of Fact of the trial court set forth 
that Husband was employed at Ford, Bacon and Davis, earning 
approximately $33,240.00 per year at the time of the Divorce 
Decree, and that Wife was unemployed at that time but she was 
then "seeking a teaching job" (R. 48) so that it was clearly 
contemplated that she would shortly be employed. 
Since the granting of the divorce decree, Husband has 
remarried and his present wife is the non-custodial parent of 
three children for whom she is under court order to pay $1.00 
per month for each of the three children, for a total of $36.00 
per year (T. 18). Husband's second wife also has joint custody 
of a child by yet another marriage and she is under an order 
to pay $1.00 per month for the support of that child also (T. 19). 
None of these children have been adopted by Husband (T. 18). 
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Since the granting of the divorce decree, Wife has 
become employed as a teacher (T. 11) as it was contemplated 
she would pursuant to paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact 
(R. 48) and she presently has an income of $15,100.00 per year 
as a teacher (T. 30). 
Since the granting of the divorce decree, Husband's 
income has gone up by $1,000.00 per year to a present annual 
income of $34,100.00 (T. 3). 
Within approximately two years after the divorce of 
the parties, Husband, on July 5, 1984, filed his Petition to 
modify the Decree of Divorce in several respects. The only 
change he is pursuing, in this appeal is a termination of 
his obligation to make the monthly house payment. He claims 
this is actually alimony (R. 71) and that there has been a 
substantial change in the circumstances of the parties, in 
that Wife is now employed and that he has remarried. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The provision in the divorce decree requiring 
Husband to pay the monthly house payment is not alimony, fgr 
the following reasons: 
(a) The parties intended that there be no 
alimony and by their express agreement all alimony 
was waived. 
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(b) A court order is not alimony simply 
because it is not a sum certain and is terminable 
on certain contingencies. Clear-cut examples of 
such orders which the court considers to be property 
settlement rather than alimony include the follow-
ing: 
(1) Periodic payments of retirement 
benefits. 
(2) The payment of Class Q allotments. 
(3) Payments on debts and purchases 
such as automobiles, etc. 
(c) The characteristics of the order in this 
case that Husband pay the monthly house payments 
are not the same characteristics as that of alimony. 
The divorce decree provides that Husband's obligation 
to pay the house payments will terminate at such 
time as another adult male lives in the home, when 
Wife no longer uses the premises as her principal 
place of residence, when the youngest child reaches 
the age of majority, or when the home is sold. 
None of these are the times at which alimony 
characteristically terminates. 
(d) The Utah cases hold that for purposes of 
modification of a divorce decree, a husbandTs re-
sponsibility to make mortgage payments will be 
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considered a property settlement and not alimony. 
2. Should the Court hold that the responsibility 
of Husband to make the house payments is actually alimony, 
there has been no substantial material change of circumstances 
so as to warrant a termination of such !falimonyM payment;;, 
for the following reasons : 
(a) Husband's only change of circumstances 
since the granting of the decree consist of an 
increase in his salary of $1,000.00 and the fact 
that he has married a woman who has a responsi-
bility to pay $1.00 per month support for each 
of three children not in her custody, and she has 
joint custody of another child for whom she is 
responsible to pay another $1.00 per month. The 
Utah cases hold that subsequent obligations volun-
tarily acquired should not reduce obligations under 
a prior divorce decree. 
(b) The fact that Wife is now employed, 
whereas she was unemployed at the time of the 
divorce decree, is not a material change of circum-
stances, inasmuch as the employment of Wife was 
contemplated by both of the parties and the court 
at the time the original Decree of Divorce was 
granted. There was a specific finding of fact 
that the Wife was at that time seeking employment 
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as a teacher and everyone recognized that she 
would not be able to support herself and children 
solely on the child support she would receive, 
without supplementary income from her own employ-
ment. 
3. The divorce decree should not be amended on the 
basxs that the Husband now feels the original divorce decree 
was not equitable. Relief from such alleged inequity should 
have been pursued by the timely appeal of the divorce decree 
itself. 
4. Any claim by Husband that he was confused or 
did not understand the provisions of the divorce decree are 
without merit, inasmuch as he was represented by competent 
legal counsel and not only did his attorney sign both the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
"APPROVED AS TO FORM", but so also did defendant himself. 
5. Husband's claim that the original divorce decree 
was inequitable because when he makes the house payments he 
receives less than half of the total assets, is not valid, in-
asmuch as Utah cases hold that it is not necessary that there 
be an equal division of the assets. 
6. Utah cases hold that it is not necessary for 
the divorce court to investigate in detail each property 
settlement agreement reached by the parties, particularly 
when represented by competent legal counsel, and the cases 
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hold that it is not necessary for the "courts to question 
the wisdom of a contract made by the parties". In any 
given case, there may be other considerations, known or 
unknown to the Court, which the parties have taken into 
account (such as the waiving of *limo*»v as in this case), 
and the parties should be able to so contract if they desire. 
7. The Court does not have a duty in an order to 
show cause proceeding to remedy an inequitable agreement 
reached by the parties when represented by competent legal 
counsel, inasmuch as such remedy should have been sought by 
a timely appeal of the divorce decree to the Supreme Court. 
ARGUMENT 
In the case of Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 
1218 (1980), this Court stated: 
"In a divorce case, even though the proceed-
ings are equitable and this Court may review the 
evidence, this Court accords considerable defer-
ence to the findings and judgment of the trial 
court due to its advantageous position. On appeal, 
this Court will not disturb the action of the 
trial court unless the evidence clearly prepon-
derates to the contrary, or the trial court has 
abused its discretion, or misapplied principles 
of law." 
There is no evidence in this case that the trial court 
has abused its discretion, or misapplied principles of law. 
The applicable statutory authority is that portion of 
Title 30-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which reads as follows: 
"The court shall ha^e continuing jurisdiction 
to make subsequent changes or new orders with re-
spect to the support and maintenance of the parties, 
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the custody of the children and their support, 
maintenance, and health and dental care, or the 
distribution of the property as shall be reasonable 
and ntpessary.ff 
The distinction between the right of the Court to 
modify support and alimony allowances and its right to modify 
property provisions of divorce decrees is set forth in the 
Utah case of Callistcr v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 
944 (1953), wherein this Court cites with approval the 
California case of Hough v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 160 P.2d 
15, wherein it is stated: 
MThis does not mean that payments under 
property settlement agreements may be modified 
even though incorporated in the decree. They 
may not (Citing cases.) But in such a situation 
there is not the same underlying policy. The 
settlement of property rights should be final in 
order to secure stability of titles. Support 
allowances on the other hand should be subject 
to the discretion of the court as justice may re-
quire * * * It has been loosely stated generally 
in passing that the divorce court has no juris-
diction to modify a decree based upon a property 
settlement agreement. (Citing cases, including 
Ettlinger v Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 144 P.2d 
540 Supra.) However, that does not mean that the 
Court does not have jurisdiction on an appli-
cation for modification to decide correctly or 
incorrectly whether the decree is based upon a 
property settlement agreement, and is not sub-
ject to modification, or is based upon alimony 
or support allowance covenants, and is subject 
to modification." 
This distinction between modification of alimony 
awards and the modification of property distributions is further 
clarified in the case of Foulger v. Foulger, Utah, 626 P.2d 
412, (1981). On page 414 of that decision, the Court states: 
-10-
MThe change in circumstances required to 
justify a modification of the decree of divorce 
varies with the type of modification contem-
plated . Provisions in the original decree of 
divorce granting alimony, child support, and the 
like must be readily susceptible to alteration 
at *\ later date, as the needs which such pro-
visions were designed to fill are subject to 
rapid and unpredictable change. Where a dis-
position of real property is in question, however, 
Courts should properly be more reluctant to grant 
a modifica ;ion. In the interest of securing 
stability in titles, modifications in a decree of 
divorce making disposition of real property are 
to be granted only upon a showing of compelling 
reasons arising from a substantial and material 
change in circumstances. (Citing Callister v. 
Callister, Supra) 
The above holds true a fortiori where the 
property disposition is the product of an agree-
ment and stipulation between the parties sanc-
tioned by the trial court. Such a provision 
is the product of an agreement bargained for by 
the parties. As such a trial court should sub-
sequently modify such a provision only with 
great reluctance, and based upon compelling 
reasons." 
It should be remembered that in the present case the 
provisions of the decree were made pursuant to stipulation of 
the parties wherein both agreed to each of the provisions. 
ISSUE I 
IS THE PROVISION OF THE DIVORCE DECREE REQUIRING 
HUSBAND TO PAY THE MONTHLY HOUSE PAYMENT ACTUALLY 
ALIMONY SO THAT IT IS SUBJECT TO MODIFICATION UPON 
A SHOWING OF A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES? 
One of the first factors to consider in determining 
whether the payment qf the house payment should be considered 
alimony is the intent of the parties themselves. It is very 
clear that they both intended there would be no alimony. 
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Paragraph 12 of the Conclusions of Latf (R. 51) and paragraph 12 
of the Decree of Divorce (R. 56) both state MThat the plaintiff 
waives her right to alimony, past, present, or future." From 
the beginning, Husband was adamant about not paying alimony to 
Wife. This was brought out at the modification hearing when 
Husband was asked, MAnd you violently objected to paying any 
alimony. You said you are not going -o pay any alimony, even 
though you have been married to this woman 12 years and you are 
earning $33,000.00, you would not agree to pay her one penny of 
alimony." Answer: "Because she was capable of working.11 
(T. 14) 
The trial court correctly perceived Husband's inten-
tions regarding the payment of alimony when it stated: 
"What it appears to the court to be is that 
the plaintiff was entitled to some alimony because 
-of the time of their marriage and the defendant 
was adamantly refusing to pay any alimony but he 
was agreeing for the sake of the children to do 
something different, which is, I will pay the 
house payment. That helps the kids. It doesn't 
help me any but it helps my ct-ldren. At the 
same time I will pay child support but I won't * 
pay alimony." (P. 38) 
Husband's claim that the requirement that he make 
the house payment is alimony because "it is not a sum certain 
but is terminable on certain contingencies" is not a valid 
argument. Divorce courts make many orders for the payment of 
sums which are not certain and are terminable on certain con-
tingencies, which are clearly not alimony awards. One such is 
an award of a portion of a husband's retirement benefits to a 
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wife. As set forth in the Utah case of Woodward v. Woodward, 
Utah, 656 P.2d 431 (1982), a husband may be ordered to pay to 
his wife a portion of his retirement benefits to be paid in 
monthly installments terminable upon the tmcertain contingency 
of his death. Such is clearly construed to be a property award 
which does not terminate upon the wife!s remarriage. 
Another example is the payment to a wife of a Class Q 
allotment which the Supreme Court of Idaho in the case of 
Perovitz v. Perovitz, 94 Idaho 453, 490 P.2d 320 (1971) con-
cluded was not alimony although it was paid monthly over a 
period of years. 
Another example of periodic payments a husband may 
be ordered to pay which are not alimony would be an order that 
husband make the monthly payment on an automobile awarded to 
the wife. 
Husband1s contention that the house payments amount 
"to an open ended alimony payment that is conditioned on the 
saim terms that alimony payments are conditioned upon" (R. 75) 
is not valid. The characteristics of alimony are that it ter-
minates at a specific time stated in the decree, or upon the 
wife's remarriage, or upon the husband's death, or at such time 
as the court may subsequently determine that a material change 
of circumstances warrant its termination. Only one of those 
characteristics (remarriage of wife) is the same as the condi-
tions in this case upon which Husband's responsibility to pay 
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the house payments is to terminate. The other conditions as 
set forth in paragraph 6 of the divorce decree (R. 55) are that 
no other adult male lives in the home, that she no longer 
uses the premises as her principal place of residence, that 
the youngest child reaches the age of majority, or that .he 
home is sold. None of these are the usual conditions on */hich 
alimony terminates. 
Another case of significance is the Utah case of 
Lyon v. Lyon, Utah, 206 P.2d 148 (1949), wherein a husband was 
ordered to pay, inter alia, a mortgage payment on certain land 
owned by the parties pursuant to a stipulated "property settle-
ment11 which was incorporated into the Decree of Divorce. There-
after, the husband sought to modify the divorce decree by ter-
minating his responsibility to make the said mortgage payments, 
and the trial judge at page 149 stated as follows: 
MAnd the court having determined that the 
provisions in the decree of divorce herein, of 
which modification is sought by said petition, 
are not orders for the payment of alimony but 
are accrued and vested judgments which this 
court has no jurisdiction to modify by reason 
of changed conditions11. 
The husband filed bankruptcy and attempted to dis-
charge his responsibility to make the said mortgage payments. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in its conclu-
sion that for bankruptcy purposes the obligation of the 
husband to make the mortgage payments was in the nature of 
alimony and was not dischargeable in bankruptcy, but the 
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Court cited with approval the trial court's prior determin-
ation that for purposes of modification of the decree the 
mortgage payments by husband would not be considered alimony. 
The court made this distinction at page 151 when it stated: 
"The issue in the former proceeding was 
whether the award was of such nature that it 
could be modified under Sec. 40-3-5, U.C.A. 
1943. The question now before us is whether 
the award was of such nature as to be dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy.M 
ISSUE II 
IF THE PROVISION REQUIRING HUSBAND TO PAY THE 
HOUSE PAYMENT IS ACTUALLY ALIMONY, HAS THERE 
BEEN A MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES SINCE 
THE GRANTING OF THE DIVORCE DECREE SO AS TO 
WARRANT A TERMINATION OF SAID HOUSE PAYMENTS 
BY HUSBAND? 
Wife, of course, contends that this issue is not 
applicable because the house payments are not actually 
alimony. For purposes of discussion, however, should it be 
considered that such payments are alimony, there has been 
no showing of a material change of circumstances so as to 
warrant the requested modification. 
Consideration will first be given to Husband's 
allegations of a change of his own circumstances. There has 
been no reduction in his income since the granting of the 
decree and, in fact, his annual income is now $34,100.00 which 
is $1,000.00 per year more than at the time the divorce decree 
was granted. His claim that he has now married a woman who 
has a responsibility to support four children is not valid. 
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His present wife has three children by a prior marriage who 
are in the custody of their natural father and for which their 
mother has an obligation to pay $1.00 per month per child for 
a total of $36.00 per year (T. 18). The new wife also has 
joint custody for a fourth child for which she is under order 
to pay $1.00 per month support. This responsibility for a 
total of $48.00 per year support obligation by Husband's 
present wife is certainly not such a material change of cir-
cumstances as to warrant a modification of the decree. 
Furthermore, under Utah law, subsequent obligations volun-
tarily acquired do not generally reduce obligations to 
make alimony payments under prior divorce decrees. See 
Carter v. Carter, Utah, 563 P.2d 177, (1977) wherein the Court 
states on page 7 as follows: 
MA similar observation applies to the 
defendant's contention that added financial 
obligations resulting from his remarriage 
should redound to his benefit herein. It is 
usually said that subsequent obligations 
voluntarily acquired should not reduce obli-
gations under a prior divorce decree.f! 
Husband's claim that the fact that Wife is now 
employed as a teacher, whereas she was unemployed at the time 
of the divorce decree, constitutes a material change of 
circumstances is without merit. A most significant factor is 
that although Wife was not employed when the divorce decree 
was granted, it was clearly contemplated that she would 
shortly be employed. This is evident from paragraph 7 of the 
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Findings of Fact, wherein the Court found as follows: 
n7. That the defendant is a well and 
able bodied person employed at Ford, Bacon 
and Davis of Salt Lake, and earns approx-
imately $33,240.00 per year; and that plaintiff 
is presently unemployed, but seeking a teach-
ing job," (Emphasis added) 
It was no doubt evident to the parties and to the 
Court that Wife could not support herself and three children 
on a total of $600.00 per month even though her house pay-
ment was to be made by Husband. It was clearly contemplated 
at that time that she would shortly be employed as a teacher, 
which, in fact, occurred as contemplated. The Utah cases 
are clear in holding that under such circumstances, even if 
there has been a material change of circumstances, the decree 
should not be modified. In the case of Felt v. Felt, 
27 Utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620 (1972), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated, at page 624: 
"....we affirm our previous pronouncements 
that a divorce decree containing awards for 
support based on either expressed or assumed 
facts contemplated by the parties or the 
court or both, should not be modified when the 
contemplated facts are obvious or agreed to by 
the parties and in turn incorporated in the 
decree, in which event the continuous juris-
diction of the Court to modify should not be 
used to thwart the expressed or obvious in-
tentions of the parties and/or the court--
unless such contemplated facts lead to mani-
fest injustice or unconscionable inequity." 
The Utah Court so held also, in the case of Allen v. 
Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021 (1970) wherein the 
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husband was seeking to modify the divorce decree by discontin-
uing the alimony of $200.00 per month. The Court found that 
at the date of the granting of the divorce, the wife was not 
employed, but contemplated securing employment within six 
months to assist her in adequately maintaining a home for 
herself and the minor child. The husband contended that the 
wife now had permanent employment and that this was a sub-
stantial change in the material circumstances of the parties. 
The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower 
court in refusing to modify on the basis that "the decree 
of divorce, when granted, contemplated that the plaintiff 
would secure employment and contribute to her own support.ff 
(P. 1022) 
A similar ruling was made in the case of Short v. 
Short, 25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 (1971), where the court 
stated, at page 55: 
"It appears obvious to us that the award 
in the decree was consistent with and based 
upon the assumption that Mrs. S. again would be 
able to obtain employment--otherwise, the trial 
court's socioeconomic philosophy would have been 
superficially inane." 
The trial court in the present case was clearly 
correct in finding that even if the payment of house pay-
ments was considered alimony, there had not been a material 
change of circumstances sufficient to justify terminating 
the Husband's responsibility to make the house payments. 
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HUSBAND'S PURPORTED ISSUE C^ 
IF THE HOUSE PAYMENT REQUIREMENT IS CHARACTERIZED 
AS A PROPERTY SETTLEMENT, SHOULD IT BE SUSPENDED 
DUE TO LACK OF CONSIDERATION, WHICH MAKES THE 
PAYMENT INEQUITABLE? 
Wife does not believe this is a legitimate issue in 
this case. It purports to take the position r.hat if the 
property settlement provisions of the divorce decree were in-
equitable, they should now be suspended. Had Husband felt 
that the decree as originally granted was not equitable, his 
remedy would have been an appeal of the original divorce decree 
to the Supreme Court within the time granted for appeals. This 
he did not do. Notwithstanding his claims that he may have 
been confused by the terms of the oral property settlement 
stipulation recited to the court at the time of the divorce 
hearing, both he and his attorney reviewed the proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce 
before they were submitted to the trial court for signature, 
and both he and his attorney signed the original Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce "APPROVED 
AS TO FORM11. (R. 52 & R. 57) 
Husband, in support of his argument, cites the case 
of Fletcher v. Fletcher (Utah) 615 P. 2d 1218 (1980;, for the 
proposition that in order for a cash payment to be classified 
as a property settlement rather than alimony in a Decree of 
Divorce, it must be paid to the other party as compensation 
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for real or personal property retained by the paying party 
and must be a sum certain. No specific reference is made in 
the said case for such a proposition and Wife suggests that 
no such proposition can be found in said case. The said case 
does, state, bowever, that it is not necessary that assets in 
a divorce be divided equally and it is also not required that 
for each asset given one party there must be given an 
adequate consideration to the other. The Court does state, 
on page 1222 that: 
MIn the division of marital property, the 
trial judge has wide discretion and his findings 
will not be disturbed unless the record indicates 
an abuse thereof." 
The Court then points out that the husband's con 
tention in that case that there must be an equalization of 
the assets is a fallacious argument. At page 1223 the Court 
stated: 
MIn continuation of his fallacious contention 
that t-here must be an equalization of the assets, 
defer iant argues each party should pay his own 
attc ney! s fees .If 
The case of Davis v. Davis, Utah, 655 P.2d 672 (1982), 
cited by Husband, is clearly distinguishable from the present 
case. The Davis case was an appeal directly from the original 
Decree of Divorce on the basis that the property division was 
inequitable. There was no property settlement agreement in 
that case and the trial court divided the property based on 
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the evidence presented at the* trial. In the present case, 
the parties themselves stipulated to the division of their 
assets, and the appeal is not from the original Decree of 
Divorce as in Davis, but is rather from a denial by the 
trial court to modify the original Decree of Divorce. In the 
present case, the Husband h* s apparently concluded long after 
the divorce decree was granted that it is inherently unfair 
and is now contending that on that basis it should be modi-
fied. The Utah case of Foulger v. Foulger (cited Supra) dealt 
with the same sort of a claim by a wife who sought to modify 
a Decree of Divorce because it was "inherently unfair", even 
though it had been stipulated to by the parties. The husband 
in that case contended, as set forth on page 414, that: 
"The property disposition in the original 
decree constituted a court-approved stipulation 
drafted by the parties dealing at arms length 
without duress or undue influence." 
The Supreme Court agreed and held that the original Decree 
should not be modified. In Joinp; so, the court stated, at 
page 414: 
"Where no appeal is taken from the original 
divorce decree, however, a change of circum-
stances must be shown in order to justify a 
later modification of such decree. Absent such 
a requirement, a decree of divorce would be 
subject to ad infinitum appellate review and 
readjustment according to the concepts of equity 
held by succeeding trial judges." 
Of further significance is the Utah case of Land 
v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 (1980), wherein the Court 
stated at page 1250: 
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"....when a decree is based upon a property 
settlement agreezsnt, forged by the parties and 
sanctioned by the court, equity must take such 
agreement into consideration. Equity is not 
available to reinstate rights and privileges 
voluntarily contracted a ,ay simply because one 
has come to regret the bargain made. Accord-
ingly, the law limits the continuing juris-
diction of the court vhere a property settle-
ment agreement has been incorporated into the 
decree, and the outrigtc abrogation of the 
provision of sucn an agreement is only to be 
resorted to with great1 reluctance and for com-
pelling reasons." 
It is submitted that no compelling reasons have been 
given for the abrogation of the provisions of the settlement 
agreement in this case. 
HUSBAND'S PURPORTED ISSUE D 
DOES THE TRIAL COURT HAVE A DUTY TO SEE THAT 
ALL AGREEMENTS BY THE PARTIES TO A DIVORCE 
ARE EQUITABLE WHETHER OR NOT THE PARTIES ARE 
REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL, AND SHOULD THE COURT 
HAVE DISCOVERED WHATEVER FACTS ARE NECESSARY 
TO MAKE SUCH A DETERMINATION? 
Wife does not believe this is a legitimate issue, 
but affirms that the answer to such question is no. Husband 
cites no cases in support of his position that the question 
should be answered in the affirmative. 
The Utah law on the subject is set forth by Justice 
Hall in his dissenting opinion in the case of LeBreton v. 
LeBreton, Utah, 604 P.2d 469, (1979) wherein he stated on 
page 472: 
"Admittedly, the agreement reached by the 
parties in settling their differences at the 
time their divorce was granted appears to be 
weighted in favor of plaintiff since it assures 
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her the return of all mortgage payments made 
after the date of the divorce, plus one-half 
of the remaining equity as of the date of the 
divorce; yet it is not for the courts to 
question tBe wisdom of a 'contrar ; made Try the 
parties." (Emphas. s added) 
Justice Hall then went on to point out that there 
may well be other matters which were con *idered by the parties 
when they made their agreement. He ever referred to a relin-
quishment of alimony as such a consideration when he stated, 
on page 472: 
f!0n the other hand, we are not aware of what 
other matters were considered by the parties 
when they made their compromise. Defendant 
may very well have received other consideration 
which prompted his agreement, such as conces-
sion made in regard to alimony, support, or the 
division of other property.If 
Judge Cornaby, in the present case, recognized that 
the parties have the right to enter into an agreement, par-
ticularly when both were represented by competent counsel, 
and he rightfully concluded that "unless there's something 
patently unfair about it, the court has an obligation to let 
them agree to what they want to agree to" (T. 38). Judge 
Cornaby recognized that the parties may have considered in 
their agreement other factors which were not a part of the 
actual divorce decree. This is evident from his statement 
that: • 
"I don't know if the defendant had some retire-
ment that was being offset and this is a 
consideration. I don't know if they had some 
other property that had some value that he 
was going to keep that was going to offset to." 
(T. 39) 
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HUSBAND'S PURPORTED ISSUE E 
DOES THE TRIAL COURT HAVE A DUTY TO REMEDY AN 
INEQUITABLE AGREEMENT, ESPECIALLY WHEN THE 
INEQUITY IS MADE MORE SEVERE DUE TO A CHANGE 
IN CIRCUMSTANCES, ONCE A PARTY TO IT HAS 
PETITIONED THE COURT FOR RELIEF, OR AT LEAST 
TO MODIFY THE INEQUITABLE PORTION OF THE 
AGREEMENT IN SUCH A WAY AS TO REMEDY 1-TE 
INEQUITY WITH THE LEAST ADVERSE IMPACT ON THE 
POSITION OF THE OTHER PARTY? 
Wife again contends that this is not a legitimate 
issue in this case and affirms that the answer to said question 
is no, and the reasons for said answer have been set forth pre-
viously in this brief. Husband's claim that the Court had a 
duty to modify the decree in some other way such as allowing 
him to keep all or part of the house equity accrued at the time 
the last child reaches age 18 in lieu of removing the payment 
entirely, is not valid. A search of all of the proceedings 
has not revealed that such a request was ever made, and 
for the reasons given previously, it would be inappropriate 
for the Court to make such a ruling in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the trial court refusing to amend 
the Decree pf Divorce should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this 3rd day <A July, 1985. 
C. GERALD PARKER 
PARKER, THORNLEY & CRITCHLOW 
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DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 1-32735 
v5-d?^) 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 
28th day of February, 1983, before the Honorable Douglas L. 
Cornaby, one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting 
without a jury, and the plaintiff being personally present 
and represented by her attorney, Ronald W. Perkins, and the 
defendant being personally present and represented by his attor-
ney, Walker E. /uiderson, and the parties having entered into 
an oral stipulation governing their respective property rights, 
custody, support, alimony, attorney's fees, and all other kindred 
rights, and the plaintiff having been sworn and testified in 
open Court, and the Court having approved the oral stipulation 
FXHIRIT A 
-2-
of the parties and being fully cognizant of all masters herein, 
and the Court having made its Findings of Fact and Conclurions 
of Law, separately stated in writing, HOW THEREFORE, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows: 
1. That the plaintiff is hereby granted a Decree ot" Divorce 
from the defendant, same to become final on May 20, 1933, provid-
ed sane is signed and filed with the Court prior to such date. 
2. That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and 
control of the three minor children of the parties, subject 
to the defendant's reasonable rights of visitation at reasonable 
times and places, 
3. That the plaintiff is awarded the sum of $2 00.00 per 
month per child as and for child support for three minor children. 
4. That the plaintiff shall retain as her personal property 
the household furniture and furnishings, the 1976 Volare automobile 
as well as her personal belongings and effects. 
5. That the defendant shall retain as his sole property 
the 19 7 9 Ford Courier, the tent trailer, the motorcycle, boat, 
motor, all interest in defendant's IRA account, as well as 
his personal belongings and effects. 
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6. That the plaintiff shall retain the marital home and 
real property located at 55 Sout i 4th West, Kaysville, Davis 
County, State of Utah, subject to a lien in favor of the defen-
dant in the sum of $12,340.00, which shall become due and payable 
upon the following conditions: 
a. Plaintiff should remarry, or 
b. That no other adult mala lives in the home, or 
c. She should no longer use the premises as her prin-
cipal place of residence, or 
d. The youngest child of the parties reaches the 
age of majority, or 
e. The home be sold by the parties , whichever of 
the above conditions should occur first. 
7. That the defendant shall pay the sum of $276,00 to 
United Savings & Loan as and for the house payment, until such 
time as any of the conditions riferred to in paragraph six (6) 
should occur, whichever occurs first, but in no event shall 
defendant be required to pay more than $276.00 per month to 
United Savings & Loan relative to such obligation. 
8. That the plaintiff shall be entitled to retain the 
1982 income tax return in the approximate sum of.$2,020.00, 
and a check from the Terkelson Company. 
a. Plaintiff shall pay all utilities at the home and 













9. That the parties shall each be entitled to retain 
one-half the 1982 Utah State income tax refund and jointly pay taxe: 
10. That the defendant shall maintain health, accident 
and dental insurance on the minor children of the parties so 
long as same is available through any place of employment, 
and should future orthodontic expenses arise with respect to 
the minor children, the plaintiff and defendant shall each 
be responsible for one-half of all sums not paid by insurance• 
11. That there presently exists a savings account in the 
approximate sum of $1,190.00, which account is in the names 
of the parties three minor children, and the plaintiff and 
the defendants1 names shall also be joined as a party to such 
account, and such account shall be used for the benefit of 
the three minor children upon mutual consent for its use by 
the plaintiff and defendant. 
12. That the plaintiff waives her right to alimony, past, 
present or future. 
13. That it is proposed for the year 1983, that the defendant 
shall claim two of the parties minor children for income tax 
purposes, and the plaintiff shall claim one minor child for 
income tax purposes, and such procedure being alternated every 
year, and it also being proposed that such tax exemption claims 
may be altered by the mutual agreement of the plaintiff and 
the defendant in any year the parties desire to alter the exemp-
tion claims. 
-5-
14 That the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the 
sum of $380.00 attorney's fees and costs in this action. 
DATED tuis /f day of {Mr oh, 1983. 
BY T 
£/ DOIK^AS Is. CORNABY, 
Distrrs£JCourt Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WALKER E. ANDERSON, 
Attorney for Defendant 
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Attorney for Plaintiff 
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2447 Kiesel Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 34401 
Telephone: 621-24 64 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 1-32735 
This matter having come on regularly for hearing on the 2 8th 
day of February, 1983, before the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby, 
one of the Judges of the above entitled Court, sitting without 
a jury, and the plaintiff being personally present and represented 
by her attorney, Ronald W. Perkins, and the defendant being person-
ally present and represented by his attorney, Walker L. Anderson, 
and th€5 parties having entered into an oral stipulation governing 
their irespective property rights, custody, support, alimony, attor-
ney's fees and all other kindred rights, and the plaintiff having 
been sworn and testified in open Court, and the Court having approve 
the oral stipulation of the parties and being fully cognizant 
















FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff is now and for more than three months 
last past has been an actual bona fide resident of the County 
of Davis, State of Utah, 
2. That plaintiff and defendant were intermarried in Clearfielc 
Utah, on or about the 20th day of June, 1970, and ever since said 
time have been and now are husband and wife; that there have been 
born the issue of this marriage, three (3) children, to-wit: 
Dawn Kerschner, age 10 years; Heather Kerschner, age 7 years; 
and Derek Kerschner, age 5 years; and that the plaintiff is a 
fit and proper person to have the care, custody and control of 
said minor children. 
3. That although the plaintiff has been a true and dutiful 
wife, the defendant, since said marriage, in disregard to his 
marriage vows, has treated the plaintiff in such a cruel and inhu-
man manner as to render further marital relations between the 
parties herein intolerable, in that the defendant no longer desires 
to be married and constantly argues and bickers with the plaintiff, 
all of which has caused the plaintiff to suffer great mental dis-



















4. That during the marriage, the parties herein have accumu-
lated a home and real property located at 55 South 4th West in 
Kaysville, Davis County, Utah. 
5. That ciuriny said marriage, the parties herein have accumu-
lated certain personal property and more particularly household 
furniture and furnishings, household appliances, 1976 Plymouth 
automobile, 1979 Ford truck , tent trailer, boat, motorcycle. 
6. That during said marriage, the parties herein have incurre 
the following debts and obligations, and that there may be other 
debts, but to whom and how much are unknown to the plaintiff, 
but those now known to the plaintiff are as follows: 
Approximately $23,000.00 due and owing to United 
Savings for the family home. 
Approximately $200.00 due and owing to Zions 
First National Bank for the Ford truck. 
7« That the defendant is a well and able bodied person employ 
ed at Ford, Bacca & Davis of Salt Lake City, and earns approximate-
ly $33,240.00 per year; and that the plaintiff is presently unem-
ployed, but seeking a teaching job. 
8. That the plaintiff has retained the services of Attorney 
Ronald W. Perkins, to represent the plaintiff in this matter, 
and has incurred reasonable attorney's fees and Court costs herein, 
which the defendant should be required to assume and pay, and 
that a reasonable attorney's fees are $350.00, plus costs of Court 















9. That the oral stipulation entered into by and between 
the parties constitutes a lawful stipulation and is approved by 
the Court. 
That from the above and foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court 
enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiff is hereby entitled to a Decree of 
Divorce from the defendant, same to become final on May 20, 1933, 
provided same is signed and filed with the Court prior to such 
date. 
2. That the plaintiff is awarded the care, custody and control 
of the three minor children of the parties, subject to defendant's 
reasonable rights of visitation at reasonable times and places, 
3. That the plaintiff is awarded the sum of $2 00.00 per 
month per child as and for child support for three minor children. 
4. That the plaintiff shall retain as her personal property 
the household furniture and furnishings, the 1976 Volare automobile, 
as well as her personal belongings and effects. 
5. That the defendant shall retain as his sole property 
the 1979 Ford Courier, the tent trailer, the motorcycle, boat, 
motor, all interest in defendant's IRA account, as well as his 
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6. That the plaintiff shall retain the marital home and 
real property located at S5 South ith West, Kaysville, Davis County 
State of Utah, subject to a lien in favor of the defendant in 
the sura of $12,340.00, which sha^l become due and payable upon 
the following conditions: 
a. Plaintiff should remarry, or 
b. That no other adult male lives in the home, or 
c. She should no longer use the premises as her principa 
place of residence, or 
d. The youngest child of the parties reaches the age 
of majority, or 
e. The home be sold by the parties , whichever of 
the above conditions should occur first. 
7. That the defendant shall pay the sum of $276.00 to United 
Savings & Loan as and for the house payment, until such time as 
any of the conditions referred tc in paragraph six (6) should 
occur, whichever occurs first, bit in no event shall defendant 
be required to pay more than $276.00 per month to United Savings 
& Loan relative to such obligation. 
8. That the plaintiff shall be entitled to retain the 1982 
income tax return in the approximate sum of $2,020.00, and a check 
from the Terkelson Company. 
a. Plaintiff shall pay all utilities at the home and 















9. That the parties shall each be entitled to retain one-
half the 1982 Utah State income tax refund and jointly 1 iy any taxes 
10. That the defendant shall maintain health, accident and 
dental insurance on the minor children of the parties 30 long 
as same is available through any place of employment, and should 
future orthodontic expenses arise with respect to the minor child-
ren, .the plaintiff and defendant shall each be responsible fcr 
one-half of all sums not paid by insurance, 
11. That there presently exists a savings account in the 
approximate sum of $1,190.00, which account is in the names of 
the parties three minor children, and the plaintiff and the defen-
dants1 names shall also be joined as a party to such account, 
and such account shall be used for the benefit of the three minor 
children upon mutual consent for its use by the plaintiff and 
defendant. 
12. That the plaintiff waives her right to alimony , past, 
present or future. 
13. That it is proposed for the year 1983, that the defendant 
shall claim two of the parties minor children for income tax purpose 
and the plaintiff shall claim one minor child for income tax purpose 
and such procedure being alternated every year, and it also being 
proposed that such tax exemption claims may be altered by the 
mutual agreement of the plaintiff and the defendant in any year 
the parties desire to alter the exemption claims. 
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14 „ That the defendant shall pay to the plaintiff the sura 
of $380 .00. attorney's fees and costs in this action. 
15„ That said Decree of Divorce shall incorporate herein 
all matters of property rights, care, custody and control of the 
parties minor children, alimony, support, attorney s fees, Court 
costs and other kindred matters that are contained in the oral 
stipulation of the parties in the Court's Conclusions of Law. 
DATED this / f day of ^ tcch, 1933. 
BY TIIEv COURT: 
"- DGUSJLASyL 1 CORNABY,^1 ^ 
Distric :ourt Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
WALKER E. ANDERSON, 
Attorney for Defendant 
r l L - - " » -,- , » • - » : 
JANE ALLEN (Bar No. 45) !?3!4 DEC -3 Til 3: W 
Attorney for Defendant
 At_, n M «-TV cLCflK 
261 East 300 South, Suite 150 r-lc'l^ T^ f^ ct'COURT 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 " ' * - . 
Telephone: (801) 355-1300 ^—^m^^ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




JOHN H. KERSCHNER, 
Defendant. 
URDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
PETITION TO MODIFY 
Civil No. 1-32735 
This matter came on for hearing on the 3rd day of October, 
1984 before the Honorable Douglas L Cornaby. The Plaintiff was 
present with her counsel, C. Gerald Parker, Esq. The Defendant was 
present with his counsel, Jane Allen, Esq. After hearing testimony 
and argument, the Court makes the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. The Decree of Divorce shall be modified to eliminate 
paragraph 13 of the Decree, with the tax deduction of the parties 
in regard to the minor children to be governed by the rule of the 
IRS. 
2. Defendant's request that he be relieved of the 
obligation to pay the house payment for the house presently 
occupied by the Plaintiff is hereby denied. 
3. That paragraph 10 of the Decree of Divorce regarding 
the maintenance of health, accident, and dental insurance on the 
minor children shall remain unchanged. 
4. Defendant's request that the equity in the marital 
residence be redetermined is hereby denied. 
5. The defendant may talk to the children on the tele-
phone without interference from the Plaintiff so long as such 
calls are at: reasonable times and duration. 
6. The parties are mutually restrained from harassing 
the other. 
7. Each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and 
costs. 
8. All other provisions of the Decree of Divorce not 
herein amended shall remain in full force and effect. 
DATED this 3 day of -J}esq* Jc<~ 1984. 
BY THE COURT: 
Dpugla^/L) Cornaby 
District Court Judge 
Approved as to form and 
content: 
C. GerSld Parkfir" 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
1 them but we submit, your Honor, that under the circumstances, 
2 it's appropriate and proper for the decree to remain as it is 
3 at the present time. 
4 THE CO0i*T: D'. you want one-minute rebuttal? 
5 MS. ALLEisi: I just think it's clear, in looking at 
6 this, that at beet this particular provision for ongoing pay-
7 ments is a gray area. It may not be alimony. 
8 THE COURT: Gray, meaning what? 
9j MS. ALLEN: Gray meaning it's'not called alimony, but 
10 it's not called property settlement. It's not called anything 
11 and because of that the Court can probably quite reasonably 
12 apply his equitable powers to see that something that is unfair 
13 does not continue for the next 10 or 12 years while he pays off 
14 the house and only get $12,000 in equity even though he pays all] 
15 the payments for all of the years on the house and since she 
16 has already been awarded her half of the equity at the time of 
17 the decree to keep it, c oviously, the house was split. 
18 she became quite immediately employed. Usually alimony is 
19 just to put the spouse who did not work, who bore the children, 
2 0
 back on her feet. She is on her feet just fine and it seems 
21 that it's just only the fair thing to do in this case is to 
2 2
 allow him not to *have to pay this payment any more. 
2 3
 THE COURT: Thank you. I will talk about the house 
24 
payment first. The Court doesn't know why it's there. It's a 
25 
very unusual provision, but parties, one represented or whether 
37 
1 or not they are represented by counsel, have a right to 
2 stipulate and agree to what they want to stipulate to on their 
3 agreements and unless there's something patently unfair about 
4 it, the Court has an obligation to let them agree to what they 
5 want to agree to. 
6 If that same thing had been presented to the Court without 
7 the defendant being represented by competent counsel, the Court 
8 probably would have challenged it at the time or at least made 
9 it clear to the parties as to what you are doing. Both parties 
were represented by competent counsel. Why in the world they 
11 chose to do what they did, certainly I don't know at this point] 
I may never know. Defense counsel, of course, is saying it's 
in the nature of alimony. It sure sounds like it, and yet, the 
14 stipulation clearly was that there is no alimony to be .paid. ! 
15 Plaintiff's counsel is saying it's obviously property I 
16 settlement. This is not obvious to me that it's property I 
17 settlement. What is appears to the Court to be is that the 
18 plaintiff was entitled to some alimony because of the length 
19 of the time of their marriage and the defendant was adamantly 
2 0
 refusing to pay any alimony but he was agreeing for the sake of 
2 1
 the children to do something different, which is, I will pay the 
2 2
 house payment. That helps the kids. It doesn't help me any but 
23 
it helps my children. At the same time I will pay child support 
but I won't pay alimony. That sounds to the Court like what 
25 





1 that that can be done and mind you, I didn't hear the trial, 
2 I only heard a stipulation between the parties and so they 
3 hammered out all of the details and they handed it to the 
4 Court and I listened to it and I sayr will you agree to it and 
5 they >ay, will you agree to it and I said, yeahr I will agree 
6 and I asked each of the parties if they will agree to it or if 
7 that's really their agreement and if they say yes then we pro-
8 ceed on that basis and that's what occurred in this case. 
9 The reporting clerk made rather detailed notes as to what 
10 was agreed on. So, as you each look at the decree to see what 
11 it says I keep watching that minute entry to see the decree 
12 matches the minute entry and the decree matches the minute entry| 
13 It does say what the minute entry says they agreed to. I don't 
14j know if the defendant had some retirement that was being offset 
15 and this is a consideration. I don't know if they had some 
16 other property that had some value that he was going to keep 
17 that thxs was going to offset to. I didn't know then and I 
18 don't enow now and I can't jump to a conclusion that it's 
19 alimony and it should be terminated. 
20 I have to say that if it were alimony there has been no 
21 showing that there is any change that would—The sheer making 
22 of $15,100 for nine months a year is not in and of itself enough 
23 to stop alimony. The fact that the defendant remarries isn't 
24 enough by itself or with the fact of the plaintiff having a good 
25 salary. I suppose good always is in quotes because none of us 
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sitting here would call $15,100 a good salary. 
The Court doesn't know why the provision was put there. 
It's odd to prt it until the youngest is 18. It makes it sound 
like some additional child support. It looks like it's probabl^ 
in lieu of alimony and yet, agreed there is no such thing as 
alimony. It could be property settlement. Over a term of 
11 years which is the approximate period of time until that 
youngest child reaches 18, we are talking about $36,000. We 
are talking about a very significant sum of money and yet, if 
the parties want to agree on it and they apparently did, at 
this timer it isn't like the defendant didn't know what he was 
doing. He may have thought about it the day after or the week 
after and said, boy, what did I do, but sometime approximately-
well, shortly less than two months he puts his own signature to 
the document drawn by his attorney. 
At least it may not have been drawn—I guess by the plain-
tiff's attorney and agreed to by the defense attorney and as 
counsel said, very unusual because he even had the defendant 
sign it, which is unusual, but it tells me that he saw it and 
undoubtedly considered it after it was drawn, not only on 
strictly the day of the hearing. 
So, I am going to hold the—unusual as it is, the terms as 
it is, even though it's there without any offsetting equity in 
the house even though it says there's no alimony. It appears 
to be two intelligent people agreeing and knowing what they 
40 
are agreeing to. Can't tell you why, but the decree was there 
and it will remain the same. Parties agree to let the IRS de-
cide who is entitled to claim the children as deductions and 
that can be amended to show that. 
With regard to visitation. Mr. Kerschner, if you cannot 
fulfill your visitation you have no right to ask the plaintiff 
to change her time with the children to match yours. Now, you 
can ask her, but you have no right to demand it. On the other-
hand, Mrs. Kerschner, if he asks you if you agree, then you are 
bound by it. You cannot change. I mean, it's true it doesn't 
say it in the decree, but we expect parents to, when they 
mutually agree on something, they will be bound by it. 
I don't know whether you agree to it or not, but if you 
agree to a change then you will want to live up to your word. 
Now, with regard to the phone visitation. The children 
ought to have phone visitation and it ought to be without any 
eavesdropping from either party. I don't know if it's occuring, 
either. We spent very little time on it. Just say there ought 
to be those rights and they ought to be respected. 
With regard to the health and accident insurance, I think 
we have got that cleared up. The decree says that each party 
will pay one-half of all medical bills not covered by insurance. 
It doesn't make any difference, orthodonist or if it's an office 
call and it's not paid by insurance. The decree says one-half, 
so each pay one-half. While it's anticipated that only the 
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defendant has insurance, it makes no difference who has the 
insurance. If you both have insurance it will be after that. 
I don't show any other issurs. Did I cover them all? Who 
is going to draw the older? 
MR. PARKER: Thoy ar>* the moving party. 
THE COURT: We will dLrect the defendant draw the orderl 
in this case. That's all tcfay, then. Thank you. 
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.) 
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gency has passed.5 It has been observed 
that the overall trend has been in the di-
rection of absoluteness rather than condi-
tionally with increasing weight apparently 
being given to the presumption against in-
testacy.6 <***: 
[3] Significantly, the testatrix did not 
make any alternative disposition of her 
property if the asserted condition precedent 
of the second paragraph was not fulfilled. 
Since she devised nothing to her husband, 
his death had no significant impact on her 
overall testamentary disposition. 
"The fact that the testator made no 
express provision for forfeiture or gift 
over upon failure of the condition tends 
to show that he did not mean to impose a 
condition." 7 
This will, considered as a whole, shows a 
manifest intention of the testatrix to make 
an absolute will disposing of all of her prop-
erty. While it may be inexpertly drawn, it 
is sufficiently clear that she did not intend 
to die intestate, if her husband did not 
precede her in death. If a literal interpre-
tation of the second paragraph could be 
deemed to create an inconsistency with the 
plain intent of the testatrix as unmistak-
ably revealed in the remainder of the will, 
then those words should be disregarded.8 
Furthermore, testatrix clearly specified her 
intent and purpose to disinherit her six 
grandchildren, who were the children of her 
deceased son. It would be totally inconsist-
ent with this avowed objective to construe 
her will as showing an intent to die intes-
tate if the condition precedent failed and 
thus the grandchildren would inherit under 
5. In re Trager's Estate, 413 111. 364, 108 N.E.2d 
908, 910 (1952). 
6. 1 A.L.R.3d 1048, Anno: Determination 
Whether Will Is Absolute Or Conditional, Sec. 
3, p. 1052; also see 1 Page On Wills (Bowe-Par-
ker Revision) Sec. 9.8, p. 428. 
7. 5 Page On Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision) Sec. 
44.2, p. 400. 
8. Brasser v. Hutchison, 37 Colo.App. 528, 549 
P.2d 801, 803 (1976). 
EXHIBIT 
the laws of intestate succession.9 Such a 
construction would produce an absurd re-
sult, clearly contrary to the intention of the 
testatrix as it is ascertained from the four 
corners of the will. 
Testatrix clearly intended her two daugh-
ters, Tess and Gloria, to be the distributees 
of all her property. This case is reversed 
and remanded to the trial court with di-
rections to proceed with the probate of the 
estate in accordance with this opinion. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and 
HALL, JJ., concur. 
STEWART, J., dissents. 
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Husband appealed distribution of prop-
erty and custodial arrangements for minor 
9. See 4 Page On Wills (Bowe-Parker Revision) 
Sec. 30.17, p. 115, wherein it is stated: "If 
testator does not dispose of the whole of his 
estate by his last will and testament, and such 
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great majority of states hold that such negative 
words cannot prevent property from passing 
under the statutes of descent and distribution. 
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children in decree of divorce entered by 
First District Court, Cache County, Ted S. 
Perry, J. pro tern. The Supreme Court, 
Maughan, J., held that: (1) under statute 
governing disposition of propuly in divorce 
proceedings and rulings thereunder, equity 
of husband in home he pure! *sed subse-
quent to wife's filing for divorce was prop-
erly considered marital asset subject to divi-
sion in divorce decree; (2) evidence was 
sufficient to support trial court's awarw jf 
alimony in sum of $300 per month for 162 
months, provided that alimony was to ter-
minate upon either husband's death T 
wife's remarriage, as reasonable and app o-
priate sum for support and mainter*n^e; 
(3) fact that father had inculcated older 
children with antagonistic attitudes toward 
mother and other evidence was sufficient to 
support trial court's award of custody of 
older children to father and of three young-
er children to mother; and (4) trial court 
did not abuse its discretion in decree requir-
ing two-week notice to arrange visitation of 
children by noncustodial parent. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <s=> 184(10) 
In divorce case, even though proceed-
ings are equitable and Supreme Court may 
review evidence, Supreme Court accords 
considerable deference to findings and 
judgment of trial court due to its advanta-
geous position. 
2. Divorce «=> 184(5), 184(10) 
On appeal of divorce proceeding, Su-
preme Court will not disturb action of trial 
court unless evidence clearly preponderates 
to contrary, or trial court has abused its 
discretion, or misapplied principles of law. 
3. Divorce <s=>252^  
There is no fixed formula in divorce 
proceedings upon which to determine divi-
sion of properties; it is prerogative of court 
to make whatever disposition of property as 
it deems fair, equitable, and necessary for 
protection and welfare of parties. 
4. Divorce <*=>252.1, 286(8) 
In division of marital property in di-
vorce proceeding, trial judge has wide dis-
cretion, and his findings will not be" dis-
turbed unless record indicates abuse there-
of. 
5. Divorce <s=»308 
Court may not, under decree of divorce, 
unless child has incapacity or disability, or-
der transfer of property of either parent to 
children for purpose of creating estate for 
children's permanent benefit. 
6. Divorce <8=*282 
Theory urged by husband in objecting 
to valuation of his presently vested interest 
in certain retirement funds, which was not 
presented to trial court in divorce proceed-
ing, had to be deemed untimely when it was 
first claimed on appeal. 
7. Divorce <s=>252.3(l) 
Under statute governing disposition of 
property in divorce proceedings and rulings 
thereunder, equity of husband in home he 
purchased subsequent to wife's filing for 
divorce was properly considered marital as-
set subject to division in divorce decree. 
U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
8. Divorce <s=>253(3) 
Marital estate is evaluated according to 
existing property interests at time marriage 
is terminated by decree of court U.C.A. 
1953, 30^3-5. 
9. Divorce <s=»253(2) 
Evidence in divorce proceeding did not 
support conclusion that trial court abused 
its discretion in division of marital assets in 
divorce decree. 
10. Divorce <s=»286(8) 
In reviewing division of marital proper-
ty on appeal from divorce judgment, award 
of alimony should not be included as mari-
tal asset which was distributed at time of 
divorce. 
11. Divorce *=>231, 240(2) 
Function of alimony is to provide sup-
port for wife as nearly as possible at stan-
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dard of living she enjoyed during marriage 
and to prevent wife from becoming public 
charge; criteria considered in determining 
reasonable award of support include finan-
cial conditions and needs of wife, ability of 
wife to produce sufficient income for her-
self, and ability of husband to provide sup-
port. 
12. Divorce <s=»231 
Alimony awarded in divorce proceed 
ing, which was not sum certain but was 
terminable on certain contingencies, could 
not be deemed in nature of property settle-
ment. 
13. Divorce <s=>240(3) 
Evidence in divorce proceeding was 
sufficient to sustain trial court's finding 
that sum of $300 per month for 162 months 
awarded for alimony, provided that alimony 
was to terminate upon death of husband or 
wife's remarriage, was reasonable and ap-
propriate sum for support and maintenance. 
14. Divorce <s=»224 
Supreme Court would not order that 
each party to divorce proceeding pay own 
attorney's fees where trial court had con-
ferred more favorable adjustment of re-
sources to husband in consideration of hus-
band's obligation to pay attorney's fees. 
15. Divorce <s=>287 
Since, on appeal from divorce judg-
ment, there were number of factors to be 
considered in determining whether attor-
ney's fees should be awarded appellee for 
defending appeal, in addition to question as 
to which party prevailed on appeal, case 
would be remanded to trial court to deter-
mine whether award of attorney's fees 
should be made, and if so, amount thereof. 
16. Divorce <s=>298(l) 
Fact that father had inculcated atti-
tudes antagonistic to mother in older chil-
dren and other evidence was sufficient to 
support award of custody of three older 
children to father and three younger chil-
dren to mother in divorce proceeding. 
17. Divorce <s=»299 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in decree requiring two-week notice to ar-
range visi~*tion of children by noncustodial 
parent where, by reason of strong animosi-
ties generated over custody issue, require-
ment of rather formalized arrangements 
'.ntil all parties involved had time to organ-
ize their n v lifestyles and gain greater 
insight as \x> their problems could not be 
deemed 'nappropriate, interim solution. 
18. Divorce <s=»310 
Tria1 court did not err in awarding 
child support until each child to broken 
marriage attained age of 19 where statute 
conferred power on trial court in divorce 
action to award support to age 21, and 
where trial court made special findings con-
cerning need for child support to age of 19. 
Lyle W. Hillyard of Hillyard, Low & 
Anderson, Logan, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
B. L. Dart of Dart & Stegall, Salt Lake 
City, Bruce L. Jorgensen of Olson, Hoggan 
& Sorenson, Logan; for plaintiff and respon-
dent. 
MAUGHAN, Justice: 
Defendant-husband appeals the distribu-
tion of property and custodial arrangements 
for the minor children in a decree of di-
vorce. The judgment of the trial court is 
affirmed. Costs to plaintiff. All statutory 
reference are to Utah Code Annotated, 
1953. 
The parties were married in June 1961; 
they are the parents of six children, who at 
the time the decree was entered in March 
1979, were the ages of 16, 15, 14, 8, 7 and 4. 
Defendant was awarded custody of the 
three older children and plaintiff was given 
custody of the three younger ones. 
At the time of marriage defendant had 
completed two years of college, and plain-
tiff was a graduate nurse. During the 
course of the marriage defendant has 
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earned bachelor's and master's degrees as 
well as taking additional classes in his spe-
cialty. At the time of trial, he was a ten-
ured associate professor of electrical engi-
neering at a state university, with a gross 
salary of $28,426, exclusive of fringe bene-
fits. In addition, defendant was a principal 
shareholder in a close corporation engaged 
in rendering professional services in his 
field. In 1978, defendant received approxi-
mately $13,275 in wages and $7,500 in loans 
from this corporation. 
Plaintiff, throughout the marriage, has 
worked as necessary to supplement the 
family income, assist in funding her hus-
band's education, or to provide a down pay-
ment on the family's real property. At the 
time of trial, plaintiff was employed half-
time as a nurse and her net earnings per 
month were approximately $613. 
In the distribution of the assets, plaintiff 
was awarded the equity in the family home, 
her automobile, some of the home furnish-
ings, and her personal belongings. The 
court found the value of this property to be 
$31,200. Plaintiff was required to assume 
and discharge a mortgage in the sum of 
$29,208 on the home. Plaintiff was award-
ed alimony in the sum of $300 per month 
for a period of 162 months, with the provi-
sion the alimony would terminate on her 
remarriage or defendant's death. Plaintiff 
was further awarded child support in the 
amount of $150 per month per child and 
$5,000 to apply towards her attorney's fees. 
Defendant was awarded assets, which the 
trial court found had the value of $63,126. 
These assets included a parcel of unim-
proved land, a new home, his automobile, 
certain items of household furniture, his 
gun collection and certain other items of 
personal property, the current value of his 
equity in a retirement fund and other in-
vestments. 
The trial of this case extended over a 
period of four days, a considerable period of 
this time was directed to the issue of custo-
dy of the six children. The plaintiffs evi-
dence indicated a calculated course of con-
duct on the part of defendant to alienate 
the children from her and to inculcate feel-
ings of animosity and contempt for her. 
Defendant denied this charge and claimed 
that as the marital relationship had disinte-
grated plaintiff had withdrawn from in-
volvement with the family, and defendant 
had merely attempted to fill the vacuum so 
that the family could ct itinue functioning 
as an integrated unit. 
The trial court found plaintiff had in-
curred the disrespect of the children by 
reason of defendant's actions. Defendant 
had either intentional y or unwittingly in-
volved the three older children in the custo-
dy dispute betwee; the parties; so the chil-
dren's loyalty to defendant had resulted in 
their rejection of plaintiff. However, nei-
ther parent was found unfit. The trial 
court recited its adherence to the standard 
of "the best interests of the child" in resolv-
ing the custodial issues. In its findings, the 
trial court contrasted the characters of the 
parties and found plaintiff a better example 
of honesty, morality, courtesy, and unself-
ishness. Defendant was found to have es-
tablished better communication with the 
children, but plaintiff's withdrawal was at-
tributed to the emotional distress precipi-
tated by defendant. The trial court ac-
knowledged and rejected the recommenda-
tion of the social worker that the children 
should remain together, and, because of the 
alienation of the older children towards 
their mother, the custody of the children 
should be given to the father. The trial 
court expressed the view the social worker 
had not considered the long range effect in 
making the recommendation, and the court 
questioned whether defendant could, in 
fact, devote sufficient time to six children 
and still meet the demands of his profes-
sion. The two younger daughters were 
found to be well adjusted in their present 
environment Based on the foregoing fac-
tors, the older children were awarded to 
defendant and the younger children to 
plaintiff, subject to reasonable visitation 
rights in the non-custodial parent. How-
ever, the court provided the visitation must 
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be arranged by the mutual consent of the 
parties two weeks in advance. 
[1,2] In a divorce case, even though the 
proceedings are equitable and this Court 
may review tht r/idence,1 this Court ac-
cords considerable deference to the findings 
and judgment of fhe trial court due to its 
advantageous position. On appeal this 
Court v^ll not disturb the actk , of the trial 
court unless th^ evidence clearly preponder-
ates to the contrary, or the trial court has 
abused its discretion, or i isapplied princi-
ples of law.2 In application of these pre-
cepts to the record herein there is no basis 
to interfere with the deer ion of the trial 
court. 
DISTRIBUTION OF ASSETS 
[3,4] There is no fixed formula upon 
which to determine a division of properties, 
it is a prerogative of the court to make 
whatever disposition of property as it 
deems fair, equitable, and necessary for the 
protection and welfare of the parties.8 In 
the division of marital property, the trial 
judge has wide discretion, and his findings 
will not be disturbed unless the record indi-
cates an abuse thereof.4 
Defendant contends the trial court erred 
in including as part of the marital assets 
subject to division certain investments iden-
tified as SNI funds. These funds were 
awarded to defendant, and the sum of 
$6,000 for these investments was included 
in the calculation of defendant's total 
award. Defendant characterized these as 
educational funds for the three older chil-
dren, and claims he should be deemed as a 
1. Article VIII, Sec. 9, Constitution of Utah. 
2. Eastman v. Eastman, Utah, 558 P.2d 514 
(1976); Watson v. Watson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1072 
(1977); Pope v. Pope, Utah, 589 P.2d 752 
(1978). 
3. Pearson v. Pearson, Utah, 561 P.2d 1080 
(1977); Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utah, 562 P.2d 
235 (1977); Naylor v. Naylor, Utah, 563 P.2d 
mere trustee to manage the funds for his 
minor children. 
[5] These funds were held solely in de-
fendant's name, and he received certain tax 
benefits incidental thereto. He made no 
attempt to transfer them to the children 
under the uniform gifts to minors provi-
sions of Section 75-5-601, et seq. His testi-
mony indicated no more than an intention 
in the future to use the funds for the chil-
dren. He retained exclusive dominion and 
controll over them. He merely indicated he 
would have no objection if the court or-
dered him to place them in trust for the 
benefit of the children. A court may not, 
under a decree of divorce, unless a child has 
an incapacity or disability, order the trans-
fer of the property of either parent to the 
children for the purpose of creating an es-
tate for their permanent benefit.5 
[6] Defendant further objects to the 
valuation of his presently vested interest in 
certain retirement funds. The valuation of 
$16,939 as the current fair market value 
was presented by a witness called by de-
fendant. There was no other evidence ad-
duced as to value. The theory urged by 
defendant was not presented to the trial 
court and must be deemed untimely when it 
is first claimed on appeal. 
[7,8] Defendant contends his equity in 
a home he purchased subsequent to plain-
tiffs filing for divorce should not have been 
considered a marital asset subject to divi-
sion. Such an argument is contrary to the 
specific provisions of Section 30-3-5, 
U.C.A., 1953, and the rulings of this court in 
accordance therewith. The marital estate 
is evaluated according to the existing prop-
184 (1977); Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 
P.2d 144 (1978). 
4. Jesperson v. Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 326 
(1980). 
5. English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409, 412 
(1977). 
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erty interests at the time the marriage is 
terminated by the decree of the court.6 
Defendant argues the division of the 
marital property was inequitable by reason 
of the trial court's failure to give sufficient 
weight and consideration to the liabilities. 
During the pendency of these proce< iin^ ^  
defendant purchased a home for $90,000, his 
equity therein was found by the trial court 
to be $6,500, which was awarded to him. 
By taking this liability and the total sum he 
may potentially pay as alimony, defendant 
calculates the net value distributed to him 
will be in a negative amount, while the net 
value awarded to plaintiff will be $50,624. 
(This amount is derived by adding $31,232 
of assets awarded to plaintiff to $48,600 
alimony and subtracting the mortgage of 
$29,208 on the home awarded to plaintiff.) 
Defendant urges a more equitable division 
would apportion the marital debts pro rata. 
[9-11] Significantly, defendant has not 
specifically claimed the trial court abused 
its discretion in the division of the marital 
assets, and such a claim could not be sus-
tained by the records. Furthermore, the 
award of alimony should not be included as 
a marital asset which was distributed at the 
time of divorce. As this Court observed in 
English v. English,7 there is a distinction 
between the division of assets accumulated 
during marriage, which are distributed 
upon an equitable basis, and the post mari-
tal duty of support and maintenance. The 
function of alimony is to provide support 
for the wife as nearly as possible at the 
standard of living she enjoyed during mar-
riage and to prevent the wife from becom-
ing a public charge. Criteria considered in 
determining a reasonable award of support 
include the financial conditions and needs 
of the wife, the ability of the wife to pro-
duce a sufficient income for herself, and the 
ability of the husband to provide support.8 
The trial court distributed approximately 
one-third of the marital assets to plaintiff 
and f^o-thirds to defendant. In its find-
ings the trial court stated: 
"The Court finds that in lieu of order-
ing a cash settlement with a lien on the 
Defendant's property to equalize the 
prorx ty settlement, it is reasonable to 
award the Plaintiff alimony in the sum of 
$300.00 per month for 162 months, 
provided, however, that said alimony is to 
t> rminate upon either Defendant's death 
or plaintiff's remarriage." 
The Court further found such an award 
resulted in a lower figure than would be the 
case if a cash settlement for the difference 
were imposed to be repaid at $300.00 per 
month at eight percent interest, but the 
Court also took into consideration the court 
costs and attorney's fees the defendant 
must pay. 
[12,13] The alimony awarded in this ac-
tion cannot be deemed in the nature of a 
property settlement, for it is not a sum 
certain but is terminable on certain contin-
gencies. The record in the case will sustain 
the alimony award as an appropriate sum 
for support and maintenance. Plaintiff in-
troduced into evidence a budget indicating 
family needs. (She had excluded the costs 
of real property taxes and insurance be-
cause she was unfamiliar with specific 
amounts.) Her income was limited by part-
time employment so she might give ade-
quate care and nurturing to the three 
younger children, ranging in age from four 
to eight. Defendant had sufficient income 
to provide support. The record sustains 
trial court's finding that the sum awarded 
for alimony was reasonable.9 
[14,15] In continuation of his fallacious 
contention that there must be an equaliza-
6. Hamilton v. Hamilton, Utah, 562 P.2d 235 9. As explained in Jesperson v. Jesperson, note 
(1977); Jesperson v. Jesperson, Utah, 610 P.2d 
326 (1980). 
7. Note 5 supra, at pp. 411-412 of 565 P.2d. 
8. Also see Gramme v. Gramme, Utah, 587 P.2d 
144 (1978). 
6 supra, 610 P 2d 326, 328, this court is inclined 
to affirm a trial court's decision whenever it 
can be done on proper grounds, even though 
the trial court may have assigned an incorrect 
reason for its ruling. 
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tion of the assets, defendant argues each 
party should pay his own attorney's fees. 
This argument is without merit. As noted, 
ante, the trial court had conferred a more 
favorable adjustment of resources in consid-
eration of defendant's obligation to pay at-
torney's fees. Plaintiff has urged she be 
a^  arded attorney's fees expended in de-
fending this appeal. However, in addition 
to the question as to which party prevailed 
on appeal, there are a number of factors to 
be considered in determining whether attor-
ney's fees should be awarded. Accordingly, 
as to that issue, this case is remanded to the 
trial court to determine whether an award 
of attorney's fees should be made, and if so, 
the amount thereof.10 
CUSTODIAL ARRANGEMENT AND 
CHILD SUPPORT 
Defendant contends it would have been 
in the best interest of the children to award 
the custody of all the children to him. As 
noted ante, the trial court made extensive 
findings of fact concerning the custody of 
the children and utilized as the standard in 
making its determination, the best interests 
of the children. Since the older children 
had exhibited such a deep antagonism to-
wards their mother, she expressed concern 
about compelling them to live • with her. 
Defendant, whom the trial court found to 
have intentionally or unwittingly contribut-
ed to the alienation of the older children, 
now urges he is the only parent capable and 
willing to assume the custody of the six 
children. 
[16] The potential damage defendant 
has wrought by his course of conduct can-
not be underestimated, and it cannot be 
deemed to be in the best interests of the 
children to grant their custody to one who 
has inculcated the attitudes exhibited by 
the older children. The record and findings 
10. Ehninger v. Ehninger, Utah, 569 P.2d 1104 
(1977). 
11. Cox v. Cox, Utah, 532 P.2d 994 (1975). 
indicate plaintiff would be the superior cus-
todial parent. The trial court faced the 
dilemma of compelling three teenagers 
against their will to live with their mother. 
To avoid further conflict and the potential 
of further exacerbating the unfortunate di-
vision in this tragic family, the custody of 
the older children was granted to defend-
ant. Both the trial court and plaintiff ex-
hibited wisdom in making this difficult 
choice, and there is no basis for this Court 
to intervene. This Court will not upset the 
trial court's judgment in custodial matters 
unless it is persuasively shown to be con-
trary to the best interests and welfare of 
the children and family.11 
[17] Defendant contends the provision 
in the decree requiring a two-week notice to 
arrange visitation constituted a clear abuse 
of discretion by the trial court. This provi-
so is not engraved in stone and is subject to 
modification as are all custodial arrange-
ments. By reason of the strong animosities 
generated over the custody issue, the re-
quirement of rather formalized arrange-
ments until all the parties involved have 
had time to organize their new life-styles 
and gain greater insight as to their prob-
lems, cannot be deemed an inappropriate, 
interim solution. 
[18] Finally, defendant contends the tri-
al court erred in awarding child support 
until each child attains the age of nineteen. 
Section 15-2-1, confers power on the trial 
court in a divorce action to award support 
to age twenty-one. This Court has ruled 
the trial court must make a special finding 
to justify such an order.12 In adherence 
with this standard the trial court made a 
special finding concerning the need for 
child support to the age of nineteen. Thus, 
defendant's claim is without merit. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and HALL, WILKINS 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
12. Harris v. Hams, Utah, 585 P.2d 435 (1978); 
Carlson v. Carlson, Utah, 584 P.2d 864 (1978); 
Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah, 578 P.2d 1274 
(1978). 
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CALLISTER v. CALLISTER. 
No. 7967. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 16, 1953. 
Proceeding on defendant's motion to 
modify decree of divorce. The District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Joseph G. Jeppson, 
J., entered judgment reducing monthly pay-
ments required of defendant to plaintiff 
from $400 per month to $250 per month, 
and ordering plaintiff to pay her own at-
torney's fees, and plaintiff appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Hoyt, D. J., held that pay-
ments made pursuant to provision of prop-
erty settlement agreement which expressly 
referred to such payments as alimony with-
out anywhere referring to such payments 
as payments for interest in property, were 
alimony, and were subject to modification 
by court granting decree. 
Affirmed. 
1. Divorce <S=>236, 245(1), 297, 309 
An agreement or stipulation between 
parties to divorce suit as to alimony or pay-
ments for support of children is not bind-
ing upon court in entering divorce decree, 
but serves only as recommendation, and 
if court adopts suggestion of parties, court 
does not thereby lose right to make such 
modification or change thereafter as may 
be requested by either party, based upon 
change of circumstances warranting such 
modification. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5.1 
2. Divorce €=^245(i) 
Payments made pursuant to provision 
of property settlement agreement which ex-
pressly referred to such payments as ali-
mony without anywhere referring to such 
payments as payments for interest in prop-
erty were alimony and were subject to 
modification by court granting decree. U.C. 
A. 1953, 30-3-5. 
3. Divorce <S=200, 289 
Purpose of statute authorizing court 
granting divorce decree to make such or-
ders in relation to children, property and 
parties and their maintenance as may be 
equitable, reasonable and proper is to give 
court power to enforce, after divorce duty 
of support which exists between husband 
and wife, or parent and child. U.C.A 1953, 
30-3-5. 
4. Evidence €=>5(2) 
It is commox. knowledge that parties 
to divorce suits frequently enter into agree-
ments relative to alimony or child support, 
which, if binding upon courts, would leave 
children or divorced wives i tdequately 
provided ior. 
5. Divorce <£=245(3), 309 
In proceeding upon defendant's motion 
to amend divorce decree, e idence estab-
lished that decrease in defenc-mt's monthly 
income and impairment of defendant's 
health constituted change in circumstances 
sufficient to warrant reduction in amount 
of monthly payments made by defendant 
to plaintiff pursuant to order in divorce 
decree, and that reduction in defendant's 
income was not directly attributable to vol-
untary impoverishment U.C.A.1953, 30-
3-5. 
6. Divorce <S==226 
In proceeding on defendant's motion 
for modification of divorce decree, evi-
dence established that plaintiff had sufficient 
income from property owned by her that 
defendant should not be required to pay 
her attorney's fees and costs. U.C.A.1953, 
30-3-5. 
James W. Beless, Jr., Gustin, Richards 
& Mattsson, Salt Lake City, for appellant. 
Nielson & Conder, Salt Lake City, for 
respondent. 
HOYT, District Judge. 
This appeal involves first the question 
of power of the court to modify provisions 
of a divorce decree which required de-
fendant (respondent here) to make monthly 
payments to plaintiff throughout her life 
or until her remarriage. In 1945 plaintiff 
(appellant) commenced suit for divorce and 
prayed for division of property and for 
alimony. During the pendency of the pro-
Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P.2d 222; Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 
196, 111 P.2d 792. 
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ceedings an "Agreement of Property Settle-
ment and Alimony" was entered into and 
executed by the parties. In addition to 
provisions for division between the parties 
o i ic«xl 2tf\d peisoraA property oi consider-
able value the agreement contained the 
following : 
"That the second party (respondent) 
agrees to pay to the first party (appel-
lant) limony in the sum of $400.00 per 
month during the life of the first party 
o~ until her remarriage. 
"Sixth. This agreement and convey-
ance is mutually intended to be, and 
the same is hereby expressly made and 
intended by each of the parties hereto 
as a mutual release, relinquishment and 
conveyance of all the right, title and in-
terest that may now be or shall here-
after be, during the lifetime or at the 
death of either of the parties hereto, 
acquired by the other by virtue of said 
marriage that now subsists between the 
parties hereto under the laws of the 
State of Utah, in and to all of the prop-
yl ty, both ptYsoroA a.Tid i^2ii, oi the oth-
er party, except to the extent of the 
moneys to be paid by the second party 
to the first party as alimony and sup-
port money; and it is the intention of 
the parties hereto to mutually release 
and waive all provisions of the laws 
of the State of Utah relating to hus-
band and wife as to dower or the in-
terests of the wife in the real property, 
homestead rights, etc., and forever bar 
each other respectively from rights of 
succession or inheritance by reason of 
the marriage relation existing between 
them. 
"Seventh Second party hereby 
agrees to pay all attorneys' fees, costs, 
and expenses in any manner incurred 
by first party in the enforcement of 
this contract, or by reason of any con-
troversy arising therefrom." 
The plaintiff was granted a dworce, cus-
tody of a minor child, and judgment for 
division of property in accordance with the 
terms of the agreement mentioned. A 
copy of the agreement was attached to the 
court's findings and by reference incorpo-
rated as a part of the findings. The decree 
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entered in the case contained the following 
recitals: 
"That plaintiff be and she is hereby 
awarded judgment against the defend-
ant io i alimony in the sum oi ^AW per 
month during the life of the plaintiff 
or until her remarriage, and for sup-
port money in the amount of $50 per 
month for the support of the minor 
child until said child becomes eighteen 
years of age. * * * 
' 'That the agreement of property set-
tlement and alimony dated July 28, 
1945, heretofore entered into by and 
between the parties be and the same is 
hereby approved by the court and the 
same is hereby ordered to be binding 
upon the parties." 
In July 1952 the defendant filed a motion 
to amend the judgment with respect to 
the monthly payments, and asked the court 
to reduce the amount from $400 to $200 
per month, alleging as grounds therefor 
that defendant's income had been mate-
rially reduced and his health impaired since 
the rendition oi the decree. Plaintiff filed 
an amended answer denying the defendant's 
allegations. The original answer is not 
shown as a part of the record on appeal. 
Trial of issues was had and the court found 
that since the rendition of the decree the 
defendant's income from his practice as a 
physician and surgeon had decreased from 
$1,000 per month to $600 per month; that 
lie had remarried and had a wife and 
child to support; that since 1949 he had 
suffered from heart trouble which had 
become progressively worse, making it 
riecessary for him to abstain from activities 
producing physical or mental strain, there-
by reducing his income from his profession; 
also that plaintiff had income from rentals 
in excess of $4,500 per year besides some 
income from investments in stocks. The 
court concluded that monthly payments 
required of defendant to plaintiff should 
be reduced from. §4QQ pec month to $2SQ 
per month, also that defendant should not 
be required to pay plaintiffs attorney fees 
in the proceeding. Judgment was entered 
accordingly. Defendant appeals and asserts 
(.1) that the judgment requiring monthly 
payments is not subject to modification; 
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that it was based upon an agreement for 
property settlement and that the payments 
required do not fall within the accepted 
definition of alimony; (2) that the evi-
dence does not support the findings of the 
court relative to change of circumstances 
upon which the judgment is based; (3) that 
voluntary impoverishment is not ground 
for modification of the decree; (4) that 
the court erred in not allowing plaintiff 
her attorney fees. 
Our statute Sec. 30-3-5, U.GA.1953, pro-
vides that: 
"When a decree of divorce is made 
the court may make such orders in rela-
tion to the children, property and par-
ties, and the maintenance of the par-
ties and children, as may be equitable 
* * *. Such subsequent changes or 
new orders may be made by the court 
with respect to the disposal of the 
children or the distribution of property 
as shall be reasonable and proper." 
This court has interpreted the statute 
to authorize the courts to increase or de-
crease alimony payments upon a showing 
of substantial change of circumstances. 
Buzzo v. Buzzo, 45 Utah 625, 148 P. 362. 
It is generally held that under such a 
statute the court can modify a decree for 
alimony regardless of whether the decree 
was based upon an agreement of the par-
ties. See annotations in 58 A.L.R. 639; 
109 A.L.R. 1068; 166 A.L.R. 675. 
[1] This court has held that, by reason 
of the statute, an agreement or stipulation 
between parties to a divorce suit as to ali-
mony or payments for support of children 
is not binding upon the court in entering a 
divorce decree, but serves only as a recom-
mendation, and if the court adopts the 
suggestion of the parties it does not there-
by lose the right to make such modification 
or change thereafter as may be requested by 
either party, based upon change of circum-
stances warranting such modification. 
Jones v. Jones, 104 Utah 275, 139 P.2d 222; 
Barraclough v. Barraclough, 100 Utah 196, 
111 P.2d 792. 
Counsel for plaintiff contends however 
that in the above cases there was not in-
volved a property settlement agreement such 
as here and that this case must therefore 
be distinguished and should be governed by 
the doctrine announced in Dickey v. Dickey, 
154 Md. 675, 141 A. 387, 58 A.L.R. 634, and 
North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, 100 S.W.2d 
582, 109 A.L.R. 1061. Plaintiff also cites 
Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 172, 44 
P.2d 540; Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 
833, 136 P.2d 1; and Rich v. Rich, 44 Cal. 
App.2d 526, 112 P.2d 780. Counsel con-
tends that in these cases it is held that 
where there has been a property settlement 
agreement, coupled with an agreement for 
monthly payments, and the court has ap-
proved of such agreement and adopted 
it in the divorce decree, the provision for 
monthly payments is an inseparable part 
of the property settlement and therefore 
may not be subsequently modified except by 
consent of both parties. 
It is noted that in Dickey v. Dickey, 
supra, the Supreme Court of Maryland held 
that where both.the agreement and the de-
cree provided for monthly payments during 
the life or until the remarriage of tlie wife, 
such payments could not be considered to 
be alimony, and therefore the court did not 
have jurisdiction either to modify the de-
cree or to enforce the payments of contempt 
proceedings. This was based upon the 
view that the court in the divorce action 
did not have power, in the absence of agree-
ment by the parties, to grant a judgment 
requiring payment of alimony after the 
death of the husband, and having granted 
judgment based upon the contract of the 
parties, which might require payments aft-
er the husband's death, such payments could 
not be considered alimony. 
This view is opposed to the majority of 
appellate decisions as appears from anno-
tations in 18 A.L.R. 1047, 1050, and 101 
A.L.R. 324, 326, and is not in harmony with 
views of this court as announced in Mur-
phy v. Moyle, 17 Utah 113, 53 P. 1010, 
1012, 70 Am.St.Rep. 767. The Utah stat-
ute at the time of that decision was sub-
stantially the same as now. The court said: 
"This statute is broad and compre-
hensive. Under it the court has power 
to make such a decree as the circum-
stances may warrant, and doubtless, if 
there is danger of the father squander-
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ing the estate, or if, from hostility or 
other cause he is likely to refuse main-
tenance to his wife, or support to his 
children awarded to her, and thus leave 
the children to be supported by the 
mother without aid from his estate, the 
court may make such order, respecting 
the property and the support and main-
tenance of the wife and children, as is 
just and equitable, and such order or 
decree may be made to continue in 
force after his decease; and the court 
may afterwards, if occasion shall re-
quire it, make such change in any de-
cree as 'will be conducive to the best in-
terests of all parties concerned/ 
* * * it is the solemn duty of every 
husband and father to support his wife 
during life, and his children during 
their minority, suitably to their station 
in life, and, if he fail to do so, every 
principle of justice demands that they 
be thus supported out of his estate.0 
It is true that in that case the claim made 
against the deceased husband's estate was 
for support of a minor child, but the opinion 
expressed as to the power of the court un-
der the statute to award alimony to con-
tinue after the death of the husband ap-
pears to be supported by the weight of ju-
dicial authority. 
In North v. North, supra, the Supreme 
Court of Missouri held that in a divorce 
proceeding the court had no power to en-
ter judgment calling for payments after the 
death of the husband, except pursuant to 
consent or agreement and that where a 
contract had been entered into for a di-
vision of property and for payment of $500 
per month until the death or remarriage of 
the wife, with a note and trust deed given 
to secure performance, and where the di-
vorce decree approved the contract and in-
corporated its terms in the judgment, the 
court had no jurisdiction to subsequently 
reduce the monthly payments, regardless of 
the fact that they were referred to in the 
decree as alimony. It should be noted how-
ever that in that case a note and trust deed 
had been given to secure payment of the 
installments of so-called alimony and the 
agreement expressly recited that in con-




the wife agreed to release the husband 
from any further obligation to pay alimony 
or to support and maintain her. Under 
such an agreement and decree it would be 
unreasonable to reduce the payments or-
dered to be made. But insofar as the de-
cision might be considered authority for 
the doctrine that the court has not juris-
diction to modify an award of alimony in 
a case where there has been a property 
settlement, we are not inclined to follow it. 
In the California cases cited by plain-
tiff, it appears that the contract provisions 
relative to installment payments were found 
to be an integral element in the settlement 
of property rights, and that this was the 
basis for the holdings that the court could 
not subsequently modify the decree. In 
Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, the opinion recites: 
"The agreement indicates that the 
monthly payments to be made thereun-
der by defendant to plaintiff, stated to 
be for the latter's 'support and main-
tenance/ constituted an integral and 
important element in the amicable ad-
justment and liquidation of such prop-
erty rights. In our opinion, the con-
tract suggests that such payments were 
to be made to and received by plaintiff 
as part of the property settlement and 
in lieu of property rights (emphasis 
added). This would appear to have 
been recognized in both the interlocuto-
ry and final decrees of divorce, for each 
provides that 'neither the making of 
this decree nor anything herein con-
tained shall in any manner modify, re-
strict, affect or prejudice the provisions 
or any of them, of said agreement here-
inabove mentioned * * * which agree-
ment * * * shall remain in full 
force and effect' " [3 Cal.2d 172, 44 
P.2d 543.] 
A subsequent opinion by the Supreme 
Court of California, Hough v. Hough, 26 
Cal.2d 605, 160 P2d 15, 18, clarifies and 
appears to set at rest the law of Cali-
fornia relative to the issue here under 
discussion. It quotes with approval the fol-
lowing from 39 Michigan Law Review 128 : 
"Assuming that the court has power 
by statute to modify a decree not based 
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on contract, it would seem that in the 
view of most courts there is no suf-
ficient reason to take the decree based 
on contract out of the operation of the 
statute as to the alimony provisions. 
That the interest of the state in the 
marital status and the dissolution there-
of is sufficient reason to support such 
a view hardly seems to require demon-
stration. * * * The obligation to 
pay alimony or support money to a di-
vorced wife is one peculiarly justified 
by considerations of social desirability 
and generally prescribed as a conse-
quence to dissolution of the marital re-
lation. Being a continuing obligation, 
and being subject to scrutiny of the 
courts as to fairness and adequacy at 
its inception, it should so remain and 
the contract of the parties should not 
be allowed to oust the court of power 
otherwise exercisable." 
The court then says: 
"This does not mean that payments 
under property settlement agreements 
may be modified even though incorpo-
rated in the decree. They may not 
(Citing cases.) But.in such a situation 
there is not the same underlying policy. 
The settlement of property rights 
should be final in order to secure stabili-
ty of titles. Support allowances on the 
other hand should be subject to the 
discretion of the court as justice may 
require. * * * It has been loosely 
stated generally in passing that the di-
vorce court has no jurisdiction to modi-
fy a decree based upon a property set-
tlement agreement. (Citing cases, in-
cluding Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, supra.) 
However, that does not mean that the 
court does not have jurisdiction on an 
application for modification to decide 
correctly or incorrectly whether the de-
cree is based upon a property settlement 
agreement, and is not subject to modifi-
cation, or is based upon alimony or sup-
port allowance covenants, and is sub-
ject to modification." 
[2-4] In the case before us the agree-
ment provided for division of property to 
each of the parties which so far as shown 
appears to have been of approximately 
equal value. The language of the para-
graph relating to monthly payments to the 
plaintiff clearly shows that it was intended 
to be for support of the plaintiff. It is ex-
pressly referred to as "alimony." The para-
graph begins with the statement that "the 
second party agrees to pay to first party 
alimony in the sum of $400 per month 
during the life of the first party." It ends 
with the statement "The alimony and sup-
port money payments herein mentioned 
shall be paid to first party on or before the 
5th day of each and every month." There 
is no statement anywhere in the agreement 
that the monthly payments constituted pay-
ment for plaintiff's interest in property de-
creed to defendant. In paragraph Sixth of 
the agreement, hereinabove quoted, the pay-
ments to be made to plaintiff are again re-
ferred to as "alimony." In view of these 
facts we hold that the payments must be 
considered alimony for support of plaintiff. 
We further hold that these provisions are 
not an inseparable part of the agreement re-
lating to division of property and that by 
approval of the agreement in the decree 
the court did not divest itself of jurisdiction 
under the statute to make such subsequent 
changes and orders with respect to alimony 
payments as might be reasonable and prop-
er, based upon change of circumstances. 
We hold this to be true even though the 
provisions of the agreement should be in-
terpreted to mean that the parties intend-
ed to stipulate for a fixed and unalterable 
amount of monthly alimony. The object 
and purpose of the statute is to give the 
courts power to enforce, after divorce, 
the duty of support which exists between 
a husband and wife or parent and child. 
Legislators .who enacted the law were 
probably aware of a fact, which is a 
matter of common knowledge to trial 
courts, that parties to divorce suits fre-
quently enter into agreements relative to 
alimony or for child support which, if bind-
ing upon the courts, would leave children 
or divorced wives inadequately provided 
for. It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that the law was intended to give courts 
power to disregard the stipulations or agree-
ments of the parties in the first instance 
and enter judgment for such alimony or 
child support as appears reasonable, and to 
thereafter modify such judgments when 
change of circumstances justifies it, regard-
less of attempts of the parties to control the 
matter by contract Under the authorities 
herein cited such a view seems to be gen-
erally if not universally adhered to by the 
courts. If it were held otherwise in this 
case, in which a husband asks for reduction 
of alimony, it would establish a precedent 
which in future cases might prevent di-
vorced wives in serious distress from ob-
taining increased alimony from ex-hus-
bands possessed of wealth or ample income 
to provide for them. We hold that the trial 
court had power and jurisdiction to modify 
the decree of divorce with respect to the 
payments involved herein. 
[5,6] Plaintiff's next contention, that 
the evidence does not support the trial 
court's findings, nor its conclusions of law 
and judgment, makes it necessary for us 
to review the evidence since this is an equity 
case. Clawson v. Wallace, 16 Utah 300, 52 
P. 9; Utah Const. A r t 8, Sec. 9. However, 
there is little or no dispute between the 
parties as to the evidence. The testimony 
of witnesses is also substantially without 
conflict. The trial court found that the 
income of the defendant from his profes-
sion as a physician and surgeon at the time 
of the divorce was approximately $1,000 
per month and that at the time of the pro-
ceedings for modification it had decreased 
to approximately $600 per month. Counsel 
for plaintiff contends that the decrease in 
income "is directly attributable to the lux-
ury of a clinic which the defendant per-
sists in maintaining" and it is asserted that 
voluntary impoverishment is not a ground 
for reduction of alimony. With the latter 
statement we agree, but we cannot say that 
the circumstances shown by the evidence 
as to maintenance of the clinic by defend-
ant amounts to voluntary impoverishment. 
It may not have proved a profitable ven-
ture, but we cannot say that that could 
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have been foreseen with any degree of 
certainty. We believe from a reading of 
the transcript and exhibits that the findings 
of the trial court are approximately cor-
rect as to the income of the-defendant from 
his profession at the time of the decree 
and at the time of the order for modifica-
tion. His income from other sources ap-
pears to have been approximately $7,000 
per year at the time of the divorce, and 
almost entirely from stocks and bonds 
which were then divided approximately 
equally between plaintiff and defendant. 
Defendant's income from sources other 
than his profession during the year 1951 
appears to have been $3,243.11 and in 1950, 
$3,250.62. The evidence shows that the 
defendant was fifty-eight years of age at 
time of proceedings for modification, that-
between April 1949 and November 1952 he 
had three examinations by a recognized 
heart specialist; that such examinations 
showed a developing abnormality of the 
heart, indicating coronary disease, and that 
the specialist had advised defendant to re-
duce his activities and avoid strain and ex-
haustion. We believe the evidence justi-
fied a finding that defendant's health has 
become impaired to some extent and that 
this condition will probably result in re-
ducing defendant's income. We also be-
lieve that the evidence shows that plaintiff 
has a sufficient income from property owned 
by her to justify the court's ruling that de-
fendant should not be required to pay her 
attorney fees and costs in these proceed-
ings. 
The judgment of the trial court will be 
affirmed. Each party to bear his or her own 
costs. 
WOLFE, C. J., and McDONOUGH and 
WADE, JJ., concur. 
CROCKETT, J., having disqualified him-
self, does not participate herein. 
HENRIOD, Justice, does not participate 
herein. 
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evidence to support the trial court's finding 
that the defendants as partners received 
the benefit of the money loaned by the 
plaint^ and that they are each-liable for 
its repayment.4 In conformity with the 
statement in the comment just quoted 
above, the fact that defendant Morgan 
signed a note acknowledging his obligation 
does not relieve the defendant Green of his 
obligation. 
[3] The final matter to be addressed is 
the assertion of plaintiffs in their respon-
dents' brief that they are entitled to the full 
$3,700 face amount of the promissory note, 
plus interest, without deduction for the 
amounts paid by the defendants by the 
checks above referred to. Their argument 
is that the defendants failed to plead the 
defense of payment and that the issue was 
thus not properly before the trial court. 
The argument is without merit. Under our 
modernized rules of procedure, Rule 54(c), 
U.R.C.P., provides that the court shall ren-
der the judgment to which the evidence 
shows the parties are entitled, even if not so 
requested in the pleadings. 
What has just been said sufficiently dis-
poses of the plaintiffs contention. But in 
supplement thereto, we further observe 
that the defendant did not comply with the 
requirements of Rule 74(b), U.R.C.P., relat-
ing to cross appeals.6 The judgment of the 
trial court is affirmed in its entirety, the 
parties to bear their own costs. 
HALL and HOWE, JJ., and CALVIN 
GOULD, District Judge, concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the result. 
MAUGHAN, C. J., does not participate 
herein; GOULD, District Judge, sat. 
(Z | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM^ 
5. That this Court will affirm the trial court on 
any proper ground apparent from the record, 
see Edwards v. Iron County, Utah, 531 P.2d 476 
(1975); Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine, Utah, 595 
P.2d 860 (1979). 
Heidemarie G. FOULGER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
John C. FOUGLER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 16909. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 4, 1981. 
Former husband appealed from order 
of the Fourth District Court, Utah County, 
David Sam, J., granting former wife's mo-
tion for modification of decree of divorce. 
The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that no 
compelling reasons were shown by former 
wife which would warrant modification of 
property disposition portion of divorce de-
cree. 
Reversed and remanded. 
Stewart, J., concurred in the result. 
Maughan, C. J., concurred in result and 
filed a statement. 
1. Divorce <£=»164 
Trial court sitting in divorce matter 
retains continuing jurisdiction to make such 
modifications in initial decree of divorce as 
it deems just and equitable, but where no 
appeal is taken from original decree, change 
of circumstances must be shown to justify 
later modification. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
2. Divorce <s=>254(2) 
Court should be reluctant to grant 
modification of provisions of divorce decree 
which dispose of real property, and grant 
such modifications only upon showing of 
compelling reasons arising from substantial 
and material change in circumstances. 
6. See Terry v. Zions Co-op Mercantile Inst., 
Utah, 617 P.2d 700, 701 (1980). 
EXHIBIT 
FOULGER v 
CHe as, Uuh, 
3. Divorce <s=» 254(2) 
Where property disposition is product 
of agreement and stipulation between the 
parties, and sanctioned by trial court, trial 
court should subsequently modify such pro-
visions only with great reluctance and 
based upon compelling reasons. 
4. Divorce <s=» 254(2) 
At time of making of stipulated prop-
erty settlement, adopted by trial court in 
original divorce decree, which awarded for-
mer marital residence to wife, facts that 
wife would be solely responsible for mainte-
nance and upkeep on residence, would make 
payments on residence, together with taxes 
and insurance payments, and could make 
substantial improvements to property, all 
without benefit of financial help or assist-
ance from former husband, were within 
contemplation of parties, and were not com-
pelling reasons to warrant later modifica-
tion of decree. 
Noali T. Woottoiv of Wootton & Wootton, 
American Fork, for defendant and appel-
lant. 
Craig M. Snyder, Provo, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
Defendant John C. Foulger takes this ap-
peal from an order by the trial court grant-
ing plaintiff Heidemarie Foulger's motion 
for modification of a decree of divorce. 
On October 29, 1975, the lower court 
granted the plaintiff a decree of divorce, 
dissolving the parties' marriage of nine 
years. The parties entered into an agree-
ment of settlement, which was adopted by 
the trial court Pursuant to that agree-
ment, and the decree based thereon, plain-
tiff was awarded custody and care of the 
couple's three minor children, alimony and 
child support payments, and a, certain poT-
tion of the marital property, including pos-
session of the family residence on conditions 
which led to the instant dispute. Para-
1. The trial court also granted plaintiffs motion 
for an increase in child support payments, from 
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graph 5 of the decree of divorce, taken from 
the couple's settlement agreement, states 
the following: 
5. That plaintiff is hereby awarded all 
right, title and :*iterest in and to the real 
property and residence at 195 North 7th 
East, . . . Subject, however, to a lien on 
said premises in t*ehalf of the defendant 
equal to fifty percent (5 o) of the 
amours received from any sale in excess 
of $17,000.00 which is th„ purchase price 
of said residence. Defendant is further 
awarded a first option 1 purchase said 
residence in the event of nale and apply 
his equity upon said p irehase price. 
Plaintiff is hereby grant d the right to 
reside in said residence #s long as she so 
desires, but in the event of sale, the above 
formula shall apply. 
On November 21, 1979, defendant was 
served with an order to show cause why the 
original decree of divorce should not be 
modified with regard to those provisions 
dealing with child support and defendant's 
\ien on the family residence. The trial 
court heard the matter on December 18, 
1979, at which time plaintiff asserted that 
there had been a substantial change of cir-
cumstance justifying modification of the 
original divorce decree relating to defend-
ant's lien on the family residence.1 In justi-
fication of this assertion, plaintiff pointed 
out that she had been making payments on 
the residence, together with tax and insur-
ance payments thereon, since the time of 
the divorce without benefit of financial help 
or assistance from defendant; that she had 
been solely responsible for maintenance and 
upkeep on the residence since the decree of 
divorce was issued; that she had made sub-
stantial improvements to the property since 
the divorce, and contemplated further im-
provements, the effect of which would be to 
increase substantially the value of the prop-
erty; and that she no longer contemplated 
returning to heT native \and of Germany 
with the three minor children, allegedly de-
fendant's motive for imposing the lien con-
dition in the agreement. 
which ruling defendant takes no appeal. 
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The court found that paragraph 5 of the 
original decree of divorce was "inherently 
unfair" and that, the motive for the inser-
tion thereof having been obviated, it should 
be modified to grant to defendant a lien on 
the family residence in <in amount equal to 
one-half the appreciated value of the home, 
over and above its purchi*~° price as of the 
time of divorce. The purchase price of the 
residence having been $17,000, and \ .iua-
tion thereof at tue time of the divorce hav-
ing been $37,000, the modification gave de-
fendant a lien in the amount o.f $10,000. 
On appeal, defendant asserts that the 
modification of the decree was improper, in 
that (1) plaintiff failed to show a sufficient 
change in circumstances to justify modifica-
tion of the decree, and (2) the property 
disposition in the original decree constituted 
a court^approved stipulation drafted by the 
parties dealing at arm's length without du-
ress or undue influence. We agree, and 
reverse the trial court's ruling. 
[1] Under Utah law, a trial court sitting 
in a divorce matter retains continuing juris-
diction to make such modifications in the 
initial decree of divorce as it deems just and 
equitable.2 Where no appeal is taken from 
the original divorce decree, however, a 
change of circumstances must be shown in 
order to justify a later modification of such 
decree.3 Absent such a requirement, a de-
cree of divorce would be subject to ad infin-
itum appellate review and readjustment ac-
cording to the concepts of equity held by 
succeeding trial judges. 
[2] The change in circumstance required 
to justify a modification of the decree of 
divorce varies with the type of modification 
contemplated. Provisions in the original 
decree of divorce granting alimony, child 
support, and the like must be readily sus-
ceptible to alteration at a later date, as the 
needs which such provisions were designed 
to fill are subject to rapid and unpredicta-
2. U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5, as amended. 
3. Anderson v. Anderson, 13 Utah 2d 36, 368 
P.2d 264 (1962). 
ble change. Where a disposition of real 
property is in question, however, courts 
should properly be more reluctant to grant 
a modification. In the interest of securing 
stability in titles, modifications in a decree 
of divorce making disposition of real prop-
erty are to be granted only upon a showing 
of compelling reasons arising from a sub-
stantial and material change in circum-
stances.4 
[3] The above holds true a fortiori 
where the property disposition is the prod-
uct of an agreement and stipulation be-
tween the parties, and sanctioned by the 
trial court. Such a provision is the product 
of an agreement bargained for by the par-
ties. As such, a trial court should subse-
quently modify such a provision only with 
great reluctance, and based upon compel-
ling reasons.5 
[4] In the instant case, no such compel-
ling reasons have been shown to exist which 
warrant the modification granted. Matters 
such as payments on the home, and mainte-
nance and upkeep thereof, certainly must 
have been within plaintiffs contemplation 
at the time she agreed to the disposition set 
forth in the original divorce decree. In 
regard to permanent improvements, de-
fendant concedes that he is not entitled to 
share in any increase in value resulting 
therefrom, but only in the enhancement in 
any increase by an accelerated economy. 
The matter of plaintiff's possible departure 
to Germany was, by her own admission, 
never anything more than a remote possi-
bility. The fact that she is now more estab-
lished as a resident of the United States, 
while it further diminishes the likelihood of 
her departure, constitutes no change of cir-
cumstances sufficiently radical to justify 
the trial court's action. 
Reversed and remanded to the trial court 
for further proceedings consistent with this 
5. Despain v. Despain, Utah, 610 P.2d 1303 
(1980); Land v. Land, Utah, 605 P.2d 1248 
(1980). 
4. Callister v. Callister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 
944 (1953), and cases referred to therein. 
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opinion. Plaintiffs prayer for attorney's 1. Administrative 
fees is denied, and the parties are to bear 
their own costs. 
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CROCKETT,* and HOWE, J J., concur. 
STEWART, J., concurs in the ^su l t 
MAUGHAN, Chief Justice (concurring in 
the result and dissenting): 
I concur in the result, but refer to m} 
dissenting opinions in Despain v. Despain, 
Utah, 610 P.2d 1303, 1307 (1980) and Chris-
tensen v. Christensen, Utah, 619 P.2d 137£ 
(1980). 
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Ray PLEDGER, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
S. Tony COX, Director, Drivers License 
Division, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 16987. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 4, 1981. 
The Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Maurice D. Jones, J. pro tern., up-
held revocation of driver's license, and ap-
peal was taken. The Supreme Court, Oak&, 
J., held that statutory "trial de novo" pro-
vided to review administrative revocation 
of driver's license for refusal to submit to 
blood test for alcohol content is a complete 
retrial upon all the evidence, and upon such 
complete retrial, the Drivers License Divi-
sion should have the burden of proof and 
the burden of going forward with the evi-
dence. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
Law and Procedure 
e=>744 
"De novo" means literally "anew, 
afresh, a second time," and has at least two 
possible interpretations when applied to ju-
dicial review of administrative action: (1) a 
complete retrial upon new evidence, and (2) 
r trial upon the record made before the 
lower tribunal, and the meaning of "trial de 
novo" in each statute is dictated by the 
wording and context of the statute in which 
it appears and by the nature of the adminis-
trative body, decision and procedure being 
reviewed. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
2. Automobiles ®=> 144.2(4) 
Statutory "trial de novo" provided to 
review administrative revocation of driver's 
license for refusal to submit to blood test 
for alcohol content is a complete retrial 
upon all the evidence, and upon such com-
plete retrial, the Drivers License Division 
should have the burden of proof and the 
burden of going forward with the evidence. 
U.C.A.1953, 41-2-19, 41-2-20, 41-6-44.-
10(b). 
3. Automobiles <s=> 144.2(4) 
Where review of administrative revoca-
tion of driver's license for refusal to submit 
to blood test for alcohol content was faulted 
by erroneous ground rule about the se-
quence and burden of proof, Supreme Court 
would not speculate about whether the er-
ror was prejudicial but would reverse and 
remand the case to district court for a new 
trial. 
Jo Carol Nesset-Sale, of Salt Lake Legal 
Defenders Association, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Robert B. Hansen, Atty. Gen., Bruce M. 
Hale, Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and respondent. 
* CROCKETT, J., concurred in this case prior to 
his retirement. 
WOODWARD v 
Cite as, Utah, 
Marvin L. WOODWARD, Plaintiff, 
Appellant and Cross-Respondent, 
v. 
Mildred L. WOODWARD, Defendant, 
Respondent and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 18089. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
The First District Court, Box Elder 
County, VeNoy Christoffersen, J., granted 
divorce with property division, and husband 
appealed. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., 
held that: (1) trial court properly awarded 
wife share in that portion of husband's 
retirement benefits to which rights accrued 
during marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
band was not entitled to such benefits until 
he worked additional 15 years, and (2) 
award of such benefits was properly made 
in form of deferred distribution based upon 
fixed percentage. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
remanded. 
1. Divorce &=> 252.3(4) 
Concept of "vesting" of retirement and 
pension rights is inappropriate basis for de-
termining what property should be subject 
to equitable division in divorce proceeding. 
2. Divorce <s=»252.3(l, 4) 
In fashioning equitable property divi-
sion in divorce proceeding, court may take 
into consideration all pertinent circumstanc-
es, encompassing all assets of every nature 
possessed by parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived, and in-
cluding retirement and pension rights; 
overruling Bennett v. Bennett, 607 P.2d 
839. 
3. Divorce e=» 252.3(1) 
Whether resource is subject to distribu-
tion in divorce proceeding does not turn on 
whether spouse can presently use or control 
it, or on whether resource can be given 
present dollar value; essential criterion is 
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whether right to benefit or asset has ac-
crued in whole or in part during marriage, 
and, to extent that right has so accrued, it 
is subject to equitable distribution. 
4. Divorce <®=»252.3(4) 
In divorce proceeding, trial court prop-
erly avarci, d wife one-half share in that 
portion of husband's pfovernment retire-
nent benefits to which rights accrued dur-
ing marriage, notwithstanding that hus-
band was not entitled to any such benefits 
until and unless h-?. worked additional 15 
years at government job. 
5. Divorce <s=>252.3(4) 
Where husband's right to retirement 
benefits was contingent upon his working 
an additional 15 years, trial court properly 
awarded wife share in such benefits in form 
of deferred distribution based upon fixed 
percentage. 
Brian R. Florence, Ogden, for plaintiff, 
appellant and cross-respondent. 
Ben H. Hadfield, Brigham City, for de-
fendant, respondent and cross-appellant. 
DURHAM, Justice: 
The plaintiff husband appeals from that 
portion of the trial court's decree of divorce 
which awarded to the defendant wife a 
portion of his retirement benefits. The 
husband argues that the court erred in con-
sidering, as a marital asset, that portion of 
his pension which would be contributed by 
the government at some future date. 
The husband has worked as a civilian 
employee at Hill Air Force Base for fifteen 
years. Under his government pension plan, 
he has contributed $17,500 to the pension 
fund during that time. If he were to leave 
his job now, he would receive only the 
amount of his contributions. In order to 
receive maximum benefits from the plan, 
the husband would have to participate in it 
for a total of 30 years. At that time, the 
government would match the amount of his 
contributions and the husband could elect to 
receive the benefits as an annuity or as a 
lump sum. In its Findings of Fact, the trial 
656 P.2d—11 
^HIBIT 
432 Utah 656 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
court stated that, because one-half of the 
30-year period occurred during the mar-
riage and because the wife is entitled to 
one-half rtf the amount accrued during that 
time, the wife was therefore "granted an 
equity interest of one-fourth of all proceeds 
which the [husband] receives on his retire-
ment account, to be paid to [the wife] . . . 
as [the husband] receives the proceeds." 
The husbatid concedes that the wife is enti-
tled to one-half of the sum he has contribut-
ed during the fifteen years of their mar-
riage. However, he claims that she has no 
right or interest in the amount to be con-
tributes by the government at the time of 
his retirement because that amount is con-
tingent upon his continued government em-
ployment 
[1,2] The only authority cited by the 
husband for his position is Bennett v. Ben-
nett, Utah, 607 P.2d 839 (1980). In that 
case, this Court reversed a trial court's divi-
sion of the husband's retirement benefits 
because the government's future contribu-
tion to the retirement fund was found to 
have "no present value." Id. at 840. How-
ever, in Dogu v. Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308 
(1982), we commented that "that holding 
reflected a failure of proof," Id. The wife 
urges the adoption of the position taken by 
the California Supreme Court in In re Mar-
riage of Brown, 15 Cal.3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 
126 Cal.Rptr. 633 (1976). There the court 
held that "[p]ension rights, whether or not 
vested, represent a property interest; to 
the extent that such rights derive from 
employment during coverture, they com-
prise a community asset subject to division 
in a dissolution proceeding." Id. at 562-63, 
126 Cal.Rptr. at 634-35. This case over-
ruled an earlier California case of long-
standing which had distinguished pension 
rights on the basis of whether the rights 
had vested. In the context of Utah law, we 
find it unnecessary to consider whether or 
1. In Stern v. Stern, 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 
(1975), the court commented that "the concept 
of vesting should probably find no significant 
place in the developing law of equitable distri-
bution." id at 348, 331 A.2dat262. The court 
refers briefly to the origins of the vested inter-
est as it was associated with the concept of 
not the pension rights are "vested or non-
vested." l In Englert v. Englert, Utah, 576 
P.2d 1274 (1978), we emphasized the equita-
ble nature of proceedings dealing with the 
family, pointing out that the court may 
take into consideration all of the pertinent 
circumstances. These circumstances en-
compass "all of the assets of every nature 
possessed by the parties, whenever obtained 
and from whatever source derived; and 
that this includes any such pension fund or 
insurance." Id. at 1276. To the extent that 
Bennett v. Bennett, supra, may limit the 
ability of the court to consider all of the 
parties' assets and circumstances, including 
retirement and pension rights, it is express-
ly overruled. 
[3] In the instant case, the husband ar-
gues that because he cannot now benefit 
from the government's promised contribu-
tions to his pension at the time of retire-
ment, the wife should not receive any por-
tion of the benefits which are based on the 
government's participation. This argument 
fails to recognize that pension or retirement 
benefits are a form of deferred compensa-
tion by the employer. If the rights to those 
benefits are acquired during the marriage, 
then the court must at least consider those 
benefits in making an equitable distribution 
of the marital assets. " 'The right to re-
ceive monies in the future is unquestionably 
. . . an economic resource' subject to equita-
ble distribution based upon proper computa-
tion of its present dollar value." Kikkert v. 
Kikkert, 177 N.J.Super. 471, 475, 427 A.2d 
76, 78 (1981) (emphasis and omission in orig-
inal) (quoting Kruger v. Kruger, 73 N.J. 
464, 468, 375 A.2d 659, 662 (1977)), aff'd, 88 
N.J. 4, 438 A.2d 317 (1981). Whether that 
resource is subject to distribution does not 
turn on whether the spouse can presently 
use or control it, or on whether the resource 
can be given a present dollar value. The 
essential criterion is whether a right to the 
seisin and also to its use in connection with 
"vested rights" in discussions of Constitutional 
guaranties. We agree that this concept of 
"vesting" is an inappropriate basis for deter-
mining what property should be subject to eq-
uitable division in a divorce proceeding. 
WOODWARD v, 
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benefit or asset has accrued in whole or in 
part during the marriage. To the extent 
that the right has so accrued it is subject to 
equitable distribution. 
[4] In the instant case, the husband 
must work for another fifteen years to 
qualify for the maximum benefits under 
the pension plan. He will not qualify in the 
twenty-ninth year or in the next to the last 
month. Because he must work for a total 
of thirty years, his pension benefits, includ-
ing any contribution by the government, 
are as dependent on the first fifteen years 
as the last fifteen. Thus, the wife is enti-
tled to share in that portion of the benefits 
to which the rights accrued during the mar-
riage. We hold that the trial court did not 
err in making equitable distribution of the 
husband's retirement benefits. 
[5] We also hold that the method used 
to distribute the retirement benefits was a 
proper exercise of the court's discretion. 
We agree with the discussion in Kikkert, 
supra, where it was stated: 
Long-term and deferred sharing of finan-
cial interests are obviously too susceptible 
to continued strife and hostility, circum-
stances which our courts traditionally 
strive to avoid to the greatest extent 
possible. This goal may be best accom-
plished, if a present value of the pension 
plan is ascertainable, by fixing the other 
spouse's share thereof, as adjusted for all 
appropriate considerations, including the 
length of time the pensioner must survive 
to enjoy its benefits, to be satisfied out of 
other assets leaving all pension benefits 
to the employee himself. 
On the other hand, where other assets 
for equitable distribution are inadequate 
or lacking altogether, or where no 
present value can be established and the 
parties are unable to reach agreement, 
resort must be had to a form of deferred 
distribution based upon fixed percent-
ages. 
Id. at 478, 427 A.2d at 79-80. The facts in 
the present case present just such a circum-
stance: other assets available for equitable 
distribution are inadequate, and a present 
value of retirement benefits would be diffi-
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cult if not impossible to ascertain because 
the value of the benefits is contingent on 
the husband's decision to remain working 
for the government. In such a case, "the 
trial court could use a method widely em-
ployed in other states, whereby the trial 
court determines what percentage of the 
marital property each spouse is to receive, 
and then divides payments from the pension 
plan accordingly." Selchert v. Selchert, 90 
Wis.2d 1, 10, 280 N.W.2d 293, 298 (1979). 
The Wisconsin court continued: 
Under this approach it is unnecessary to 
make any determination as to the value 
of the pension fund. . . . When the bene-
ficiary spouse then opts to receive pay-
ments under the pension plan, the non-
covered spouse would be entitled to her 
established percentage of those pay-
ments . . . . Any risk associated with the 
fund . . . would be by this method appor-
tioned equally between the parties. This 
method may [sic] particularly appropriate 
where the present value of a pension 
fund is very difficult or impossible to 
assess. 
Id. at 10-12, 280 N.W.2d at 298 (footnotes 
omitted). 
The trial court awarded one-half of the 
marital property to each of the parties in 
the instant case. It is clear that the court 
intended the wife to receive one-half of the 
retirement benefits which had accrued dur-
ing the fifteen-year marriage. However, in 
its order, the court specified that the wife 
receive one-fourth of the proceeds of the 
retirement plan as they are received by the 
husband. This portion, one-fourth, awards 
to the wife one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage only if the husband 
works for the full thirty years. The order 
should be modified to provide for the wife 
to receive one-half of the benefits accrued 
during the marriage, regardless of the 
length of time the husband continues in the 
same employment. Whenever the husband 
chooses to terminate his government em-
ployment, the marital property subject to 
distribution is a portion of the retirement 
benefits represented by the number of 
years of the marriage divided by the num-
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ber of years of the husband's employment. 
The wife is entitled to one-half of that 
portion pursuant to the award of the trial 
judge in this case, which our modification is 
intended to sustain. 
We therefore affirm in part, reverse in 
part and remand to the trial court so that 
the order may be amended to conform with 
this opinion. No costs or fees are awarded. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
HOWE, JJ., concur. 
Kristine H. BOWEN and Cynthia Bowen, 
an infant by Nathaniel Bowen, her 
guardian ad litem, Plaintiffs and Appel-
lants, 
v. 
RIVERTON CITY, a municipal corpora-
tion, Sterling R. Draper and Enoch 
Smith Sons Company, Defendants and 
Respondents. 
No. 17732. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 4, 1982. 
In a personal injury action, the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, James S. 
Sawaya, J., granted summary judgment for 
city and subsequently, pursuant to motions 
and stipulations in consolidated actions, dis-
missed all claims, counterclaims and cross 
claims with prejudice except for claim 
against city, and plaintiffs appealed. The 
Supreme Court, Stewart, J., held that: (1) 
appeal was timely filed, and (2) whether 
city fulfilled its duty to maintain city 
streets in safe condition was question of 
fact for jury, precluding summary judg-
ment. 
Reversed and remanded for trial. 
1. Appeal and Error ®=»430(1) 
Since failure to file timely notice of 
appeal is jurisdictional, Supreme Court 
lacks jurisdiction to hear appeal if notice 
was not timely filed. Rules Civ.Proc, Rules 
42(a), 73(a). 
2. Appeal and Error <®=>344, 428(2) 
Trial court's April 13 order, entered 
pursuant to stipulation of counsel in both 
consolidated actions, was final judgment in 
each case for purpose of calculating timeli-
ness of appeal, and thus plaintiffs, who on 
May 12, 1981, filed notice of appeal, timely 
filed appeal from trial court's grant of sum-
mary judment on January 26 for city. 
3. Judgment <s=> 181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment is proper only if 
pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admis-
sions show that there is no genuine issue of 
material fact and that moving party is enti-
tled to judgment as matter of law. 
4. Judgment <$=> 185(2) 
If there is any doubt or uncertainty 
concerning questions of fact, doubt should 
be resolved in favor of opposing party on 
motion for summary judgment and thus 
court must evaluate all evidence and all 
reasonable inferences fairly drawn from ev-
idence in light most favorable to party op-
posing summary judgment. 
5. Judgment <3=>180 
Summary judgment is appropriate only 
in the most clear-cut negligence cases. 
6. Municipal Corporations <$=> 757(1) 
City has nondelegable duty to exercise 
due care in maintaining streets within its 
corporate boundaries in reasonably safe 
condition for travel and may be held liable 
for injuries proximately resulting from its 
failure to do so. 
7. Municipal Corporations <s=>798 
In fulfilling its nondelegable duty to 
maintain streets, it is necessary for cities to 
maintain traffic signals in reasonably safe, 
visible and working condition. 
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cumstances under which the refusal to 
grant a continuance requested on the 
ground of the absence of a material wit-
ness would amount to an abuse of discre-
tion. An abuse of discretion will be found 
where an application for such a continu-
ance (1) is made in good faith, (2) shows 
that reasonable diligence has been exer-
cised to obtain the presence of the witness, 
(3) shows substantially to what the witness 
would testify and that such testimony is 
material, and (4) shows a sufficient reason 
for the absence of the witness by the affi-
davit of an affiant in position to know the 
facts. In this case, no showing was made 
as to what plaintiff would testify; nor was 
any affidavit filed in support of the con-
tention that plaintiff, delayed by inclement 
weather and bad roads, was on his way to 
the place of trial. The record presented 
here does not come close to being one 
which would require this Court to find an 
abuse of discretion. 
The prior history of this case lends fur-
ther support to the district court's decision 
to dismiss for failure to prosecute; it is a 
history of delay and lack of due diligence. 
This is no reflection upon plaintiff's 
present attorney, who did not appear on be-
half of plaintiff until July of 1969. Prior 
to this date, plaintiff's action had been dis-
missed twice. The first dismissal occurred 
when plaintiff did not appear either by 
counsel or in person at a hearing on de-
fendant's motion to dismiss. The second 
was granted because (1) plaintiff had 
failed to employ new counsel pursuant to 
notice and order of the court and (2) the 
matter had not been prosecuted in a timely 
fashion. These facts ipay well have influ-
enced the trial court in its decision to or-
der the dismissal being challenged here. 
The question of dismissing an action for 
failure to prosecute is generally one for 
the discretion of the trial court, and its 
ruling will not be reversed except for man-
upon affidavit, the evidence which he ex-
pects to obtain; and if the adverse party 
thereupon admit that such evidence would 
be given, and that it be considered as ac-
ifest abuse of discretion. Beckman v. 
Beckman, supra; Hansen v. Firebaugh, su-
pra. In light of the record presented on 
appeal and the prior history of this case, 
there was no abuse of discretion by the 
district court. 
The order of dismissal is affirmed. 
Costs to respondent. 
McQUADE, C. J., McFADDEN and 
SHEPARD, JJ., and MAYNARD, District 
Judge, concur. 
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Sylvester E. PEROVITZ, Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
v. 
Violet E. PEROVITZ, Defendant-
Respondent. 
No. 10350. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
Oct. 29, 1971. 
Appeal by husband from an order of 
the District Court, First Judicial District, 
Bonner County, James G. Towles, J., modi-
fying divorce decree and granting alimony. 
The Supreme Court, Shepard, J., held that 
grant to wife, in divorce decree, of hus-
band's class " Q " allotment, as enlisted 
member of the armed forces, to provide as-
sistance to certain dependents, and of any 
and all future allotments made by the hus-
band for the use and benefit of the wife 
was not an alimony award so as to entitle 
the wife to modify the decree 23 years aft-
er it was entered to provide for monthly 
alimony payments. 
Reversed. 
Spear, J., did not participate in the de-
cision. 
tually given on the trial, or offered and 
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1. Divorce <S=>I64 
If divorce decree contains no provision 
for an award of alimony, no modification 
of the decree can be made once the time 
for appea1 has elapsed. I.C. § 32-706. 
2. Divorce <3=>23l 
"Alimony" must be awarded in the 
for^ of a lump sum certain or periodic 
payments of sum certain or must require 
the performance of a particular act which 
may be in place and stead of a particular 
sum of money. 
3. Divorce €=? 245(1) 
Grant t wife, in divorce decree, of 
husband's ckss "Q" allotment, as enlisted 
member of < *e armed forces, to provide as-
sistance to certain dependents, and of any 
and all future allotments made by the hus-
band for the use and benefit of the wife 
was not an alimony award so as to entitle 
the wife to modify the decree 23 years aft-
er it was entered to provide for monthly 
alimony payments. I.C. § 32-706; 10 U.S. 
C.A. § 894. 
Stephen Bistline, Sandpoint, for plain-
tiff-appellant. 
Everett D. Hofmeister, Lyons & Hof-
meister, Sandpoint, for defendant-respon-
dent. 
SHEPARD, Justice. 
This case is an appeal from an order 
modifying a divorce decree to grant the re-
spondent former wife $50.00 per month as 
alimony. We everse the order of the dis-
trict court. 
Appellant and respondent were married 
in 1945. Appellant then, and for many 
years thereafter, was an enlisted man in 
the armed forces. Respondent was a na-
tive of India, where the parties were mar-
ried. A child was born the issue of that 
marriage in 1946. During 1948, respondent 
developed a mental illness and was con-
fined in a state mental institution in Min-
nesota. The last time that appellant saw 
respondent was in the year 1950. 
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In 1953, the appellant sought a divorce 
from the respondent on the ground of her 
permanent and incurable insanity, which 
was so certified by the superintendent of 
the institution in which she was confined. 
Although respondent did not appear in the 
said action either in person or by counsel, 
a guardian had been appointed for her and 
she was represented by the prosecuting at-
torney of Bonner County. 
The district court in the original divorce 
decree awarded the custody of the minor 
child of the parties to the appellant herein 
and the custody of the child remained in 
and with the appellant until she reached 
the age of majority. The record herein 
discloses that the appellant herein support-
ed the child during her minor years. The 
original divorce decree discloses that the 
only property of the parties at that time 
was the sum of $800.00, which had been 
accumulated by savings from a Class " Q " 
allotment made by the appellant from his 
pay in the armed forces. The trial court 
awarded that property to the respondent 
herein. 
The only question for resolution herein 
is the effect of that portion of the original 
divorce decree which states: 
" * * * and is further awarded, for 
the use and benefit of the defendant [re-
spondent], the proceeds of any and all 
future allotment or allotments made by 
the plaintiff for the use and benefit of 
Violet E. Perovitz." (Emphasis sup-
plied) 
By 1966, the respondent had recovered 
from her mental illness and entered a mo-
tion to amend the original divorce decree 
therein asking for $600.00 per year back 
alimony and $300.00 per month future ali-
mony. Respondent's theory here and in 
the court below was that the above quoted 
portion of the original divorce decree con-
stituted an award of alimony. 
Appellant appeared specially and moved 
to quash the motion for modification. He 
contends that the district court had no ju-
risdiction to modify the original divorce 
decree by granting alimony since the above 
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quoted portion of the decree did not consti-
tute an award of alimony. 
After hearing on the motion for modifi-
cation, the court below ordered that the de-
cree of divorce be modified and that re-
spondent be granted $50.00 per month fu-
ture alimony, but that she recover nothing 
by way of past alimony. 
[1] LC. § 32-706 authorizes the award 
of alimony in the discretion of the district 
court and alimony may also be awarded 
when a divorce has been secured on the 
ground of permanent and incurable insani-
ty, I.C. § 32-804. I.C. § 32-706 authorizes 
the modification of a divorce decree from 
time to time, but if the decree contains no 
provision for an award of alimony, no 
modification of the decree can be made 
once the time for appeal has elapsed. 
McDonald v. McDonald, 56 Idaho 444, 457, 
55 P.2d 827 (1936); Jordan v. Jordan, 87 
Idaho 432, 437, 394 P.2d 163 (1964). Ob-
viously then, the above cited language of 
the decree is determinative as to the result 
herein. 
[2] We note initially that the language 
sought to be interpreted as awarding ali-
mony is in fact no award of any specific 
sum. Further, there is no time certain at 
which or within which any specific sum of 
money must be paid. In fact, the language 
used would seem to connote that the appel-
lant may voluntarily make some payment 
in the future of some indeterminate 
amount of money for the use and benefit 
of the respondent. It is obvious that no 
action could be brought by way of con-
tempt or otherwise to have forced appel-
lant to make any payment of any sum un-
der the authority of the above cited lan-
guage of the decree. While there appears 
to be some split of authority as to whether 
a court may award alimony in the form of 
periodic monthly payments or may require 
a lump sum payment as and for alimony, it 
is clear that in Idaho either alternative 
may be utilized. Enders v. Enders, 36 Ida-
ho 481, 211 P. 549 (1922). Respondent has 
cited no authority to the effect that lan-
guage as used in the case at bar is to be 
construed "alimony." It is implicit that 
"alimony" must in any event be awarded in 
the form of a lump sum certain or periodic 
payments of sums certain or require the 
performance of a particular act which may 
be in place and stead of a pi^icular sum 
of money, such as the purchase of insur-
ance in a certain amount. 27A C.J.S. Di-
vorce § 235. 
Following the heai'ng on the motion for 
modification, the trial court held that the 
grant of a "Class *Q' " allotment in the orig-
inal divorce decree constituted an alinu ny 
award. Such conclusion on, the part of the 
trial court is not supportable in considera-
tion of the federal statutes governing and 
authorizing the making of allotmer s by 
personnel of the armed services. A Class 
"Q" allotment may be made by an enlisted 
member of the armed services to provide 
assistance to "certain dependents." 10 U. 
S.C.A. § 894 (1927); 32 C.F.R., Ch. 5, 
Part 538 (Revised 1954). The statutes 
further provide that dependents include 
wives or children, and further provide 
that any such allotment must cease at 
the time that the relationship of the hus-
band and wife ceases. The ability of the 
appellant to allot and the ability of the 
respondent to receive any allotment ter-
minated at the time of the divorce de-
cree. It was beyond the power of the trial 
court to provide for or require the payment 
of an allotment after the parties were di-
vorced, since such action was and is con-
trary to the federal statute. The above 
cited statutes also authorize the making 
of a Class "E" allotment to a divorced 
wife, but such is a purely voluntary art 
on the serviceman's part. 32 C.F.R., Ch. 
5, Part 538. 
[3] At trial the uncontroverted testimo-
ny of the appellant discloses that appellant 
and respondent lived together as husband 
and wife less than three years. The child 
of the parties was supported entirely by 
the appellant until she reached the age of 
majority. Appellant has remarried and has 
two minor children. He is employed and 
his net take-home pay is approximately 
STATE EX REL. SYMMS v. V-I OIL COMPANY 
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He and his present prior to trial, had filed 
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$101.00 per week, 
family live modestly in a small home and 
his entire income is necessary to the sup-
port of his present family. After 23 years, 
this ghost from the past has arisen to 
haunt and make demands upon her former 
husband for alimony. It is the opinion of 
this Court that the decision of the court 
below serves no societal interest, and in 
any event, since the original divorce decree 
was devoid of any alimony award, the trial 
court exceeded its jurisdiction in attempt-
ing to modify the original divorce decree 
to award alimony. 
The decision of the lower court is re-
versed. Costs to appellant. 
McQUADE, C. J., and McFADDEN and 
DONALDSON, JJ., concur. 
SPEAR, J., sat but retired prior to deci-
sion. 
94 Idaho 456 
The STATE of Idaho ex rel. R. Doyle 
SYMMS et al., Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
V - I OIL COMPANY, an Idaho Corporation, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
Nos. 10580, 10829. 
Supreme Court of Idaho. 
Nov. 4, 1971. 
Appeal by condemnor from award en-
tered in the Sixth Judicial District Court, 
Bannock County, Gus Carr Anderson, J., 
in action for condemnation of real proper-
ty for highway construction. The Su-
preme Court, Shepard, J., held that where 
condemnor learned, during pendency of ap-
peal from award to condemnee who had 
testified that profit at gas station on lot to 
be condemned had been in excess of 
$18,000 per year for previous two years 
and that there had been few "gas wars", 
that condemnee, approximately one year 
federal action in 
Utah alleging improper competition, that 
he had incurred substantial losses ranging 
between $5,000 and $8,000 per year at his 
gas station site and that "gas wars" had 
been in existence between 80 and 90% of 
the time during period involved, condemn-
or was entitled to new trial on ground of 
fraud or misrepresentation. 
Reversed and remanded for new trial. 
Spear, J., sat but retired prior to de-
cision. 
I. Judgment <§=>376 
Where condemnor learned, during pen-
dency of appeal from award to condemnee 
who had testified that profit at gas station 
on lot to be condemned had been in excess 
of $18,000 per year for previous two years 
and that there had been few "gas wars," 
that condemnee, approximately one year 
prior to trial, had filed federal action in 
Utah alleging improper competition, that 
he had incurred substantial losses ranging 
between $5,000 and §8y000 per year at his 
gas station site and that "gas wars" had 
been in existence between 80 and 90% of 
the time during period involved, condemn-
or was entitled to vacation of judgment 
and new trial on ground of fraud or misrep-
resentation. Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 
60(b). 
2. Eminent Domain <§=>202(4) 
Testimony regarding profits from 
business conducted upon property sought to 
be condemned is not ordinarily admissible 
except in most unusual cases. 
3. Eminent Domain <S=s202(4) 
Where condemnor in eminent domain 
action for condemnation of real property 
for highway construction was merely con-
demning parcel of land and not business 
located thereon, direct testimony concern-
ing past profits from going business con-
ducted on land sought to be condemned 
was not admissible. 
4. Eminent Domain <§=>2I9 
Condemnor which raised but one 
objection to entire line of questioning of 
condemnee concerning profits of business 
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act or conduct of the defendants. They 
have done nothing to invoke an estoppel 
against them. 
[2] Therefore, we conclude that since 
the plaintiffs lien expired while this ac-
tion was pending in the district court, the 
estate was distributed to Harry Walker 
free of any lien arising by virtue of the 
plaintiff's judgment. 
The judgment of the district court is re-
versed, and the case is remanded with di-
rections that the plaintiff's complaint be 
dismissed and that a decree be entered 
quieting title to the property in Harry 
Walker, free of any liens held against it 
by the plaintiff. Appellants to recover 
their costs. 
PRATT, C. J., and LATIMER and Mc-
DONOUGH, JJ., concur. 
WADE, J., concurs in the result 
LYON v. LYON. 
No. 7229. 
Supreme Court of titan* 
May 16, 1949. 
1. Bankruptcy <§=433(7) 
Courts will look behind a judgment 
to ascertain whether the obligation which 
was merged in the judgment is discharge-
able in bankruptcy. 
2. Bankruptcy <§=»436(2) 
Evidence of conversations between 
parties leading up to written stipulation 
upon which "property settlement,, provided 
for in divorce decree was based was admis-
sible in order to ascertain whether obliga-
tion represented thereby was merged in 
judgment against defendant which was 
dischargeable on his bankruptcy. Bankr. 
Act, § 1 et seq., 11 U.S.C.A. § 1 et seq. 
3. Bankruptcy <§=»436(3) 
Evidence established that a property 
settlement between husband and wife in 
EXHIBIT 
divorce action was an award for support 
and maintenance of the wife "in the nature 
of alimony" which was not dischargeable 
on the husband's bankruptcy. Bankr.Act, 
§ 17, 11 U.S.CA. § 35. 
See Words and Phrases, Permanent 
Edition, for other judicial constructions 
and definitions of "In the Nature of Ali-
mony". 
4. Bankruptcy <S=J42I(5) 
Where it was alleged that effect of 
original divorce decree was to provide for 
a property settlement and not for alimony, 
and trial court thereafter determined that 
such award was a property settlement and 
hence beyond its power to amend after ex-
piration of the interlocutory period, wheth-
er the award was "in the nature of alimony" 
and not dischargeable on the husband's 
bankruptcy was not res judicata. Bankr. 
Act, § 17, 11 U.S.CA. § 35; U.CA.1943, 
§ 40—3—5. 
Appeal from District Court, Fourth Dis-
trict, Utah County; William Stanley Dun-
ford, Judge. 
Action by Florence Clara Lyon against 
Myron B. Lyon to recover payments in 
accordance with a prior decree of divorce 
rendered between the parties. From the 
judgment, defendant appeals. 
Judgment affirmed. 
Christenson & Christenson, Provo, for 
appellant 
J. Rulon Morgan, Elias Hansen, Salt 
Lake City, for respondent. 
WOLFE, Justice. 
Appeal by the defendant from a judg-
ment of the Fourth District Court in favor 
of the plaintiff for $2,750 and adjudging 
the enforceability of future payments to 
plaintiff in accordance with a prior decree 
of divorce rendered between the parties 
herein. It is necessary to a proper under-
standing of the case that the background 
and surrounding facts be related in some 
detail. 
For some twenty-two years prior to 1945 
plaintiff and defendant had lived together 
as husband and wife. In that year, plain-
LYON v. 




tiff commenced an action for divorce 
against defendant, and in her complaint 
she alleged that they had "agreed upon a 
property settlement" (italics added) and 
prayed that she "be awarded a property 
settlement" (italics added), and for general 
relief. There was no prayer for alimony. 
On the same day that the complaint was 
verified, the parties entered into a written 
stipulation for a judgment of $5,000 pay-
able $50 or more per month; and providing 
for payment by defendant of a mortgage 
on certain land in Indiana owned by the 
parties; and that defendant carry a $5,000 
life insurance policy naming plaintiff as 
beneficiary, until the $5,000 judgment and 
the mortgage were fully paid. After hear-
ing, the court concluded that plaintiff was 
''entitled to a property settlement as set 
forth in the stipulation," and entered a 
decree substantially incorporating the pro-
visions of the stipulation. At no place in 
the pleadings, findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, or decree did the words "alimony" 
or "support money" appear. All references 
to the money judgment and other provisions 
of the decree relating to the financial obli-
gations of the defendant to plaintiff were in 
the terms of "property settlement." 
Some months later, and after the expira-
tion of the interlocutory period, defendant 
filed a petition for modification of the 
divorce decree by way of reduction in the 
amount of the monthly payments ordered 
by the decree of the court. Plaintiff re-
sisted the granting of the petition by de-
murrer, motion, and answer, asserting that 
the decree provided for a property settle-
ment, and not for alimony, and therefore 
was beyond the jurisdiction of the court 
to modify. Plaintiff's general demurrer to 
the petition was sustained, and defendant 
having failed to amend within the time 
allowed, the petition was dismissed on 
motion of plaintiff. The order of dismissal 
reads in part as follows: 
"And the court having determined that 
the provisions in the decree of divorce 
herein, of which modification is sought by 
said petition, are not orders for the pay?nent 
cf alimony but are accrued and vested 
judgments which this court has no juris-
diction to modify by reason of changed 
conditions; 
"It is now ordered and adjudged: that 
the said petition be, and the same is here-
by, dismissed." 
In 1947 defendant was adjudged a bank-
rupt, and was discharged from all claims, 
and debts except such as are excepted from 
discharge by the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S. 
C.A. § 1 et seq. 
Subsequent thereto, and on petition of 
plaintiff, the district court (of Utah) issued 
an order to show cause why the amount 
due plaintiff under the divorce decree 
should not be fixed, and why defendant 
should not deliver to plaintiff a life insur-
ance policy for $5,000 with plaintiff as 
beneficiary, and why defendant should not 
be punished for contempt. Defendant an-
swered, pleading his discharge in bank-
ruptcy. After hearing on the order to 
show cause, the court held that defendant's 
obligations under the divorce decree were 
not discharged in bankruptcy, and entered 
judgment against defendant for $2750 as 
accrued payments and for costs. Defend-
ant was found not in contempt. From that 
judgment defendant appeals. 
The ultimate question to be determined 
is whether the unpaid financial obligations 
of the defendant to the plaintiff under the 
decree of divorce were discharged in bank-
ruptcy, or stated differently, whether the 
divorce decree comes within the provisions 
of that portion of the Bankruptcy Act 
which reads as follows: 
"A discharge in bankruptcy shall release 
a bankrupt from all of his provable debts, 
except * * * for alimony due or to 
become due, or for maintenance or support 
of wife or child * * *." 11 U.S.C.A. 
§35 . 
Defendant has set forth 29 assignments 
of error, but many of these go to the same 
question or questions, and they may be 
consolidated for convenience of discussion. 
Before consideration of the legal ques-
tions involved, it should be further observed 
that at the hearing on the order to show 
cause, the court admitted in evidence, over 
the objection of the defendant, testimony 
as to the conversations between the plain-
tiff and defendant leading up to the written 
stipulation upon which the decree was 
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based. That testimony was to the effect 
that prior to the divorce the parties had 
jointly owned an equity in a home in 
Indiana, but before the divorce that home 
was placed in the wife's name alone; that 
at the time the written stipulation was 
signed, it was understood between the par-
ties that the $5,000 was for her support 
and maintenance, and the payments on the 
house mortgage were for the same purpose, 
and that the insurance was to assure her 
at least $5,000 for the same purpose. On 
cross-examination plaintiff testified that in 
addition to their home, the parties owned, 
at the time of their divorce, certain an-
tiques, household furniture, $2,700 in cash, 
an automobile, and some war bonds. Prior 
to her marriage to defendant, plaintiff had 
had experience as a stenographer, music 
instructor, and a buyer. 
Defendant testified that prior to the di-
vorce plaintiff had set $5,000 as the price 
for defendant's freedom. He further testi-
fied as to certain jewelry owned by plain-
tiff at the time of the divorce. Of all the 
personal property owned by the parties at 
the time of the divorce, defendant kept the 
car (equity worth about $350), his personal 
clothing, and a part of the furniture, and 
plaintiff received all the rest. Defendant 
further testified that at no time in connec-
tion with the stipulation was there any men-
tion of alimony, it being always referred 
to as a property settlement; that plaintiff 
would say she didn't want to be left penni-
less; that she said she wanted "her share", 
and that she was entitled to that much and 
if he wanted his freedom from her she 
would have to have that amount. 
Defendant further testified that his an-
nual gross income from his employment 
at Geneva Steel Company was $7,000 per 
year, and that he had been continually 
employed there from a time prior to the 
divorce up to the time of hearing except 
for a period from October, 1945, to July, 
1946, when operations had been shut down. 
From January to June of 1946, defendant 
had been employed by another steel com-
pany in Gary, Indiana. 
The basis of the decision below is 
revealed in a well considered memorandum 
decision written by the trial judge, and 
although it constitutes no part of the record 
before us, it has been of material assist-
ance to us in reaching a decision in this 
case. The trial court took the view that 
even though the divorce decree provided 
for a property settlement, such property 
settlement was "in the nature of alimony" 
and therefore the obligation thereunder 
was not discharged in bankruptcy. In this 
connection it must be noted that it is not 
just alimony in its conventional form (viz., 
monthly payments to a wife) which is 
excluded from the provisions for discharge 
of debts. All obligations "for maintenance 
or support of wife or child," whether 
denominated alimony by the state statute 
or not, are such as are not dischargeable 
in bankruptcy. It follows, therefore, that 
the real issue in this case is not, as the 
parties have argued, whether the award of 
the divorce decree was alimony or a prop-
erty settlement, but rather whether the 
"property settlement" was really an award 
for the support and maintenance of de-
fendant's wife. 
In his memorandum decision, after 
pointing out that of the $7800 worth of 
real and personal property owned by the 
parties at the time of the divorce, plaintiff 
received more than $7,300 worth and de-
fendant received only about $460 worth,, 
the trial judge clearly stated his reasons 
for holding that the property settlement 
was "in the nature of alimony" in the 
following language: 
"Divisions of property between divorce 
litigants are not ordinarily made upon a 
basis 1/16 to the husband and 15/16 to the 
wife. Yet that is the approximate ratio of 
the division in this stipulation. The right 
in lieu of dower in Utah is only one-third to-
the wife. Strict divisions of property have 
gone as high as one-half each. Thus, 
looking behind the decree and the stipula-
tion, the conclusion seems inescapable 
under the authorities cited that much of 
the property awarded, without regard to 
the order for payment of the mortgage 
upon the home, or the judgment for $5000,. 
or the order for maintenance of the insur-
ance protection, was 'in the nature of 
alimony,' and designed and contemplated 
by the parties to be for the support and 
maintenance of the plaintiff. 
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'Such a conclusion is further supported had been merged in judgments or into 
by consideration of the years that the par-
ties maintained the domestic relationship, 
by the fact that she was a stenographer 
a n d self-sustaining before marriage, that 
she is now 56 years old and thus practically 
unemployable in her profession, and by 
her positive testimony that in the attor-
ney's office at the time of drawing the 
stipulation the payments of money were 
referred to as being for her support and 
maintenance, and by the defendant's admis-
sion that support and maintenance of the 
plaintiff was discussed there." 
In attacking the judgment, defendant 
first asserts that the court erred in receiv-
ing evidence of conversations between the 
parties leading up to the written stipulation 
upon which the "property settlement" pro-
vided for in the divorce decree was based; 
that the trial court erred in receiving 
evidence as to the disposition by the parties 
of personal property not mentioned in the 
stipulation or decree; and that it was error 
for the trial court to go behind the divorce 
decree to determine the nature of the 
award therein provided. 
[1,2] It may be true, as contended by 
defendant, that as a general rule a trial 
court will not look behind a judgment or 
decree to determine the nature thereof, 
unless it is so ambiguous or uncertain that 
extrinsic evidence is necessary to explain 
it. However, plaintiff has cited to us a 
number of cases holding that courts will 
look behind the judgment to ascertain 
whether the obligation which was merged 
in the judgment was dischargeable in bank-
ruptcy. See in re Williams, 208 N.Y. 32, 
101 N.E. 853, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 719; Green 
v. Beaumont, 179 Ga. 804, 177 S.E. 572; 
Bever v. Swecker, 138 Iowa 721, 116 N.W. 
704; Taylor v. Buser, 167 N.Y.S. 887; 
Smith v. Smith, D.C., 7 F.Supp. 490; and 
2 Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., 1176, 
2349, Sections 552, 1128. We have dis-
covered no authority to the contrary. The 
rule announced in the cas'es and texts 
above cited is reasonable and necessary to 
give full effect to the legislative intent. 
Otherwise, many obligations intended to 
be excepted from the discharge provisions 
of the Bankruptcy Act might neverthe-
less become discharged simply because they that a judgment may not be modified by 
written contracts. The court did not err 
in receiving extrinsic evidence to show the 
true nature of the obligation of defendant 
td plaintiff. 
[3] Defendant next contends that even 
though the court did not err in receiving 
extrinsic evidence a to the nature of 
award provided for by the divorce d :ree, 
such evidence did not justify the hjiding 
that the award was "in the mature of 
alimony." With this contention we cannot 
agree. As pointed out in the mu' orandum 
decision of the trial court, a property 
settlement of 15/16 in favor of le wife 
and 1/16 to the husband is highly unusual. 
The wife was well past middle age and 
could not reasonably expect to uad employ-
ment of the type for which she had been 
trained. The fact that the husband was 
to pay off the mortgage on the home, that 
he was to pay the alimony in gross in 
monthly installments of $50, that he was 
to carry insurance on his own life with 
his former wife as beneficiary, and that 
she received nearly all of the household 
furniture, all point to the idea of support. 
The evidence adequately supports the find-
ings and holdings of the trial court. 
[4] It is next argued by defendant 
that the question is res judicata. Counsel 
contends that the effect of the original di-
vorce decree was to pronounce a property 
settlement; that it did not provide for ali-
mony; that the court having thereafter de-
termined that such award was a property 
settlement and hence beyond the power of 
the court to amend after the expiration of 
the interlocutory period, they co d not 
now re-examine the same question - nd hold 
that the award was "in the natur* of ali-
mony." 
The issue determined on the petition for 
modification of the divorce decree was not 
the same issue as the one now confronting 
us. The issue in the former proceeding 
was whether the award was of such nature 
that it could be modified under Sec. 40— 
3—5, U.C.A.1943. The question now be-
fore us is whether the award was of such 
nature as to be dischargeable in bankruptcy. 
Defendant concedes "that the mere fact 
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the court does not render the same dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy * * *. The 
character of the liability is the controlling 
matter, not "imply the incidents with re-
spect to finally or modification, although 
they may be indicative as to such char-
acter." 
The ruling upon the demurrer to the 
petir^n for modification in the court below 
and the subseq .nt order of dismissal on 
failure of petitioner to plead over, are not 
inconsistent vith the subsequent ruling of 
the court 01 the question of discharge in 
bankruptcy. The ruling on the demurrer 
to the petition for modification and the 
order of dis lissal of the petition were 
based upon t \e ground that the agreement 
incorporated in the divorce decree pro-
vided for a judgment in a definite sum, 
namely $5,000, although * payable over a 
period of years at the rate of $50 per 
month. The court reached the conclusion, 
as evidenced by the order of dismissal of 
the petition to modify, that this judgment 
was not subject to modification by the 
court. There is not necessarily implicit in 
such ruling a holding that the contract 
incorporated in the divorce decree consti-
tuted a property settlement rather than a 
provision for the payments in the nature 
of support money. 
In its subsequent ruling on the question 
of discharge in bankruptcy, the court held 
in effect that the monthly payments pro-
vided for in the decree were in the nature 
of support money and hence not discharge-
able in bankruptcy. 
It does not necessarily follow, because a 
decree such as t h ' t before us is not subject 
to modification assuming for the purpose 
of this decision chat the court was correct 
in so holding), -hat the payments provided 
in such decree are not in the nature of 
support money within the -intendment of 
the Federal Bankruptcy laws. Hence the 
ruling on the petition to modify was not 
properly pleadable as res judicata of the 
question involved in the subsequent pro-
ceedings in the order to show cause. 
In D'Andria v. Hageman, 253 App.Div. 
518, 2 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835, it was held that 
an agreement for the payment of a debt 
owing to the wife in lieu of support, and 
further providing that the unpaid portion 
would upon her death pass to her estate, 
was exempt from a discharge in bank-
ruptcy even though the agreement was 
that the plaintiff would relinquish her claim 
for support and maintenance if the defend-
ant would pay her the $60,000 he owed her 
because of advances made to him in fur-
therance of his career. The court said 
"in a sense it involved a contract for the 
maintenance or support of the plaintiff 
since the defendant, in making payment of 
the debt, would be released also from that 
obligation/' In short, the debt was by the 
agreement of the parties "converted into-
a contract 'for the maintenance and support 
of wife' within the purview of section 17 
of the Bankruptcy Act." 
The judgment in the D'Andria case was 
affirmed by the Court of Appeals of New 
York, 278 N.Y. 630, 16 N„E.2d 294. 
It seems clear that the agreement con-
strued by the New York court would not 
be subject to modification, in a court 
proceeding instituted for such purpose. 
However, this fact did not preclude a 
holding that the agreement did provide for 
payments in the nature of support money 
and hence the obligation was not discharge-
able in bankruptcy. True, in that case 
the court was not confronted with a plea of 
res judicata. But the opinion clearly re-
veals that had there been an adverse ruling 
on a petition to modify prior to the deci-
sion in the case in question, the same result 
relative to discharge in bankruptcy would 
have been reached. 
Defendant has argued that if we should 
hold, as we do, that the award of the 
divorce decree was not dischargeable in 
bankruptcy, we should further hold that 
the trial court could entertain a petition 
for modification of the decree, and upon a 
proper showing of change of circumstances, 
should order a modification. The question 
of whether the award of the decree was 
one which could be modified on a petition 
for modification, has not been, by appropri-
ate assignment of error and argument in 
the printed briefs, presented to us for 
decision, and hence, as to that question we 
SLATER v. SAL1 
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c xpress no opinion, except as to the impli-
cations of the discussion on the conclusive-
ness of the judgment of dismissal for 
failure to amend the petition for modifica-
tion may throw light on said question. 
The judgment is affirmed^ Costs i . re-
spondent. 
PRATT, C. J., and WADE, LATIMh. l , 
and McDONOUGH, JJ., concur. 
( O I KEt MUMBIR StSTEM> 
SLATER v. SALT LAKE CITY et al. 
No. 7222. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
May 14, 1949. 
t. Appeal and error €=917(1) 
On appeal from judgment of dismissal, 
founded on ruling sustaining general de-
murrer to complaint, Supreme Court must 
accept allegations of facts in complaint as 
true. 
2. Commerce €=12 
Largely local matters can be dealt with 
by state, though regulations thereof inter-
fere in some degree with free flow of in-
terstate commerce. 
3. Commerce €=55 
A city ordinance prohibiting sale of 
magazine subscriptions on streets in con-
gested business district deals with largely 
local matter of retaining sidewalks for in-
tended use by pedestrians, and hence is not 
unconstitutional as imposing burden on in-
terstate commerce. 
4. Commerce €=48 
Municipal corporations €=703(1) 
The right to regulate traffic on streets 
and sidewalks is within powers delegated 
to city by state, and reasonable restrictions 
thereon do not offend against commerce 
clause of -federal Constitution. 
,T LAKE CITY Utah \~>\\ 
P.2d 153 
5. Commerce €=48 
Control of traffic on city streets under 
city ordinance does not materially obstruct 
free flow of commerce in violation of com-
merce clause of federal Constitution, and 
amount of any increase in burden imposed 
on such commerce by ordinance is inconse-
quential. 
6. Commerce €=48 
Gi .at leeway is allowed local authori-
ties in controlling pedestrians and use of 
sidewalks, in absence of conflicting federal 
regulation, though local regulations ma-
teric jy intei fere with interstate commerce. 
7. Constitutional law €=90 
A city ordinance, prohibiting sale of 
rragazine subscriptions on certain streets 
in congested business district of city is not 
unconstitutional as abridging or infringing 
freedom of speech. 
8. Constitutional law €=90 
The constitutional right to 'freedom of 
speech is subject to reasonable regulation. 
9. Constitutional law €=90 
The right of free speech cannot be 
used to protect commercial activities car-
ried on in streets or on sidewalks. 
10. Appeal and error €=837(1) 
City ordinances, not pleaded by appel-
lant in court below, are not properly before 
Supreme Court for consideration in sup-
port of appellant's argument as to construc-
tion and unconstitutionality of another such 
ordinance. 
11. Evidence €=32 
The Supreme Court does not take ju-
dicial r >tice of municipal ordinances.1 
12. Ev dence €=20(1) 
It is common knowledge that selling of 
newspapers, religious literature and imita-
tion poppies and forget-me-nots is carried 
on in business district of Salt Lake City. 
13. Constitutional law €=208(1) 
Discrimination is essence of classifica-
tion by statute and violates constitution 
only when founded on unreasonable basis.2 
1 State v. Butcher, 74 Utah 275, 279 
P. 497. 
2 State v. Mason, 94 Utah 501, 78 P.2d 
920, 117 A L.R. 330; Broadbent v. Gib-
20G P.2d—10^i 
son, 105 Utah 53, 140 P.2d 939; Wall-
berg v. Utah Public Welfare Comm., 
Utah, 203 P.2d 935. 
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Verla H. CARTER, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Gerald W. CARTER, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14554. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 5, 1977. 
Husband appealed from order of the 
Fifth District Court, Juab County, J. Har-
lan Burns, J., which denied his motion to 
reduce alimony payments. The Supreme 
Court, Crockett, J., held that: (1) it was 
proper for trial court to ask husband, who 
claimed reduction in earning capacity, 
whether he had testified in another case 
that he was a competent cattleman; and (2) 
fact that husband had been in good health 
and earning $21,000 per year in construc-
tion work at the time of initial decree but 
had suffered an impairment of health which 
reduced his earning capacity to $10,000 to 
$12,000 per year and that husband had re-
married did not entitle husband to reduc-
tion alimony from $200 per month to $100 
per month. 
Affirmed. 
1. Evidence <s=>43(3), 51 
Notice may be taken of the record of 
another case but, for that to be done, it 
should be so offered in evidence by a party 
or so stated by the trial court so that it will 
be known to them what is being relied 
upon. 
2. Witnesses <s=* 379(1, 8) 
Witness may be cross-examined on the 
basis of statements or representations prop-
erly imputed to him on any prior occasion, 
including another trial. 
3. Witnesses e=> 246(2), 379(8) 
It was proper to ask husband, who 
claimed diminution in earning capacity and 
ability to pay alimony, whether he had tes-
tified in another case that he was a compe-
. CARTER Utah 177 
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tent cattleman; there was nothing improp-
er in the trial court's asking the question. 
4. Judges <3=*49(1) 
Fact that trial judge had prior knowl-
edge of testimony given by husband in a 
prior case did not indicate any prejudice 
against the husband. 
5. T /orce <£=>240(2) 
Amount of alimony to be paid by hus-
band need not be correlated in percentage 
to husband's income; earning capacity and 
income a**e important factors to be con-
sit iered but they are only part of the total 
cv cumstances to be considered as to what is 
appropriate and equitable. 
6. Divorce <s= 240(2) 
One major factor to be considered in 
determining the amount of alimony are the 
wife's needs and requirements. 
7. Divorce <®=> 245(2) 
Fact that husband had remarried and 
that, although he was in good health and 
earning approximately $21,000 per year in 
construction work at the time that alimony 
was initially set at $200 per month, his 
health had deteriorated so that he was able 
to do only less strenuous work and had an 
earning capacity of only $10,000 to $12,000 
per year did not entitle husband to reduc-
tion in alimony payments from $200 per 
month to $100 per month. 
8. Divorce ®=> 245(2) 
Subsequent obligations voluntarily ac-
quired do not generally reduce obligations 
to make alimony payments under prior di-
vorce decree. 
9. Divorce <s=> 245(3) 
Burden of persuading trial court that 
there has been such a change in circum-
stances as to justify reduction in amount of 
alimony payable by husband rests upon the 
husband. 
10. Divorce <s=> 184(5, 10) 
Same rules of review apply in supple-
mentary proceedings as to original divorce 
matters; reviewing court surveys the rec-
' ord in the light favorable to the findings 
EXHIBIT g 
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and determination made by the trial court 
and does not interfere therewith unless it 
appears that the evidence clearly prepon-
derates against th°. trial court'0 findings or 
that the trial court has abused its discre-
tion. 
Patrick H. Fenton, Cedar City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Dave McMullin, Pavson, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
CROCKETT, Justin: 
Defendant Gerald W. Carter appeals 
from the refusal of the District Court to 
reduce his alimony payments to plaintiff 
Verla H. Carter from $200 per month, as 
provided in the divorce decree herein, to 
$100 per month. 
The divorce was granted to plaintiff in 
June of 1973. She was awarded custody of 
the only child, with $60 per month support, 
and $200 per month alimony. 
The position essayed by the defendant is 
that there has been a substantial change in 
circumstances: that whereas he was then in 
good health and earning about $21,000 per 
year in construction work, his health is now 
impaired so he has to do less strenuous 
work, which has reduced his earning capaci-
ty to $10,000 to $12,000 per year; and that 
he has increased financial obligations due to 
his remarriage. 
[1, 2] Prefatory to addressing the princi-
pal problem, we direct attention to an at-
tack the defendant makes upon the evi-
dence. He argues that the trial judge im-
properly considered testimony given by the 
defendant in a prior unrelated case in which 
the trial judge presided. It is true that 
notice may be taken of the record of anoth-
er case.1 But for this to be done it should 
1. Pierpont v Hydro Manufacturing Co, 22 
Anz.App 252, 526 P2d 776 (1974) 
2. See State in Interest of Hales, 538 P 2d 1034 
(Utah 1975), requiring such a procedure, as 
stated by Justice Ellett for a unanimous court 
"In any case the court should not take notice 
sua sponte of the proceedings in another case 
be so offered in evidence by a party, or so 
stated by the trial court, so that it will be 
known to them what is being relied on.2 
However, this does not preclude the cross-
examination of a witness on the basis of 
statements or representations properly im-
puted to him on any prior occasion, includ-
ing another trial.3 
[3,4] In connection with defendant's 
testimony herein concerning his earning ca-
pacity, the trial judge himself asked the 
defendant if he had not testified in the 
other case that he was a competent cattle-
man. This was a legitimate question to be 
asked as probative on the defendant's earn-
ing capacity and thus as to his ability to pay 
alimony. It therefore could have been 
asked by counsel; and there was nothing 
improper in the trial court asking if he 
thought the pursuit of truth so required. 
Neither does the fact that the trial judge 
had this prior knowledge, ipso facto, indi-
cate any prejudice against the defendant. 
The latter was fully aware that the judge 
had presided in the prior proceeding; and if 
he had thought any prejudice existed, he 
should have taken timely and appropriate 
action with respect thereto. 
[5-7] In regard to the major problem: 
the defendant's argument that the evidence 
compels a reduction in the alimony payment 
from $200 to $100 per month. He is mis-
taken in his assumption that the amount of 
alimony payable should be correlated in 
percentage to his income, to be scaled up or 
down as his income may vary. His earning 
capacity and his income are, of course, im-
portant factors to be considered. But that 
is only part of the total circumstances to be 
considered as to what is appropriate and 
equitable Another major one is what are 
plaintiff's needs and requirements;4 and 
unless the files of the other case are placed in 
evidence in the matter before the court ' 
3. 31A C J S Evidence § 299 
4. Lambert \ Lambert, 66 Wash 2d 503, 403 
P2d 664 (1965), Gordon v Gordon, 44 
Wash 2d 222, 266 P 2d 786 (1954), Hendncks 
v Hendncks, 91 Utah 553, 63 P 2d 277 (1936), 
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there is no showing that there has been any 
decrease therein. Drew JENSEN, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
[8] A similar observation applies to the 
defendant's contention that added financial 
obligations resulting from his remarriage 
should redound to his benefit herein. It is 
usually said that subsequent obligations vol-
untarily acquired should not reduce obliga-
tions under a prior divorce decree. While 
this is the primary and fundamental rule, it 
is likewise not absolute, but is still another 
factor which may be considered in deter-
mining what is equitable and practical un-
der the total circumstances.5 
[9,10] As opposed to defendant's insis-
tence that the trial court should have modi-
fied the decree, it is appropriate to have in 
mind that the burden of persuading the 
trial court that there has been such a 
change in circumstances as to justify such 
modification rests upon him;6 and that the 
same rules of review apply in supplementa-
ry proceedings, as in original divorce mat-
ters; that is, that we survey the record in 
the light favorable to the findings and de-
termination made by the trial court; and 
that we do not interfere therewith unless it 
appears that the evidence clearly prepon-
derates against his findings or that he 
abused his discretion.7 
Upon the basis of what has been said 
herein, we are not persuaded that the rul-
ing of the trial court should be overturned. 
Costs to plaintiff (respondent). 
ELLETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN, WIL-
KINS and HALL, JJ., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
Hampton v. Hampton, 86 Utah 570, 47 P.2d 419 
(1935). 
v. 
Steve BAUGHMAN, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 14547. 
Supreme CouK of Utah. 
April 6, 1977. 
Defendant appealed from an order of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Marcellus K. Snow, J., grantin[ plaintiff's 
motion to vacate a prior dis nissal with 
prejudice for failure to answer interrogato-
ries. The Supreme Court, Hall, J., held 
that: (1) order of district judge granting 
motion to vacate a prior dismissal of com-
plaint with prejudice for failure to answer 
interrogatories was not objectionable as re-
versing or altering the order of a fellow 
district judge, since prior order of dismissal 
of other judge was only in "contemplation" 
of plaintiff's possible failure to provide an-
swers to interrogatories within 15 days per-
mitted so that such order was never opera-
ble; and that (2) record established that 
court did not abuse its discretion in grant-
ing motion to vacate order of dismissal with 
prejudice for failure to answer interrogato-
ries on alleged ground that order had been 
obtained ex parte after assurance of plain-
tiff's counsel that additional time would be 
afforded to file the answers. 
Judgment affirmed. 
1. Judges <s=>24 
Order of district judge grar ting motion 
to vacate a prior dismissal of complaint 
with prejudice for failure to answer inter-
rogatories was not objectionable as revers-
ing or altering the order of a fellow district 
judge, since prior order of dismissal of other 
6. Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87, 475 P.2d 1021 
(1970); Sorenson v. Sorenson, 20 Utah 2d 360, 
438 P.2d 180 (1968). 
5. 24 Am.Jur.2d, Divorce & Separation Section 
689; Reed v. Reed, 128 Cal.App.2d 786, 276 
P.2d 36 (1955). 
7. Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975); 
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1974). 
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sign to kill "must precede the killing by 
some appreciable space of time, but the 
time need not be long" and again that it 
"need only be long enough for some reflec-
tion and consideration. It involves a 
choice to act or not when the time is suffi-
cient for this, it does not matter how brief 
it is." 
[2] Defendant relies heavily on State 
v. Anselmo,5 which we believe to be inap-
ropos here because in that case the in-
struction provided that there need be no 
appreciable time between intent and act 
and that it could be instantaneous, whereas 
in the instant case the court instructed that 
the intent to kill must have been formed 
before the blow was struck and "must pre-
cede the killing by some appreciable space 
of time," and that "in the commission of 
the offense 'deliberate' means in a self-con-
trolled state and not in a sudden passion" 
and that it connotes a weighing of motives, 
its consequences, its nature and all other 
circumstances. The distinction is obvious, 
and anyway, we think the case of State v. 
Warwick 6 is dispositive on this point. 
[3] As to 3) : As to one striking the 
first blow being entitled to claim self-de-
fense and an instruction thereon: The 
trial court instructed on self-defense in 
words substantially as found in the justifi-
able homicide statute (Title 76-30-10, Utah 
Code Annotated 1953), except that the in-
struction in stating the rights and duties of 
one attacking, used the words "original as-
sailant" while the statute stated "assailant." 
The defendant says the difference is preju-
dicial as giving the jury the impression 
that an "original assailant" could never 
have a claim of self-defense. The diffi-
culty is that the defendant here shot first 
and was the "original assailant" and we 
discern no facts reflected in the record 
that could be interpreted that he acquired a 
claim of self-defense thereof save his own 
self-serving gratuity that the victim drew 
first, a fact that is not otherwise support-
ed,—a fact that the jury need not have had 
5. 46 Utah 137, 148 P. 1071 (1915). 
EXHIBIT 
to believe. The error complained of is 
technical at best under the admitted and 
other facts adduced, and at best we believe 
that conceding the instruction may have 
been erroneous, it was not prejudicial. 
[4] As to 4) : That the court erred in 
allowing the prosecution to question de-
fendant as to his right to remain silent 
while under custodial interrogation: It ap-
pears that defendant was given the Miran-
da warning at time of arrest, and again 
when questioned by a detective, after 
which he admitted the offense, took the 
former to the scene and helped in a search 
for empty shells. At no time did he claim 
self-defense until trial, when he did, result-
ing in his cross-examination for impeach-
ment purposes. We think that no prejudi-
cial error was committed here. (All em-
phasis added.) 
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT and 
ELLETT, J J., concur. 
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the result. 
27 Utah 2d 103 
Lee C. FELT, aka Lee Craig Felt, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Robert S. FELT, Defendant and Respondent. 
No. 12409. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Feb. 1, 1072. 
From a judgment of the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Gordon R. Hall, 
J., reducing alimony award, an appeal was 
taken. The Supreme Court, Henriod, J., 
held that it was immaterial that divorced 
husband had since married a woman with a 
child. 
Remanded for new trial. 
6. 11 Utah 2d 116. 333 P.2d 703 (I960). 
4, 
FELT v. 
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1. Divorce 0245(3) 
Divorced husband, moving to delete al-
imony provision of divorce decree, had 
burden of proving change of circumstances 
warranting modification; and, on record 
presented, burden was not borne with such 
substantiality as to warrant emasculation 
of $12,000 award of alimony except for to-
ken annual $1. 
2. Divorce <§=>247 
Evidence that his counsel had advised 
him to sign agreement under which di-
vorced wife accepted alimony in specified 
amount on condition that she could supple-
ment it with other income was not perti-
nent to divorced husband's motion to delete 
alimony provision from divorce decree in-
corporating agreement. 
3. Divorce <§=>247 
On divorced husband's motion to de-
lete alimony provision from divorce decree, 
divorced wife's equity in home and insur-
ance policies awarded to her in divorce de-
cree were impertinent. 
4. Divorce <S=^247 
On divorced husband's motion to de-
lete alimony provision of divorce decree, 
husband's sterilization 18 years before di-
vorce was not pertinent matter. 
5. Divorce <£=>247 
On divorced husband's motion to de-
lete alimony provision of divorce decree, it 
was immaterial that he had since married a 
woman with a child. 
6. Divorce <§=>247 
That divorced wife was qualified by 
education and experience to support herself 
was not appropriate consideration on di-
vorced husband's motion to delete alimony 
provision of divorce decree. 
7. Divorce <§=>247 
Neither finding that divorced wife, 
who was under doctor's care and working 
only part time when divorce decree was 
entered, was presently working full time 
nor other findings justified termination of 
SI2,000 annual alimony award. 
FELT Utah 621 
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8. Divorce <§=>247 
That agreement incorporated into di-
vorce decree was based in part on recogni-
tion of wife's assistance in husband's edu-
cation could not be considered in determin-
ing divorced husband's right to termination 
of $12,000 annual alimony award. 
9. Divorce <§=>245(2) 
Divorce decree containing awards for 
support based on either expressed or as-
sumed facts contemplated by parties or 
court or both should not be modified, and 
continuous jurisdiction of court to modify 
should not be used to thwart expressed or 
obvious intentions of parties and/or court 
—unless such contemplated facts lead to 
manifest injustice or unconscionable ineq-
uity. 
10. Divorce <§=287 
Where findings did not reflect such 
inequity as justified drastic modification of 
substituting award of $1 per year for 
$12,000 per year alimony, but did represent 
such change in circumstances as, with oth-
er changes, if shown, might justify some 
lesser modification, reviewing court re-
manded case for new trial. 
VanCott, Bagley, Cromwell & McCarthy, 
Clifford L. Ashton, Thomas M. Burton, 
Richard H. Stahle, Salt Lake City, for 
plainti f f-appellant. 
Gayle Dean Hunt, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant-respondent. 
HENRIOD, Justice: 
Appeal from a judgment reducing an 
alimony award of $12,000 per year to 
$1.00 per year. Reversed and remanded 
for a new trial, with costs to appellant. 
The parties had been wife and husband 
for about 18 years before Mrs. F filed 
for divorce. Incident thereto a 13-page 
"Property Settlement Agreement" was ex-
ecuted by the parties, the significant part 
of which, so far as this case is concerned, 
was the following paragraph: 
It is further agreed . . . that 
the aforesaid amount of alimony ($1,-
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000 per month) . . . is a rea-
sonable sum in view of the efforts made 
by plaintiff in assisting defendant in his 
professional education and considering 
the present circumstances and social 
standing now enjoyed by Lee C. Felt: 
and that said amount shall not be here-
after adjusted, notwithstanding increases 
or decreases in any amount in the in-
come of plaintiff, and notwithstanding 
any changes in the income of the de-
fendant unless said changes are sub-
stantial and so decrease the defendant's 
income so that defendant is reasonably 
unable to pay the alimony agreed to 
herein. 
The paragraph above certainly contem-
plates that plaintiff intended to seek em-
ployment for more than the part-time work 
and its income, in which the record re-
flects she then was engaged, with no ref-
erence to or finding as to her then income. 
The court, upon hearing the matter, 
must have understood that Mrs. F ac-
cepted ihe $1,000 per month alimony on 
condition that she could supplement it with 
other income,-—otherwise the provision, to 
which Mr. F, without objection, volun-
tarily became signatory, made no sense. 
The court incorporated the paragraph as 
a part of the decree, with the statement: 
"which Property Settlement Agreement the 
court hereby adopts as fair and reasona-
ble." The findings and decree of the court 
were supported by Mrs. F's testimony that 
she was the main source of income for 
the first seven years while her husband 
was completing his medical training, that 
she presently worked part-time and hoped 
to work again, which the trial court re-
marked at that point, by asking what we 
think was a very significant question to 
the effect that: uSo you can supplement 
your income to some extent?" to which 
Mrs. F said "Yes." 
[1] About a year after the divorce, Mr. 
F was cited for nonpayment of alimony 
and was ordered to pay $4,000 in arrear-
ages, and again, about eight months later, 
was ordered to pay another $8,000 for the 
same reason, and pursuant thereto he was 
ordered to appear about two months later 
to determine the issue of contempt at 
which time he was found in contempt, w~ 
sentenced to 10 days in jail, and given an 
opportunity to purge himself by prompt!^ 
paying the alimony when it accrued, and 
by paying off the past due judgments. At 
the time Mr. F was cited for contemot, 
he filed a motion to delete the alimony, 
which was heard at the same time as the 
contempt issue. Mr. F's counsel referred 
to the case of Callister v. Calhster l which 
holds in effect that the court has continu-
ing jurisdiction to raise or lower alimony 
irrespective of any agreement of the par-
ties, if there is a change of circumstances 
warranting such modification,—a principle 
which consistently we have espoused,— 
and a principle which simply is repeated 
in the paragraph signed by the parties and 
quoted above, the only question in the in-
stant case being whether the burden of 
proof, which in this case was Mr. F's, 
was borne with such substantiality as to 
warrant the emasculation of a $12,000 
award of alimony except for a token an-
nual $1.00 that certainly cannot be cate-
gorized as deficit financing. 
Mr. F's brief makes much of certain 
testimony, that the trial court apparently 
did not believe, or which was not pertinent 
in the hearing on the motion to amend 
the decree, since nowhere are the facts re-
flected in said testimony found in the 
court's written Findings, i. e.: 
[2-5] Mr. F said he questioned the ad-
visability of signing the agreement, but his 
counsel advised him to sign it, saying any 
district court judge would agree it wab 
fair and equitable. His counsel proved to 
be right, since the district court in a signed 
decree said just that, and such evidence 
is not pertinent since he signed the agree-
ment. His counsel questioned Mrs. F as 
to her role in helping Mr. F in securing 
his medical education. This had already 
I. 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 944 (1953). 
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been canvassed before the divorce decree 
was entered, and hence was inapropos 
here, but only a possible matter to con-
sider on a motion for new trial or appeal. 
He questioned Mrs. F about her present 
income and the best he could get from 
such interrogation was $9,000, without any 
testimony or adduced facts about what 
Mrs. F was making part-time at the time 
of the decree. In such event the $9,000 
is not an absolute and at best an elusive 
factor in determining changed circum-
stances. He questioned her about her equi-
ty in the home and about insurance pol-
icies awarded to her in the decree,—facts 
quite impertinent and inadmissible here. 
He asked her about her husband's sterili-
zation that occurred 18 years before the 
divorce, another matter not pertinent and 
a fact existing before and merged in the 
decree. He asked Mr. F about his health 
problem occurring after the decree, and 
about the added burdens of his practice 
and about his being so tired that he 
stumbled around on going to bed, and 
about consulting doctors and what they ad-
vised him, and about some immaterial 
matters such as increased seminar costs, 
insurance costs, etc. It is apparent that 
the trial court thought the above recitals 
either were immaterial or that he did not 
believe Mr. F, since no mention of them 
was made in the court's Findings. The 
fact that Mr. F remarried a woman with 
a child was not material, but considered 
so in the Findings. 
[6-8] What seems^to be cogent to us 
in this case that the findings of the trial 
court, some of which cannot be used in 
a conclusion to relieve one of alimony pay-
ments, did not warrant the termination of 
a $12,000 annual award. To justify our 
conclusion in this respect we advert to the 
Findings of the court, set forth in italics, 
abstracted so far as pertinent here, as fol-
lows, without comments thereon in plain 
type: 
6. That plaintiff is qualified by edu-
cation and experience to support herself, 
which was demonstrated throughout the 
marriage and particularly now after she 
works full time, 7i'hile only part time 
at the time of the decree, at which time 
she zuas under the doctor's care. 
This finding has to do largely with mat-
ters existing before the decree and taken 
into account in arriving at the alimony 
award, except that part about full-time 
employment, and with that exception the 
Finding is on matters that are res judi-
cata and if canvassable at all, were mat-
ters to be considered on timely appeal, not 
three or four years later on motion to 
amend. 
7. That the agreement was based in 
part on recognition of Mrs. F's assist-
ance in Mr. F's education; that such ef-
forts were substantial, but that his edu-
cation was substantially completed be-
fore the marriage. 
All the facts recited in this finding were 
before the court prior to the decree and 
cannot be considered by another division 
of the court three years later, since they 
are merged in the decree, are res judicata, 
and their consideration in this* case is 
tantamount to the granting of a three-
year belated new trial on the merits,—and 
hence cannot be considered in determining 
the modification of the alimony award. 
8. That Mrs. F was entitled to ali-
mony for a given period of time suf-
ficient to adjust to single life; that to 
continue to allow permanent alimony in 
the light of present circumstances is un-
just, unnecessary and unequitable and 
hence the decree should be modified to 
nothing but $1.00 a year. 
This Finding mostly is a conclusion and 
not a statement of proven fact and there 
is nothing recited therein to indicate what 
present circumstances are, let alone that 
they are unjust,—all of which amounts to 
an ipse dixit probative of nothing enlight-
ening in determining that an alimony 
award should be modified. Besides, it is 
somewhat of an affront to the decree whose 
author entertained the motion and said that 
it was fair and reasonable that any in-
crease or decrease in Mrs. F's income, as 
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agreed to by Mr. F, should not be con-
sidered as a factor in any adjustment of 
the award. 
9. That Mrs. F's earnings are suffi-
cient to maintain herself without de-
pendence on Mr. F. 
This simply is a conclusion not bottomed 
on any specific facts recounted anywhere 
in the Findings, and it is impotent as a 
factor in changing the award. 
10. That Mr. F has remarried one 
who has a child, both of whom he sup-
ports; that Mrs. F is single. 
The fact of remarriage cannot be used in 
determining modification of an alimony 
award, although in some conceivable rare 
case it might, and we are at a loss to 
know why the trial court so found,—un-
less it was on account of what was said 
in Callister v. Callister, supra, which re-
cited the fact of remarriage, which we dis-
affirm if it is urged that such fact is ad-
missible for the purpose of reducing the 
alimony award in the instant case. 
11. That since the divorce Mr. F's 
costs of doing business has substantial-
ly increased, as has his income but not 
commensurate therewith. 
Nothing is reflected in this Finding that 
would indicate that Mr. F's income had 
decreased so that he was reasonably un-
able to pay what he agreed or to justify 
the wiping out of a $12,000-per-year-ali-
mony award, and we are unimpressed with 
such a generalized, unspecific finding in 
this case. 
12. That Mrs. F's income is sub-
stantially higher than at the time of di-
vorce. 
The Finding does not state how much 
higher, and represents conjecture, since 
there is no fact stated in comparison as 
2. Cody v. Cody, 47 Utah 456, 154 P. 952 
(1916) ; Allen v. Allen, 25 Utah 2d 87, 
475 P.2d 1021 (1970) ; Short v. Short, 
25 Utah 2d 326, 481 P.2d 54 (1971). 
See also 18 A.L.R.2d 10, 21 (1951) where 
it is observed that "Where the alleged 
change in circumstances of the parties is 
one that the trial court expected and 
to what Mrs. F's income was at the time 
of divorce, because there was no evidence 
before the decree or thereafter as to her 
part-time income. 
14. That substantial changes in the 
circumstances have occurred since the 
decree. 
This kind oi Finding is fraught with 
meaninglessness without - y recitation as 
to v hat the substantial changes were, and 
lends nothing to a ; ^stification for the 
elimination of an annual $12,000 alimony 
award. 
[9,10] We think th- written Findings 
in this case are so fr xgmentary and un-
specific as not to justify the drastic elim-
ination of an annual $12,000 award, ex-
cept for a dollar, and we so hold. In do-
ing so, we affirm our previous pronounce-
ments that a divorce decree containing 
awards for support based on either ex-
pressed or assumed facts contemplated by 
the parties or the court or both, should 
not be modified when the contemplated 
facts are obvious or agreed to by the par-
ties and in turn incorporated in the de-
cree, in which event the continuous juris-
diction of the court to modify should not 
be used to thwart the expressed or obvi-
ous intentions of the parties and/or the 
court,—unless such contemplated facts lead 
to manifest injustice or unconscionable in-
equity.2 The Findings of the instant case, 
in our opinion, do not reflect such inequi-
ty justifying the drastic modification in-
dulged, but do represent some change in 
circumstances that, with 3ther changes, if 
shown, might in the aggregate °quire the 
application of the rule that the court in a 
proper case is not bound by an agreement, 
that might warrant some lesser or to-
tal modification. Therefore we are con-
strained to remand this case for a new 
probably made allowances for when en-
tering the original decree, the CL<*»nge is 
not a ground for modification of the de-
cree." See also concurring opinion of 
two of the Justices in MacDonald v. Mac-
Donald, 120 Utah 573, 236 P.2d 1066 
(1951). 
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trial with instructions to entertain evidence 
of facts occurring after, not before, the 
decree was entered, and in accordance 
with the observations stated herein,—and 
we so hold. (Emphasis added.) 
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT, 
ELLETT and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
tion of employee and removed any founda-
tion upon which to impute negligence to 
employer, whose liability was derivative 
and secondary,; and plaintiff was not enti-
tled to maintain action against employer. 
Remanded to grant defendant's motion 
for summary judgment. 
Ellett, J., dissented and filed opinion 
in which Tuckett, J., concurred. 
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Hal E. HOLMSTEAD, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
ABBOTT G. M. DIESEL, INC., Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 12257. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 25, 1972. 
Action against corporation alleging 
that its employee, while operating motor 
vehicle within scope of his employment, 
negligently collided with plaintiff's vehicle, 
causing plaintiff injuries and property loss, 
wherein defendant moved for summary 
judgment on ground that plaintiff's cove-
nant not to sue employee operated as mat-
ter of law to release defendant from liabil-
ity and, prior to hearing on motion, plain-
tiff filed action against employee and his 
carrier for reformation of covenant not to 
sue. The Fourth District Court, Utah 
County, Joseph E. Nelson, J., granted de-
cree of reformation, denied defendant's 
motion for summary judgment and granted 
defendant's petition for intermediate ap-
peal. The Supreme Court, Callister, C. J., 
held that where covenant not to sue speci-
fied that injured plaintiff understood that 
agreement was to terminate further contro-
versy respecting all claims for damages 
which plaintiff had asserted or that he or 
his personal representatives might thereaf-
ter assert against negligent employee, the 
covenant constituted a complete exonera-
493 P.2d—40 
1. Master and Servant <§=>300 
A master's liability for acts of his 
servant is under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior. 
2. Master and Servant <§^333 
Under doctrine of respondeat superior, 
liability of master to third person for inju-
ries inflicted by servant in course of his 
employment and within scope of his au-
thority is derivative and secondary, while 
that of servant is primary, and, in absence 
of any delict of master other than through 
the servant, exoneration of servant re-
moves foundation upon which to impute 
negligence to the master. 
3. Contribution <§=>5 
While master may be jointly sued with 
servant for a servant's tort committed 
within scope of his authority or employ-
ment, they are not joint tort-feasors in 
sense that they are equal wrongdoers with-
out right of contribution. 
4. Indemnity <3=>I3(I) 
Subrogation <§=?! I 
If master is required to respond to 
third person in damages by reason of his 
liability under doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior, he will be subrogated to rights of in-
jured third party and may recover over 
from his servant who is primarily liable. 
5. Release <3=>37 
Where covenant not to sue specified 
that injured plaintiff understood that 
agreement was to terminate further contro-
versy respecting all claims for damages 
which plaintiff had asserted, or that he or 
his personal representatives might thereaf-
ter assert, against negligent employee, the 
ALLEN v. 
Cite as 475 
to interrogatories pursuant to Rule 33, 
U.R.GP. 
However, under the pleadings and affi-
davits filed in this case, I am convinced 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover, 
and so I concur in reversing the uial court. 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM> 
23 Utah 2d 87 
Ruth Cafn ALLEN, Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Arthur A. ALLEN, Jr., Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 11918. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Aug. 17, 1970. 
, ALLEN Utah 1 0 2 1 
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tioning for modification of alimony and 
support provisions of divorce decree. 
2. Divorce €=»245(2) 
Where decree of divorce contemplated 
that wife would secure employment and 
contribute to her own support, and that 
former residence of parties would be sold 
and proceeds divided, and no provision was 
-nade in decree of divorce for two adult 
jaughters of parties who were residing with 
wife and attending college at time of di-
vorce, facts that wife subsequently found 
employment, that former residence was sold 
and proceeds divided, and that one of 
daughters had married and left home and 
other had secured gainful employment did 
not constitute a substantial change of ma-
terial circumstances warranting modifica-
tion of alimony provisions of divorce de-
cree. 
Proceeding by ex-husband to modify 
alimony provisions of divorce decree. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
Emmett L. Brown, J., denied petition, and 
ex-husband appealed. The Supreme Court, 
Ruggeri, District Judge, held that where 
decree of divorce contemplated that wife 
would secure employment and contribute 
to her own support, and that former resi-
dence of parties would be sold and proceeds 
divided, and no provision was made in de-
cree of divorce for two adult daughters of 
parties who were residing with wife and 
attending college at time of divorce, facts 
that wife subsequently found employment, 
that former residence was sold and proceeds 
divided, and that one of daughters had 
married and left home and other had se-
cured gainful employment did not consti-
tute a substantial change of material cir-
cumstances warranting modification of ali-
mony provisions of divorce decree. 
Affirmed. 
Callister and Henriod, JJ., did not par-
ticipate. 
I. Divorce <S=>245(3) 
Burden of showing a substantial 
change of circumstances is upon party peti-
Harold G. Christensen, of Worsley, Snow 
& Christensen, Salt Lake City, for defend-
ant and appellant. 
James W. Beless, Jr., Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
RUGGERI, District Judge: 
Appeal from a judgment denying defend-
ant's petition to modify a divorce decree. 
On October 10, 1968, the plaintiff was 
granted a decree of divorce from the de-
fendant, and was awarded the custody of a 
minor child; $100 per month for the child's 
support; and alimony of $200 per month. 
The plaintiff, at the date of the granting 
of the divorce, was not employed, but con-
templated securing employment within six 
months to assist her in adequately maintain-
ing a home for herself and minor child. 
As of the date of the divorce decree, two 
additional daughters of the parties, not 
minors, were college students and residing 
with the plaintiff. While the divorce hear-
ing was conducted as a default matter, the 
defendant was nevertheless present, and, in 
effect, stipulated to the terms of settlement 
as decreed by the court. Shortly following 
the divorce hearing the plaintiff found em-
EXHIBIT M 
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ployment, and at the time the petition for 
modification of the decree was heard her 
net monthly earnings were approximately 
$210. 
The defendant's petition for modification 
is predicated upon a substantial change in 
the material circumstances of either one or 
bof i oi the parties since the entry of the 
decree of divorce, "ie bases his contention 
on several facts, one of which is that the 
plaintiff has permanent employment, and 
he seeks a discontinuance of the alimony 
allowance of .200 per month. However, 
the decree of d'vorce, when granted, con-
templated that the plaintiff would secure 
employment an ^ contribute to her own sup-
port. The dt**-ndant further contends that 
since the former residence of the parties 
was sold, and the proceeds divided, this 
fact constitutes a material change in the 
plaintiff's financial circumstances. How-
ever, here again, there is a development 
that was contemplated at the time of the 
trial court's decree. Clearly, no provision 
was made in the decree of divorce for the 
two adult daughters of the parties who were 
residing with their mother and attending 
college at the time of the divorce, and the 
fact that one has married and left plain-
t i f fs home, and that the other has secured 
gainful employment, has no relevance to the 
alleged change of plaintiff's circumstances 
as related to the provisions of the divorce 
decree for alimony and support money. Ad-
mittedly, there has been no material change 
in the income or circumstances of the de-
fendant since the granting of the divorce 
decree. 
[1,2] Subjecting the defendant's appli-
cation for modification to thorough scruti-
ny, as did the trial court, and bearing in 
mind that the burden of showing a substan-
tial change of circumstances is upon the de-
fendant,1 the facts in the instant case fail 
to support the intervention of this court, 
and the'trial court's judgment is affirmed 
with costs to the plaintiff. 
CROCKETT, C. J., E L L E T T and 
TUCKETT, JJ., and J O S E P H E. NEL-
SON, District Judge, concur. 
CALLISTER and HENRIOD, JJ., hav-
ing disqualified themselves, do not partici-
pate herein. 
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Stewart B. MACKEY, a single man, Paul H. 
Sherritt and Joy D. Sherritt, his wife, 
Ernest E. Gurr and Gwendolyn Gurr, his 
wife, Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 11916. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Oct. 27, 1970. 
Appeal by landowners from a judgment 
of the Fourth District Court, Summit Coun-
ty, Maurice Harding, J., in condemnation 
proceeding. The Supreme Court, Ellett, 
J., held that evidence supported $4,990 
award to landowners. 
Affirmed. 
Eminent Domain <£=I49 
Evidence, m condemnation proceeding, 
supported $4,990 award to landowners. 
Vernon B. Romney, Atty. Gen., Carl J. 
Nemelka, Special Asst. Atty. Gen., Salt 
Lake City, for defendants-appellants. 
I. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 20 Utah 2d 360, 438 P.2d 180. 
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Phil Hansen and Associates, Salt Lake 
City, for defendant and appellant. 
Ronald C. Barker, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiif and respondent. 
TUCKETT, Justice: 
The plaintiff filed her action at law in 
the court below seeking to recover dam-
ages for a claimed battery committed upon 
her by th defendant. At a subsequent time 
the plaintiff filed an amended complaint in 
whica she added various other claims 
sounding in both tort and contract. After 
the fii-ng of ihese proceedings the plain-
tiff pr >cured the issuance of an order re-
strain? ug the defendant from committing 
other acts of violence or in any way molest-
ing her. The propriety of issuing the order 
in the first instance would seem doubtful 
inasmuch as the plaintiff's action for dam-
ages would appear to be an adequate reme-
dy, and if not she had available a statutory 
proceedings pursuant to the provisions of 
Title 77y Chap. 4. However that matter is 
not before us inasmuch as the defendant 
consented that an order be issued by the 
court restraining him from molesting or in-
terfering with the plaintiff. 
The plaintiff filed her affidavit alleging 
that the defendant had violated the court's 
injunction and an order to show cause was 
issued by the court ordering the defendant 
to appear on a day certain to answer for the 
alleged violation. At the conclusion of the 
hearing the court orally found the defend-
ant in contempt of court and sentenced him 
to serve 15 days in the county jail with 10 
days suspended on condition that the de-
fendant pay to the plaintiff $100.00 attor-
ney's fee. The court did not make and 
enter written findings of fact and judg-
ment. The defendant has appealed to this 
court claiming that the pronounced sentence 
of the court was erroneous under the prior 
decisions of this court requiring the entry of 
written findings of fact and a judgment.1 
The plaintiff here contends that the court 
not having made findings of fact and not 
having entered a judgment thereon there is 
no final judgment from which an appeal 
might be taken pursuant to Rule 72(a), 
U.R.C.P. 
It appears that the appeal taken by the 
defendant was not from a final judgment 
as required by the rule above mentioned, 
and the appeal therefore must be dismissed 
and it is so ordered. No costs awarded. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and ELLETT, 
HENRIOD and CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
KEY MUNICH STSTW s> 
25 Utah 2d 326 
Wanda Martha SHORT, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Ralph Arlind SHORT, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 12225. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Feb. 19, 1971. 
Proceeding by divorced husband seek-
ing modification of alimony award. The 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Emmett 
L. Brown, J., dismissed petition, and hus-
band appealed. The Supreme Court, Hen-
riod, J., held that refusal to vacate alimony 
award of $75 per month to divorced wife, 
who was unemployed at time of award, who 
had been employed prior thereto, and who 
obtained employment thereafter, without 
consideration of parties' present circum-
stances in relation to circumstances at time 
of decree was not abuse of discretion. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
Ellett, J., concurred in result. 
Divorce C=>246 
Refusal to vacate alimony award of 
$75 per month to divorced wife, who was 
unemployed at time of award, who had 
I. Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 118, 378 P.2d 519. 
-AHIB/T N 
SHORT 
Cite as • 
een employed prior thereto, and who ob-
ained employment thereafter, without con-
ideration of parties' present circumstances 
n relation to circumstances at time of de-
r e e was not abuse of discretion. 
Joseph P. McCarthy, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant-appellant. 
Oscar W. McConkie, Jr., of Kirton & 
McConkie, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff-
respondent. 
HENRIOD, Justice: 
Appeal from a judgment of dismissal of 
a petition for modification of an alimony 
award downward. Affirmed with costs 
on appeal to Mrs. Short, with a remand 
that the question of attorney's fees, if any, 
be resolved by the trial court where cer-
tain aspects of this case still are pending. 
The parties were married in 1947 and 
have two children. A divorce complaint 
was filed in 1961 and found repose, for 
some undisclosed reason, in the court's 
archives till 1966 when it became restless 
and was amended, resulting in a divorce in 
January 1967, in which Mrs. Short, unem-
ployed at the time, was awarded $75 per 
month alimony and a like amount for sup-
port of the children. Mrs. S., who had 
been employed in the past, obtained em-
ployment thereafter, after which Mr. S. 
filed a petition to eliminate the alimony, 
on the ground of changed circumstances, 
and was denied relief. It appears obvious 
to us that the award in the decree was con-
sistent with and based upon the assump-
tion that Mrs. S. again would be able to 
obtain employment,—otherwise the trial 
court's socioeconomic philosophy would 
have been superficially inane. Less than 
a year later Mr. S. petitioned again to 
eliminate the alimony and again was re-
\ SHORT Utah 5 5 
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buffed, as he was again in July 1970, by 
dismissal thereof, subject of this appeal. 
There is but one point on appeal: That 
the court erred in failing to compare the 
parties' present circumstances in relation to 
those at the time of the decree. 
By and large in the ordinary divorce case 
the appellant's contention would be meri-
torious and the cases decided by this court 
sustain his contention. The difficulty here 
is that in exercising the latitude of discre-
tion accorded to and recognized in the trial 
court in these domestic relations matters 
the appellant's contention is not immal-
leafre, but must yield to reason and the 
equities attendant in each particular case. 
In the instant case, we must and do as-
sume that the court did not intend that the 
$75 alimony award would be eliminated if 
Mrs. S. obtained a job paying $75 per 
month,—or even $175 per month,—or even 
$389 per month, the income of Mrs. S. at 
her job at time of the third petition to 
eliminate the alimony. We think the facts 
in this case themselves reflect no abuse of 
discretion on the part of the trial court in 
refusing to vacate the $75 alimony award, 
and we base our conclusion here, not nec-
essarily on any authority to the effect that 
the court views the facts in relation to the 
last petition for modification,1 but because 
the denial was not capricious when viewed 
in the light of circumstances existing at 
the time of the decree,—the $75 award 
implemented by a necessary and inescapable 
assumption by the court that Mrs. S. could 
not survive under any conceivable hypoth-
esis on $75 per month, and there is noth-
ing in the record to indicate she had any 
other means of livelihood. 
CALLISTER, C. J., and TUCKETT and 
CROCKETT, JJ., concur. 
ELLETT, ].y concurs in the result 
1. 18 A.L.R.2d IS. 
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Sharon Mae DAVIS, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Charles Francis DAVIS, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 18077. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Sept. 22, 1982. 
Husband appealed from a decree of 
divorce entered by the Third District Court, 
Salt Lake County, G. Hal Taylor, J., chal-
lenging the property division. The Su-
preme Court, Howe, J., held that: (1) finan-
cial arrangement on marital home, award-
ing husband one half of equity in property 
at time of trial plus one half of any increase 
accruing in future due to inflation but fail-
ing to provide husband any interest in in-
creased equity in house which would result 
by virtue of his paying aftmony designed to 
cover amount of second mortgage payment, 
was inequitable, and (2) award of one third 
of out-of-state property, acquired by hus-
band prior to marriage but paid for, in part, 
from joint account during marriage, to wife 
and two-thirds to husband was within am-
bit of trial court's discretion. 
Remanded. 
1. Divorce ®=* 252.5(1) 
Divorce decree's financial arrangement 
on marital home, which awarded husband 
one half of equity in property at time of 
trial plus one half of any increase accruing 
in future due to inflation but failed to 
provide him any interest in increased equity 
in house which would result by virtue of his 
paying alimony designed to cover amount 
of second mortgage payment, was inequita-
ble where, when amount of life insurance 
premiums and interest on second mortgage 
balance were added to mortgage balance, 
husband would be required to make postde-
cree payments totalling amount nearly dou-
ble equity awarded him, all proceeds of 
second mortgage loan went into improve-
•:.XH!Bil 
ment of house, and husband had no right to 
possession. 
2. Divorce &=> 252.3(3) 
Divorce award of one third of out-of-
state property, acquired by husband prior to 
marriage but paid for, in part, from joint 
account during marriage, to wife and two-
thirds to husband was within ambit of trial 
court's discretion, notwithstanding that 
three fourths of purchase price was paid 
prior to marriage. 
Henry S. Nygaard, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Paul H. Liapis, Salt Lake City, for plain-
tiff and respondent. 
HOWE, Justice: 
This is an appeal by the defendant 
Charles Francis Davis from a decree of 
divorce entered in an action brought 
against him by his wife, Sharon Mae Davis, 
plaintiff. He challenges the division of 
property made by the trial court. 
The parties were married on March 5, 
1974. Both had been previously married. 
"Plaintiff gave up a $150 per month alimony 
award from her previous divorce when she 
married the defendant. The plaintiff had 
three children by her first marriage and 
she, the children and the defendant lived 
together in a house which she owned at the 
time of her marriage to the defendant. 
The plaintiff was employed during the last 
two years of the marriage and at the time 
of trial was earning $687 net per month. 
She also received child support from her 
former husband. 
No children were born to the parties. 
During the six years they lived together 
they expended substantial amounts of mon-
ey to improve the house. The defendant 
paid the plaintiff's former husband $1,300 
to satisfy a lien he held on the property. 
Although the plaintiff disputed it, he 
claimed that he further invested in it mon-
ey which he had received as an inheritance 
from his mother's estate, as well as money 
he received from a personal injury settle-
o 
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ment. There is no dispute that shortly be-
fore the separation of the parties they 
obtained a second mortgage loan to remodel 
part of the house and to make an addition 
of 450 square feet. The balance on that 
mortgage at the time of trial was $15,-
876.27. The monthly payments were $345. 
Prior to their marriage, the defendant in 
1967 purchased under contract four one-half 
acre lots in New Mexico for $6,200. Three-
fourths of that price was paid prior to the 
marriage in 1974 and the balance of the 
contract was paid from their joint account 
during the marriage. 
The trial court apparently concluded 
from the evidence that the equity of the 
parties in the house had increased $23,000 
during the marriage. It awarded the de-
fendant one-half of that equity ($11,500) 
plus one-half of any increase which may 
accrue in the future due to inflation and 
made that award payable when the plain-
tiff remarried, sold the property or her 
youngest child attained the age of 18 years. 
The court further ordered the defendant to 
pay to the plaintiff $420 per month alimony 
until such time as the second mortgage had 
been paid in full, and ordered that he main-
tain sufficient insurance on his life to in-
sure payment of the mortgage balance in 
the event of his death. An order was made 
that the parties sell the New Mexico lots 
and divide the proceeds between them as 
follows: One-third to plaintiff and two-
thirds to defendant. 
The defendant's main contention is that 
it was inequitable for the trial court to deny 
him any interest in the increased equity in 
the house which will result by virtue of his 
paying alimony designed to cover the 
amount of the second mortgage payment. 
Defendant refers us to the Conclusions of 
Law in which the trial judge took the 
monthly payment on the second mortgage 
of $345 and added to it $75 for the general 
support of the plaintiff, and then ordered 
the defendant to pay a total of $420 each 
month to her, terming it alimony. 
[1] We agree that this financial ar-
rangement on the house was inequitable. 
The trial court properly awarded the de-
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fendant one-half of the equity in the prop-
erty at the time of trial plus one-half of any 
increase accruing in the future due to infla-
tion. It wisely provided that such "equity 
should not be payable to the defendant un-
til plaintiff should remarry, sell the proper-
ty, or until her youngest child attained the 
age of 18 years. Thi" provision assured the 
plaintiff and her children a place t^ live. 
But after having done that, the tria court 
upset the equity of that division by requir-
ing the defendant to make a further sub-
stantial investment in the property without 
any corresponding benefit to hiiu. When 
the amount of the life insurance j -emiums 
and the interest on the second mortgage 
balance are added to the mortgage balance, 
the defendant will be required ic make post 
decree payments totalling an amount nearly 
double the equity awarded to him. This 
was unfair to him and weighted the division 
of the property heavily in the plaintiffs 
favor. Fairness dictates that he should re-
alize something out of the increased equity 
which will result from his providing the 
funds to retire the second mortgage. The 
unfairness is evident when it is considered 
that all the proceeds of the second mort-
gage loan went into the improvement of the 
house. Also, he has no right to possession. 
It should also be noted that he was ordered 
to pay approximately $9,000 of debts and 
$1,000 attorney's fees for his wife. The 
decree should be amended to allow the de-
fendant's participation to the extent of one-
half in the increased equity brought about 
by the reduction of or retirement of the 
second mortgage. 
[2] We find no error in the division of 
the New Mexico property. Althougn it was 
contracted for and partially paid lor prior 
to the marriage, a substantial number of 
the monthly payments were made after the 
marriage. We find it to be within the 
ambit of discretion of the trial court to 
award the plaintiff one-third of that prop-
erty and two-thirds to the defendant. 
Remanded to the trial court to amend the 
decree in conformance with this opinion. 
Each party to bear his or her own costs. 
HALL, C.J., and STEWART, OAKS and 
DURHAM, JJ., concur. 
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to be compensated, under the evidence 
for pain and suffering and a loss of 22% 
days wages, irrespective of prospective 
damages, which the jury and trial court 
evidently doubted. Obviously, the jury 
failed to consider these items of damage. 
The verdict was defective in form in that 
it did not comprehend all the items of 
damages contained in the instructions 
given by the court, it was therefore insuf-
ficient. 
* * * * * * 
If counsel be permitted to remain mute 
when a verdict is insufficient or informal, 
he gains an unfair strategic advantage 
[and since] there must be reasonable rules 
to control the termination of litigation, if 
counsel has an opportunity to correct er-
ror at the time of its occurrence and he 
fails to do so, any objection based there-
upon is waived.18 
[8] In the present case the plaintiff 
alleges the verdict is insufficient as to dam-
ages suffered as a result of the delivery of 
the Warranty Deed. The plaintiff was un-
der a responsibility to object to this patent 
insufficiency at the time the verdict was 
rendered. Since the plaintiff did not avail 
himself of the opportunity to object to the 
verdict before the jury was dismissed, any 
later objection to its insufficiency is 
waived.19 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, HALL 
and STEWART, JJ., concur. 
O I KEY NUMBER SYSTEM 
18. Id, 491 P2d at 1214 
19. The plaintiff could realize definite advantage 
in the present case because of the complexity 
of the factual issues involved, the duration of 
the trial and the vast volume of evidence 
presented The instructions given to the jury 
by the court apprised them of the applicable 
law governing the recovery of damages in this 
action In those instructions the jury was told 
that in determining the liability of the defend-
ant Sather the jury was to consider the possi-
Sheila Penrose Larsen LAND, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
William Dennis LAND, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 16238. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Jan. 22, 1980. 
On cross motions to modify a divorce 
decree, the Third District Court, Salt Lake 
County, Christine M. Durham, J., entered 
an order for appraisal of certain real prop-
erty and for conveyance by the husband to 
the wife. The husband appealed, and the 
Supreme Court, Hall, J., held that the trial 
court acted within its discretion in applying 
the commonly accepted definition of the 
term "equity" in interpreting a written 
stipulation of the parties which was incor-
porated into the divorce decree. 
Affirmed. 
Maughan, J., concurred in the result. 
1. Divorce <s=> 252.2 
In dividing property between divorcing 
spouses, trial court is governed by general 
principles of equity. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
2. Divorce <s=*164 
Court which issues divorce decree re= 
tains continuing jurisdiction over the par-
ties and may modify the decree due to a 
change in circumstances, equitable consider-
ations governing. 
bihty of mitigation of damages by Ute-Cal's 
tender of the monies expended by Sather as 
guarantor of the loan They were also instruct-
ed on the restrictions to awarding speculative 
damages and the plaintiff admitted the exact 
amount received as rents could not be calculat-
ed The plaintiff had ample opportunity to 
present evidence concerning the damages suf-
fered during the trial and no injustice is ren-
dered by denying the plaintiff an opportunity to 
"try again" with a new jury 
v 
3. Divorce <s=> 249.2 
When a divorce decree is based on a 
property settlement agreement devised by 
the parties and sanctioned by the court, 
equity must take the agreement into con-
sideration. 
4. Equity <s=»23 
Equity is not available to reinstate 
rights and privileges voluntarily contracted 
away simply because one has come to regret 
the bargain made. 
5. Divorce <*=> 249.2, 254(2) 
The trial court has discretion to adopt 
or reject an agreement between divorcing 
parties as part of the original decree or a 
modification thereof, as equity may dictate. 
6. Husband and Wife *=> 279(2) 
The law limits the continuing jurisdic-
tion of a divorce court where a property 
settlement has been incorporated into the 
decree and the outright abrogation of such 
an agreement may be resorted to only for 
compelling reasons. 
7. Husband and Wife <s=> 279(1) 
Where parties to written stipulation 
that was specifically adopted in divorce de-
cree used the term "equity" without equivo-
cation or elaboration and, seemingly, in its 
usual and ordinary context, it was appropri-
ate for the court to interpret the term in 
accordance with common usage. 
8. Contracts <s=> 147(2) 
Where possible, the underlying intent 
of a contract is to be gleaned from the 
language of the instrument itself. 
9. Contracts «=>169 
It is only when contractual language is 
uncertain or ambiguous that extrinsic evi-
dence need be resorted to. 
10. Contracts <*=> 143(2) 
Mere fact that parties urge diverse def-
initions of contract terminology is not suffi-
cient to render the terminology ambiguous. 
11. Husband and Wife <•=» 279(1) 
Trial court acted well within its discre-
tion in applying the commonly accepted 
definition of the term "equity" to interpret 
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written stipulation, incorporated into di-
vorce decree, wherein parties agreed that 
wife would receive as sole property a 50 
percent interest in the "present equity" of 
certain real property and that the husband 
would receive as sole property a 50 percent 
interest in that "equity." 
Paul N. Cotro Manes, Salt Lake City, for 
defendant and appellant. 
Neils E. Mortenson, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
HALL, Justice: 
Defendant appeals, challenging the dis-
trict court's interpretation of the term "eq-
uity" as it appears in the stipulation and 
property settlement agreement of the par-
ties. 
Plaintiff obtained a decree of divorce 
from defendant on November 19, 1974. 
Said decree specifically adopted the provi-
sions of the written stipulation in question, 
and, where pertinent to this appeal, the 
stipulation provided: 
7. The parties agree that the business 
known as the Eat'n House located at Salt 
Lake City, Utah, shall be awarded entire-
ly to Defendant with Defendant having 
full ownership of all assets and full re-
sponsibility for all debts arising there-
from. 
8. The Defendant agrees to assume as 
his sole obligation all debts and obliga-
tions incurred by the parties up to the 
29th day of October 1974 except those 
specifically mentioned herein and agrees 
to defend and hold the Plaintiff harmless 
therefrom. 
9. The parties agree that the Plaintiff 
shall receive as her sole property a 50 
percent interest in the present equity of 
the home and real property located at 
5171 South 2870 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah and the Defendant shall receive as 
his sole property a 50 percent interest in 
that equity. The value of the equity 
shall be determined not later than Janu-
ary 1, 1975 by at least two independent 
appraisers selected by the parties for that 
605 P2d—27 
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purpose. Should the appraisals fail to 
agree, the two appraisers shall select a 
third appraiser^ and an average value 
shall be determined. The percentage in-
terests shall be paid to the parties at the 
time of receipt of funds on any sale of 
the property, or shall be paid by the 
Plaintiff within two years following the 
date of majority or emancipation of the 
youngest surviving child of the parties. 
The 50 percent interest awarded to the 
Defendant shall bear interest at 3 percent 
per annum from January 1, 1975 until 
paid. Any increase in equity in the home 
and real property after the fixing of the 
interests described herein shall accrue to 
the benefit of the Plaintiff and Defend-
ant shall have no rights over any such 
increase. 
* * * * * * 
11. The Plaintiff specifically agrees to 
assume as her sole obligation the first 
mortgage on the home and to make the 
required payments on that mortgage. 
The Defendant specifically agrees to as-
sume as. his sole obligation the second 
mortgage on the home and to make the 
required payments until this mortgage is 
paid in full. 
The debts and obligations recited in the 
stipulation (in addition to the two mortgag-
es), were mostly associated with defend-
ant's business establishment, the Eat'n 
House. Certain of said debts (totalling 
some $27,000), had been reduced to judg-
ment and hence constituted liens on the real 
property at that time. 
This matter came before the district 
court on cross-motions to modify the decree 
of divorce for various reasons not pertinent 
here. In addition, plaintiffs motion sought 
to compel defendant to quit-claim to her all 
of his interest in the subject real property. 
Plaintiff asserted that defendant had no 
1. Despite the provisions of paragraph 9 of the 
stipulation, no appraisal of the property was 
undertaken. However, the undisputed affidavit 
of plaintiff estimated the value of the property 
at the time of the divorce to be $52,000. Inas-
much as the liens on the property totalled $27,-
000 and the two mortgages totalled $25,000, 
the remaining equity would be nominal at best, 
actual interest in the property by reason of 
the fact that no equity existed therein. 
This was so, explained plaintiff, because the 
total of the mortgages and the ether liens 
exceeded the value of thr property at the 
time of the stipulation and decree of di-
vorce.1 
The court below ordered that appraisal be 
made as of January 1, 1975, and tha< de-
fendant convey to plairtiff (upon payment 
to him of the value, if any, of the interest 
granted him by the stipulation), al interest 
in the property. This interest wa^ to be 
measured by calculating the "equity in the 
property as the market value as of January 
1. 1975, less any liens, mortgage obliga-
tions or other encumbrances as Ox that date. 
It is only from that order that defendant 
appeals. 
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is 
that the court below failed "to do equity" in 
interpreting the stipulation. However, he 
concedes that the record is silent "as to just 
what was meant by the parties for the 
calculation of the equity in the real proper-
ty." He simply asserts that the trial court 
should have calculated the equity as the 
appraised value, less the amount of the first 
and second mortgages only. 
[1-6] Defendant's contention that the 
court must look behind his stipulation in 
order to do equity is without merit. True it 
is that, in making a division of property by 
a decree of divorce a trial court is governed 
by general principles of equity.2 It is like-
wise true that the court retains conf'nuing 
jurisdiction over the parties and mf modi-
fy the decree due to a change in circum-
stances, equitable considerations igain to 
govern.3 It must, however, be added that, 
when a decree is based upon a property 
settlement agreement, forged by the parties 
and sanctioned by the court, equity must 
assuming the accuracy of the trial court's inter-
pretation (discussed infra). 
2. U.C.A., 1953, 30-3-5. 
3. Id. See also, Carson v. Carson, 87 Utah 1, 47 
P.2d 894 (1935). 
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take such agreement into consideration.4 other liens.10 
Equity is not available to reinstate rights 
and privileges voluntarily contracted away 
simply because one has come to regret the 
bargain made.5 Accordingly, the law limits 
the continuing jurisdiction of the court 
where a property settlement agreement has 
been incorporated into the decree,6 and the 
outright abrogation of the provisions of 
such an agreement is only to be resorted to 
with great reluctance and for compelling 
Utah 1251 
The courts have generally 
followed the foregoing definitions of the 
term.11 
reasons.' 
[7] The parties chose to use the term 
"equity" without equivocation or elabora-
tion, and, seemingly, in its usual and ordi-
nary context. Consequently, we deem it 
appropriate for the trial court to have 
placed a common usage meaning upon the 
term and that is precisely what it did. By 
interpreting the term "equity" as it did, the 
court made an effort, not to supplant the 
original agreement, but simply to construe 
it in the manner as contemplated by the 
parties at the time it was drafted. 
The term "equity" is described as the 
money value of a property or of an interest 
in property in excess of claims or liens 
against it.8 It is the amount of value of a 
property above the total liens or charges.9 
It is the value in excess of mortgage or 
4. 47 Am.Jur.2d Judgments, Sec. 1082; Niemi-
nen v. Pitzer, 281 Or. 53, 573 P.2d 1227 (1978). 
[8-10] Where possible, the underlying 
intent of a contract is to be gleaned from 
the language of the instrument itself; only 
where the language is uncertain or ambigu-
ous need extrinsic evidence be resorted to.12 
No such ambiguity is present in this case, 
nor was it asserted. Also, the mere fact 
that the parties urge diverse definitions of 
contract terminology does not, per se, ren-
der it ambiguous.13 
[11] The trial court acted well within its 
discretion in applying the commonly accept-
ed definition of the term "equity" as used 
in the context of the stipulation14 and its 
judgment is therefore affirmed. No costs 
awarded. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
( O t KEYNUMBERSYS7EM> 
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8. Webster's Third New International Diction-
ary, Unabridged, 1961. 
5. Defendant concedes that he would normally 
be bound by his stipulation but cites the case of 
Klein v. Klein, Utah, 544 P.2d 472 (1975) as 
supportive of his position. Such reliance is 
misplaced. That decision dealt with a situation 
wherein an original decree of divorce, not itself 
the product of any agreement, was modified by 
the trial court according to the terms of an 
alleged stipulation which the appellant denied 
making. The trial court has discretion to adopt 
or reject an agreement between the parties as 
part of the original decree (or a modification 
thereof), as equity might dictate. See Nelson 
on Divorce, (2d ed., 1945), § 13.45. 
6. Callister v. CaUister, 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P.2d 
944 (1953); see also Clark, The Law of Domes-
tic Relations, Sec. 16.13. 
7. See LeBreton v. LeBreton, Utah, 604 P.2d 469 
(1979). 
9. Black's Law Dictionary, 5th Ed., 1979. 
10. Funk & Wagnall's Standard Comprehensive 
International Dictionary, 1976. 
11. See e. g., Comstock v. Fiorella, 260 Cal. 
App.2d 262, 67 Cal.Rptr. 104 (1968); Pierson v. 
Bill, 138 Ha. 104, 189 So. 679 (1939); Des 
Moines Joint Stock Land Bank v. Allen, 220 
Iowa 448, 261 N.W. 912 (1935). 
12. Oberhansly v. Ear/e, Utah, 572 P.2d 1384 
(1977); Bennett v. Robinson's Medical Mart, 18 
Utah 2d 186, 417 P.2d 761 (1966). 
13. Camp v. Deseret Mutual Benefit Ass'n, 
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14. Pugh v. Stockdale, Utah, 570 P.2d 1027 
(1977); Commercial Bldg. Corp. v. Blair, Utah, 
565 P.2d 776 (1977). 
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Dixie Roblek LeBRETON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
Thomas Edward LeBRETON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 15923e 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 20, 1979. 
Ex-husband appealed from an order of 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County, 
David K. Winder, J., which equally divided 
the equity in certain real property between 
the parties as of the date of their divorce. 
The Supreme Court, Wilkins, J., held that in 
view of 1969 divorce decree's ambiguity as 
to whether the equity of marital home 
should, in 1977, after wife had remarried 
and children had both reached the age of 
majority, be divided according to its present 
value or its value at the time of the divorce, 
a remand of the case would be ordered for 
an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of 
determining what is reasonable and neces-
sary to do now, pursuant to statute provid-
ing in relevant part that "The court shall 
have continuing jurisdiction to make such 
subsequent changes or new orders with re-
spect to * * * the distribution of the 
property as shall be reasonable and neces-
sary." 
Reversed and remanded. 
Hall, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
Divorce <s=>287 
In view of 1969 divorce decree's ambi-
guity as to whether the equity of marital 
home should, in 1977, after wife had remar-
ried and children had both reached the age 
of majority, be divided according to its 
present value or its value at the time of the 
divorce, a remand of the case would be 
ordered for an evidentiary hearing for the 
purpose of determining what is reasonable 
and necessary to do now, pursuant to stat-
ute providing in relevant part that "The 
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to 
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make such subsequent changes or new or-
ders with respect to * * * the distribu-
tion of the property as shall be reasonable 
and necessary." U.C.A.1953, 30-3-5. 
Don Blackham, Salt Lake City, for de-
fendant and appellant. 
Thorm P. Vuyk, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and respondent. 
WILKINS, Justice: 
Deiendant appeals from an order of the 
District Court which equally divided the 
equit;, in certain real property between 
plafritiff and defendant as of the date of 
their divorce. 
On April 28, 1969, plaintiff sued for di-
vorce. The parties entered into a stipula-
tion providing for the division of the sub-
ject property and the same was accepted 
and approved by the Court. The pertinent 
portion thereof reads as follows: 
With regard to the house, it will be sold 
upon her remarriage or when the home is 
no longer needed for the minor children, 
at which time the home will be sold and 
the equity as of the date of the divorce 
will be divided equally among the parties 
with the further stipulation that the 
Plaintiff shall have all of the principal 
payment made by her after the date of 
the divorce before the costs of sale and 
then the remaining equity will be divided 
equally. [Emphasis added.] 
In June of 1977, defendant filed an affi-
davit ir support of an order to show cause 
why Tie house should not be sold and the 
proceeds therefrom distributed according to 
the provisions of the decree. Plaintiff had 
remarried in the interim and the children 
had both reached the age of majority. A 
hearing was held on April 14, 1978. The 
District Court ordered that the equity of 
the home be divided "by sale or buy-out" 
according to its value at the time of the 
divorce nine years earlier. It is specifically 
from this order that defendant appeals. 
The single claim on appeal by defendant 
is that the District Court misconstrued the 
Q. 
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terms of the decree of divorce, and that 
properly read, the above-quoted language 
mandates a division of the equity as of the 
time oi the sale (after subtracting principal 
payments made by plaintiff after the origi-
nal divorce decree). The plaintiff argues 
contrarily, contending that the time of di-
vorce controls the date that this division 
shall occur. The difference such an inter-
pretatior .vould make in the portion of the 
proceeds going to defendant would be sub-
stantial, as the equity in the home has been 
enhanced markedly by the dramatic in-
crease in property values in the area during 
the past decade. 
The District Judge verbally stated at this 
hearing: 
Well, I have heard the statements of 
both of you that you would both testify, 
if you were to take the stand . . . 
to a different interpretation of this para-
graph. . . So, I think it would be 
a standoff as far as the testimony is 
concerned but I think that 
with that wording in there, "the equity as 
of the date of this divorce," I think that 
has got to tip the balance and I think 
that is what we are talking about. That 
is what I hold . . . it was the equi-
ty as of the date of the divorce. 
The District Court also stated in its Find-
ings and Conclusions in this hearing: 
The Court finds that though ambiguous 
the meaning of the decree is that the 
equity as of the date of the divorce would 
be the value to be divided among the 
parties. 
Additionally, the attorney for plaintiff, who 
prepared the Findings, Conclusions, and De-
cree in the original divorce action, noted 
initially in this opinion, conceded in the 
hearing in 1978 that there was an ambigui-
ty, and the attorney for defendant also—in 
essence—in this 1978 hearing acknowledged 
a basis for two interpretations. 
We agree that there is ambiguity, and 
conclude that we should remand for an evi-
dentiary hearing for the purpose of deter-
mining what is reasonable and necessary to 
do now, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 
1. Pursuant to the continuing junsdicti 
Section 30-3-5, 1953, as amended, which 
provides in relevant part: 
When a decree of divorce is made, the 
court may make such orders in relation to 
the children, property and parties, and 
the maintenance of the parties and chil-
dren, as may be equitable. The court 
shall have continuing jurisdiction to make 
such subsequent changes or new orders 
with respect to the support and mainte-
nance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support and mainte-
nance, or the distribution of the property 
as shall be reasonable and necessary. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Of course, we would ordinarily remand 
this matter to the District Court for the 
purpose of taking evidence of pertinent cir-
cumstances, including intent of the parties, 
at the time of the original divorce, but the 
record before us discloses that such a proce-
dure would be useless here as there was no 
meaningful evidence, even that was prof-
fered, at the 1978 hearing that would be 
probative. Hence, we remand, in this un-
usual case, for an evidentiary hearing under 
§ 30-3-5, where findings can be made on 
the basis of present circumstances. 
Reversed and remanded for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion. No 
costs awarded. 
CROCKETT, C. J., and MAUGHAN and 
STEWART, JJ., concur. 
HALL, Justice (dissenting): 
I respectfully dissent. 
My first concern is that the majority 
opinion would remand for an evidentiary 
hearing for the purpose of determining 
what is "reasonable and necessary" in light 
of the present circumstances of the parties.1 
Defendant sought no such relief below and 
does not urge it on this appeal. In any 
event, I do not deem him entitled to such 
relief because I view the narrow issue 
presented not as one in equity, but as one in 
contract. 
provisions of U.C.A., 1953, Sec. 30-3-5. 
LeBRETON v 
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It is fundamental, that in order for a 
court of equity to assume jurisdiction, there 
must be grounds for equitable relief 
presented.2 Also the •^•rit of a claim for 
equitable relief is dependent upon a show-
ing of ability to have prevented the prejudi-
cial situation in which the litigant finds 
himself.3 I* The instant case, ju^t the oppo-
site is true. Defendant chose to contract 
away certain of his rig! ^ in property and 
cannot now be heard to seek equity. 
I am constrained to note that if matters 
of this type are to uo viewed as within the 
continuing jurisdiction of the court, any 
litigant, once satisfied with a stipulated di-
vorce settlement, but becomes disenchanted 
therewith because o^  a change in market 
values, (up or down), need only appeal to 
the court to give him a second chance by 
way of reformation. Such is not the law of 
contracts and should not be the law of 
"equity" as it pertains to decrees of divorce 
which divide property based upon stipula-
tions. 
It is noteworthy that the majority cites 
no precedent for its holding and, indeed, 
there appears to be none. While this Court 
has not directly ruled upon the issue here 
under discussion, in the case of Callister v. 
Callister* the Court clearly recognized the 
sanctity of property settlements as distin-
guished from alimony settlements In do-
ing so, the California case of Hough v. 
Hough5 was cited and the following was 
excerpted therefrom: 
"This does not mean that payments 
under property settlement agreements 
may be modified even though incorporat-
ed in the decree. Tviey may not. (Citing 
cases.) But in such a situation there is 
not the same underlying policy. The set-
tlement of property rights should be final 
in order to secure stability of titles. Sup-
port allowances on the other hand should 
2. 27 AmJur 2d, Equity, Sec 19 
3. Id , Sec 1 
4. 1 Utah 2d 34, 261 P 2d 944 (1953) 
5. 26 Cal2d 605, 160 P2d 15 (1945) 
6. Although the trial judge referred (perhaps 
inadvertently) to the decree of divorce as "am-
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be subject to the discretion of the court 
as justice may require. It has 
been loosely stated generally in passing 
that the divorce court has no jurisdiction 
to modify a decree based upon a property 
settlement agreement. (Citing cases, in-
cluding Ettlinger v. Ettlinger, 3 Cal.2d 
172, 44 P.2d 540 supra.) However, that 
does not mean that the court does not 
have jurisdiction on an application for 
modification to decide correctly or incor-
rectly whether the decree is based upon a 
property settlement agreement, and is 
not subject to modification, or is based 
upon alimony or support allowance cove-
nants, and is subject to modification" 
[Emphasis added.] 
My next concern pertains to the confused 
interpretation the majority opinion places 
on the original divorce decree. At trial, the 
parties were in accord that the mortgage 
payments made by plaintiff from and after 
the date of the divorce were to be deducted 
from the house equity before it was to be 
divided. Hence, the sole issue presented 
was whether their agreement provided for 
a division of equity as of the date of the 
divorce or as of the date the property is 
sold. Consequently, the sole issue present-
ed by this appeal is whether or not the trial 
court's interpretation of the decree was 
proper. I deem it was.6 
The stipulation of the parties, as accepted 
by the court and incorporated in the decree 
of divorce, plainly, and without ambiguity, 
provides for a division of the equity in the 
house "as of the date of the divorce" and 
further provides "that the Plaintiff shall 
have all of the principal payment made by 
her after the date of the divorce before the 
costs of sale and then the remaining equity 
will be divided equally." [Emphasis added.] 
biguous," I am not of the opinion that any 
ambiguity exists therein In any event, even 
assuming there was ambiguity, the judge re-
solved it in favor of plaintiff on the basis of the 
evidence before him which included the proffer 
of proof made by each party and the matter 
should be left at rest 
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The stipulation formed a binding, legal 
contract, clear on its face, which should be 
interpreted as a matter of law, and in ac-
cordance with its terms.7 Basic mles of 
interpretation of a written document such 
as this require that it be read so that its 
own terms are consistent.8 The "remaining 
equity" necessarily refer" to the already 
established "equity at the time of the t3' • 
vorce" as clearly stated in the decree. Any 
other interpretation would distort the liter-
al language of the decree. 
Admittedly, the agreement reacht1 by 
the parties in settling their differences at 
the time their divorce was granted apt^ears 
to be weighted in favor of plaintiff stace it 
assures her the return of all mortg; ^e pay-
ments made after the date of the divorce 
plus one-half of the remaining equity as of 
the date of the divorce; yet it is not for the 
courts to question the wisdom of a contract 
made by the parties. On the other hand, 
we are not aware of what other matters 
were considered by the parties when they 
made their compromise. Defendant may 
very well have received other consideration 
which prompted his agreement such as con-
cession made in regard to alimony, support, 
or the division of other property. 
The stipulation of the parties is clear and 
unequivocal and should therefore not be 
subjected to reformation based upon hind-
sight as to what might appear to be more 
advantageous to one of the parties under 
present circumstances. 
I would affirm the judgment of the trial 
court. 
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7. Overson v. United States Fidelity and Guar-
anty, Utah, 587 P.2d 149 (1978) 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Robert Alex VALDEZ, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 15920. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Nov. 26, 1979. 
Defendant was convicted in the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay E. 
Banks, J., of negligent homicide. Defend-
ant appealed. The Supreme Court, Wilkins, 
J., held that because requested instructions 
as to justifiable homicide were inapplicable 
to the facts of the case, the court did not 
err in refusing to give them. 
Affirmed. 
1. Homicide $=>297 
In murder prosecution, absent any evi-
dence to show that decedent threatened 
anyone with imminent use of unlawful 
force or threatened death or serious bodily 
injury to defendant or any third person, 
defendant's requested instruction concern-
ing justification for use of force under such 
circumstances was inapplicable and was 
properly refused. 
2. Homicide $=>297 
In homicide prosecution, wherein it was 
shown that defendant threatened decedent 
with a loaded gun and then shot him, trial 
court properly refused requested instruction 
regarding justification for use of force oth-
er than deadly force. U.C.A.1953, 76-1-
601(10), 76-5-206. 
3. Criminal Law <&=> 1038.1(1) 
Absent some reason for exception to 
general rule, instructions not objected to at 
trial by defendant could not be objected to 
for first time on appeal, despite defendant's 
contention that inconsistent instructions 
were given to the jury. 
8. Hartman v. Potter, Utah, 596 P.2d 653 (1979). 
C. Gerald Parker 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
2610 Washington Boulevard 
P.O. Box 107 
Ogden, Utah 84402 
Telephone: 399-3303 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 




JOHN H. KERSCHNER, 
Defendant-Appellant, 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Supreme Court No. 20378 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 3rd day of July, 1985, 
I hand-delivered 15 copies of the Respondent's Brief to the 
Utah Supreme Court Clerk, and 4 copies to Jane Allen, Attorney 
for Defendant-Appellant, at #8 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, 
Utah, 
:. Gerald Parker 
